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ABSTRACT
How Racial Injustice Causes Ignorance
by
Eric Edmond Bayruns Garcia
Advisor: Linda Martín Alcoff
According to a (Jones and Saad) 2016 Gallup poll 69% of US whites and 32% of US blacks believe
that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market. Much ink has been spilt showing
that this belief is false (Alcoff 2015; Anderson 2010; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Fricker 2007;
McConahay 1983; Mills 1997; Mills 2007; Stanley 2015). But if its falsity is well publicized, then why
do so many people persist in believing this falsehood? In this dissertation, I argue that racial injustice
and whites’ current dominant-group status explains why such a high percentage of people in the US
hold this false belief.
The bulk of my dissertation argues that this falsehood persists for five reasons, all which are
due to racial injustice itself. Racial injustice can cause people to hold false beliefs because (1) racial
injustice makes news sources less coverage reliable on topics that challenge white’s dominant-group
status, (2) racial injustice makes black and Latino expression styles seem less credible, (3) racial injustice
makes facts about racial oppression less likely learned by all society members, (4) racial injustice
interacts with subjects’ cognitive architecture such that they are likely to hold false beliefs that are in
tension with knowledge they already have and (5) racial injustice interacts with capitalism to undermine
non-dominant racial groups’ hermeneutical or interpretative resources.
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Introduction
In 2014, New York City police officers murdered Eric Garner. According to a 2014 Pew Research
Center Poll, 90% of blacks thought that these officers should have been charged with murder (Doherty
et al. 2014). On the other hand, only 47% of whites thought that these officers should have been
charged with murder. This and other polls suggest that whites disproportionately believe that these
police officers are not guilty of murder even though widely-publicized-video evidence clearly shows
their guilt (Snyder et al. 2017).
According to a 2016 Gallup Poll, 69% of whites believe that black and white people have equal
opportunity in the US job market despite evidence to the contrary (Jones and Saad 2016). On the
other hand, 34% of blacks believe that white and black people have equal opportunity in the US job
market.
A basic aim that I have in this dissertation is to explain why whites disproportionately hold
false beliefs about cases such as these despite clear evidence to the contrary. That is, one aim I have
is to explain why whites tend to get things wrong when it comes to questions of race and racial
injustice.
But I hope to achieve this aim in the service of achieving a broader aim. This broader aim is
to motivate the idea that racial injustice is not only morally and politically bad, but that it is also
epistemically bad. That is, in this dissertation I aim to show that racial injustice is not only bad because
it deprives non-dominant racial groups of equal access to education, equal treatment by the police,
access to quality healthcare, equal opportunity in job market and fair access to housing loans and
business capital, but that it is also bad because it deprives people of the truth regarding mainly, but not
only, race and racial injustice.
If I achieve these aims, then I will have properly described how social, moral and political
phenomena cause a bad epistemic state of affairs where this bad state of affairs involves that subjects
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will tend to hold false beliefs, lack true beliefs and even lack justification in beliefs in the domain of
race and racial injustice.
The Approach
This dissertation is primarily a descriptive or diagnostic project. In this descriptive project, I
take a veritistic approach. If someone takes a veritistic approach when evaluating a society, then she is
concerned with evaluating how well a society’s organization or the social practices that partly compose
the society fare in terms of their truth conduciveness for its members (Goldman 1999). So,
dissertation is veritistic because I am describing how a feature of a society, namely racial injustice,
affects whether its members hold more or fewer true beliefs in general and in particular the domain
of race and racial injustice itself.
One way of understanding this dissertation is as a work in racial veritism. This way of
conceiving of veritism was suggested by Charles Mills, if briefly, in The Racial Contract, and then
developed at length in White Ignorance. The basic idea in these works relevant to this project is that
the category of white or anti-black, anti-indigenous or anti-Latinx racism can cause members of society
to hold false beliefs, lack true beliefs or be in a bad epistemic state such as unjustified belief. The basic
idea here is that whiteness causes subjects to be in bad epistemic standings.
As a work of racial veritism, this dissertation is partly composed of an explanation of how
whiteness or racial injustice actually does cause bad epistemic outcomes for subjects. This explanation
involves a few different approaches to epistemology.
This dissertation is veritistic because in it I offer an explanation that appeals to organizational
features of a society and the social practices that compose this society. These features are explanans
relative to the explanandum, namely bad epistemic outcomes for subjects and society as a whole.
The second epistemological approach is naturalistic. This dissertation is naturalistic because
it appeals to psychological features of subjects such as dispositions in belief that humans have and
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human cognitive architecture to at least partly explain why subjects tend to hold false beliefs in certain
domains. The basic idea here is that this dissertation is naturalistic because it takes seriously how
subjects actually are and the relation of how people are to epistemic states such as knowledge and
justly held belief.
The third approach is feminist epistemological. This dissertation is a work of feminist
epistemology because in feminist epistemology power relations are appealed to.

Feminist

epistemologists appeal to them to explain (1) why formulations such as ‘S knows that p’ overgeneralize,
(2) how certain social identities are better locations from which to answer certain questions accurately
than others and (3) how non-dominant group speakers are likely to be taken as less credible than they
are or not as in the business of giving knowledge (Alcoff 1999; Code 1991; Dotson 2011; Fricker 2007;
Harding 1993, 2015). That is, feminists were among the first epistemologists to figure power relations
into epistemic evaluations of subjects’ doxastic states
The fourth approach is normative. Even if this dissertation is primarily a descriptive work, it
is also normative. It is normative because I delimit different states that are epistemically bad to be in.
For example, in the chapter titled, “Coverage-Reliance Ignorance,” I provide sufficient conditions for
a state that it is epistemically bad to be in. In this way, this dissertation is contiguous with the tradition
in analytic epistemology of evaluating doxastic states as either epistemically good or bad. An example
of this is the long-standing debate over what conditions a subject must satisfy to be properly evaluated
as knowing information or a proposition.
This dissertation is also a normative project because it provides guidance on what subjects and
society’s as a whole should do so that the likelihood that a society’s subjects are in better epistemic
states is increased. For example, in the chapter titled, “When Knowledge Is Not Enough,” I argue
that a society should engender sufficiently robust understanding of racial injustice in its subjects at an
early age because if such understanding is so engendered, then the likelihood that they will hold false
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beliefs regarding race and racial injustice will be decreased. To put the point differently, normative
epistemology tells you what and how to believe and so this dissertation is normative because it
provides guidance on how societies should be organized such that subjects are more likely in good
epistemic states and less likely in bad epistemic states.
The Explanation
Each chapter of this dissertation contributes to explaining how racial injustice causes
ignorance by appealing to a basic feature of our epistemic lives. In the first chapter, I appeal to a
largely unnoted feature of the way that subjects convey information through testimony, namely
expression style. A speaker’s expression style can consist in the speed, decibel level, regional accent,
colloquialism, cadence and speech-associated gesturing. So, a subject who speaks loudly, quickly,
using New York City colloquialisms and cadence manifests her expression style. The basic idea of
expression style shares most of its content with an idea prominent in the field of socio-linguistics,
namely a ‘way of speaking (Gumperz 19**). Even though they share most of their content, the idea
of expression style puts greater emphasis on phenomena such as emotional tone, pausing and gesturing
while the idea of a way of speaking puts greater emphasis on grammar and lexicon
I appeal to expression style to explain how racial injustice causes ignorance because expression
styles convey information along with the speech acts that they co-occur with. If expression styles
convey information along with their co-occurring utterances and racial injustice makes it such that
non-dominant racial group members cannot employ expression styles that better convey information
without epistemic penalty, then appealing to expression style can partly explain how racial injustice
prevents good epistemic outcomes from obtaining. One such good epistemic outcome is nondominant speaker’s exercising their capacity to convey information and engender good epistemic
states in their listeners.
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In the second chapter, I appeal to subjects’ reliance on others and information sources such
as newspapers to keep them apprised of information about race and racial injustice. That is, subjects
rely in an ineliminable way on sources for information about the world and in particular for
phenomenon that inhere in societies such as racial injustice. I appeal to this reliance because if racial
injustice reduces the likelihood that subjects will be reliably informed by, say, newspapers about race
and racial injustice, then racial injustice plays a causal role in reducing the likelihood that subjects have
more rather than less information about racial injustice itself.
In the third chapter, I appeal to subjects’ cognitive architecture and the epistemic state of
understanding to explain how subjects who avoid believing falsehoods about racial injustice differ
from those who do not. The ‘fragmentation’ theory of belief storage qua theory of cognitive
architecture partly explains how white subjects can have knowledge of, say, the legacy of slavery in the
US while also believing, without any sense of tension or incoherence, that black and white folks have
equal opportunity in the US job market. I appeal to the epistemic state of understanding to explain
why at least some whites avoid holding such false beliefs.
In the fourth chapter, I take up the norms that govern how information flows from person to
person and in turn into and out of a community or society. I take up how racial injustice affects these
norms to explain why information about race and racial injustice does not reliably flow to members
of the US that do not have it.
In the fifth chapter, I appeal to how the general human disposition to believe what feels good
and disbelieve what feels bad interacts with (i) society’s racially unjust structure and (ii) capitalist driven
markets such that hip hop as a hermeneutical resource is made less epistemically effective for black
and Latinx subjects. Here, I appeal to these features of subjects and society because these features
help explain why US society’s set of shared meanings and concepts is so impoverished relative to
conveying understanding of black and Latinx folks’ worlds.
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Who should care about this dissertation and why?
Epistemologists, philosophers of race, political philosophers and anyone who is concerned
with why so many people can get it wrong about important topics such as race and racial injustice
should care about this dissertation.
Epistemologists who have done what I consider individualist epistemology should care about
this dissertation. By my lights, individualist epistemologists are concerned with providing conditions
under which someone is properly evaluated as knowing or as justified in a belief where these
conditions largely do not take up either features of society or social and political features of the world.
These epistemologists should care about this dissertation because this dissertation takes up how racial
injustice bears on whether someone is properly evaluated as justified or knowing her belief.
Feminist epistemologists should care about this work because this dissertation is an extension
of their project in epistemology in terms of race. Feminist epistemology is partly concerned with how
power relations affect knowledge and justification ascriptions and this dissertation is concerned with
how power relation asymmetries between racial groups affects such ascriptions.
Social epistemologists care about how features of society, features of speakers and even
features of technology affect whether subjects come to be in good epistemic states such as holding
more rather than fewer true beliefs, being justified, having knowledge or having the proper credence
in a belief. If social epistemologists care about these phenomena, then they should care about this
dissertation because this dissertation takes up how racial injustice qua feature of society affects the
likelihood of whether subjects are in these epistemic states.
Philosophers of race care about the almost innumerable questions that can be asked about
race itself and how race affects society and its members. Many philosophers of race care about why
society’s members are so ignorant when it comes to historical and occurrent facts that involve race
such as the nature of slavery in the US, the legacy of US slavery, the history of native genocide and
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settler colonialism, anti-Latino oppression, anti-Asian oppression, and police brutality against people
of color. If philosophers of race care about these questions, then they should care about this
dissertation because I take up why members of society get it so wrong on these questions and I take
up these questions in terms that the philosophy of race literature often does not take up. These terms
involve psychological dispositions of belief and the explanatory value of epistemic states such as the
state of understanding.
Political philosophers who care about how to make society more just or how to make societies
more democratic should care about this dissertation. They should care about this dissertation because
making a society more just along a dimension of, say, economic outcomes will require that societies’
members know or understand about how non-dominant members of a society have suffered, say,
economic injustices.
Political philosophers who work in democratic theory should care about this dissertation
because most accounts of democracy involve that its members must know relevant facts about the
government, political body and its constituent subgroups. In the US, some of these relevant facts are
the legacy of slavery, the current maldistribution of opportunities and social goods along racial lines
and unjust treatment of, say, black and Latinx people by law enforcement organizations.
Even though this dissertation is an epistemic project that is largely concerned with diagnosing
how social-political phenomena can affect purely epistemic phenomena, the project itself is motivated
by the importance of the questions that people are getting wrong, namely questions about race and
racial injustice. That is, people who want to ameliorate racial injustice around the world should care
about the arguments and conclusions in this dissertation because racial injustice obtains at least partly
in virtue of the lack of knowledge and false beliefs people have. For example, many white people
believe that if black and Latinx people ‘work harder,’ then the massive wealth gaps between black and
Latinx folks and US whites would be bridged. But, of course, this view partly rests on a lack of
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knowledge about things such as racist housing policy that prevented black and Latinx folks from
buying homes and increasing their wealth in ways that Italian and Irish white immigrants did after
World War II. The basic idea here is that racist policies and behavior obtain at least partly because
people either lack knowledge or hold false beliefs.
To paraphrase political scientist Michael Parenti, systemic change in a society involves a battle
for the minds of the people (Parenti 2007). Here, Parenti’s point is that if society wide change happens,
it will occur as a result of a society’s members knowing the truth about oppression in their society and
acting to ameliorate it. Similarly, if racial injustice qua society wide phenomenon is ever ameliorated,
then it will result in part from people knowing and understanding historical and occurrent facts about
racial injustice.
So, if you care about ameliorating racial injustice and ameliorating racial injustice involves
ameliorating ignorance of racial injustice, then you should care about this dissertation because in this
dissertation I explain why ignorance of racial injustice is so prevalent and pervasive. What is more, is
that understanding why ignorance regarding racial injustice is so prevalent and pervasive is a first step
to ameliorating this this ignorance and in turn racial injustice itself.
How General is this Account?
All the following chapters contain arguments regarding race. And all these chapters’
arguments can generalize to other identity dimensions such as gender, sexuality, able or disabledbodmient and class.
However, even if these arguments generalize to other identities and other kinds of injustice,
the innumerable historical facts that make these identities differ from one another should make one
cautious about assuming that identities function as mere place holders or variables as in, say, predicate
logic. For example, the first premise in the second chapter’s argument is:
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(P1) If racial prejudice obtains widely, news sources unreliably apprise subjects of
information in the domain of race and racial injustice.
Now, if one substitutes the term ‘racial’ with ‘gender, then the argument would still go through. But,
even though this argument still goes through, the reasons that make this premise true would
importantly differ. They would differ because the attending histories of oppression and
discrimination that attend to each of the members of each identity differ. One way they differ that
matters for the argument in chapter two is that women were restricted in what property and
businesses they could own while black men could own property and business even if doing so was
quite difficult relative to whites. For example, free black men could own newspapers or periodicals
while woman, largely, could not (Gonzalez and Torres 2011).
These differences between identities matter because if one wants to make prescriptions
based on these descriptive arguments, then the details that attend to differing identities will make a
difference for how good one’s prescriptions are. If one needs to change the structure of society to
make, say, news sources more reliable, then one should countenance these details because society’s
structure disfavors women differently than it disfavors, say, black men.
In the following chapters, I hope to provide arguments that are both general enough to help
understand how identities of different kinds cause bad epistemic outcomes where asymmetrical
power relation do a great deal of explanatory work, but I also hope that I provide arguments that are
rich enough in detail about race and racial injustice such that they can provide at least some basis for
prescriptions that aim to alleviate racial ignorance.
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Chapter 1
Expression-Style Exclusion
Suppose William is a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant man and a political philosopher. When William
forcefully argues that the distribution of wealth in the US should be more egalitarian, he is typically taken
as rationally explaining a position. When so arguing, hearers typically take him as credible and as a
knower partly because of a positive stereotype of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men as dispassionately
rational and not emotional. William’s forceful expression style does not cause hearers to take him as
either less credible or as someone who is not in the business of giving knowledge. And, suppose that
William’s forceful expression style makes his argument better understood by his audience than other
expression styles.
Suppose Simone is a black woman political philosopher. When Simone argues without force that
the distribution of wealth in the US should be more egalitarian, hearers typically take her as rationally
explaining a position just like William. But, if Simone were to forcefully make the same argument, then she
likely would be taken as irrational because of a negative angry black-woman stereotype that black
women are prone to emotionally-driven irrationality (Lewis & Neville, 2015).
If Simone were to forcefully make this argument, then this negative stereotype would cause
her to be taken as either (a) less credible than she is (Fricker 2007) or (b) not in the business of making
knowledge claims (Dotson 2011). Here, Simone’s (i) argument or expression style likely would interact
with (ii) a negative stereotype about black women to trigger or cause (iii) epistemic injustice where this
epistemic injustice can at least result in either a hearer attributing a credibility deficit to Simone or a
hearer not taking Simone as a knower simpliciter.

If Simone’s audience understands this

maldistribution of US wealth argument to a higher degree when she expresses it in a forceful style,
then Simone, unlike William, cannot express her argument in an understanding-maximizing-
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expression style without suffering an epistemic penalty like testimonial quieting or testimonial
injustice. And, suppose that Simone does not make this argument in a forceful expression style because
she knows that she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty. Here, Simone is excluded from using an
understanding-maximizing-expression style where this exclusion involves the likelihood that a hearer
would take her as either less credible or not in the business of giving knowledge. So, this exclusion
occurs without any clear perpetrator because no hearer actually takes Simone as less credible or as not
a knower.
I label this epistemic injustice phenomenon, expression-style exclusion. A challenge I hope to meet
in this chapter is to render plausible that expression-style exclusion both (1) is a consequence of
testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting and (2) shares features with agentially-caused-epistemic
injustices like testimonial injustice and structurally-caused-epistemic injustice like hermeneutical
injustice. I assume that if I plausibly suggest that (a) testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting at
least partly cause expression-style exclusion and (b) that expression-style exclusion shares features with
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, then I will have met this challenge.
A second challenge I hope to meet in this chapter is to render plausible that there is a relation
between a speaker’s expression style and an audience’s degree of understanding where for a particular
speaker’s argument some expression styles allow for higher or lesser degrees of understanding in her
audience.

I assume that I have met this challenge if I plausibly suggest that a hearer’s degree of

understanding of an argument can depend on expression-style features like emotional tone, prosody
and gesturing.
A third challenge I hope to meet in this chapter is to suggest that identifying subtler kinds of
epistemic injustice matters, because the abolishment of things like de jure racism in the US can make it
appear as though identity-prejudice-driven injustices like testimonial injustice are declining, but as
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Charles Mills points out things like de facto racism are still rife (Mills 1999; Mills 2007). Testimonial
injustice or quieting could be infrequent, say, in a particular university’s philosophy department but
expression-style exclusion could be much more frequent. So, some philosophers in this department
might judge the department well in terms of epistemic injustice because testimonial injustice and
quieting are infrequent even though it is not doing well in terms of expression-style exclusion.
A preliminary note is that I focus on a case of expression-style exclusion where a black woman
suffers expression-style exclusion and not other non-dominant-identity-group members because (1)
injustices that black women and Afro-Latinas experience are under-theorized in the epistemology
literature and (2) a wealth of psychology literature, both qualitative and quantitative, shows that the
angry-black-woman stereotype’s effect on black women’s and Afro-Latina’s lives is pervasive and
persistent (Ashley 2014; Lewis et al. 2013; Lewis and Neville 2015; Lewis et al. 2016; Ward 2016;
Sparks 2015).
A last preliminary note is that I assume that when a speaker conveys an argument to her
audience, she not only aims to have her audience know the argument, but she also aims to have her
audience understand the argument. For example, when I teach my students an argument, I am pleased
that they know it and can rehearse it, but I am more pleased when they understand it.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I explain what I take expressionstyle exclusion to be and its relation to the epistemic state of understanding. In the second section, I
explain that expression-style exclusion is a consequence of agentially-caused-epistemic injustices like
testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting, and I explain expression-style exclusion’s primary and
secondary harms. In the third section, I suggest that expression-style exclusion shares some features
with testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, but it does not share all of its features with both.
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In the fourth section, I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why what Charles Mills
calls white ignorance is so ubiquitous.
I
1.1: Expression-Style and Understanding
I now consider the relation between expression-style and understanding. Not all subjects
express themselves in the same way. Some subjects speak quickly, slowly, loudly, quietly, deferentially,
in an animated or gesturing manner and so on. If a subject says p quickly, loudly and in an animated
gesturing manner, then by my lights these adverbs describe an expression style that this subject either
consciously or unconsciously uses to express p. The basic idea of expression style here is that there are
many ways to say p. For example, I can say p in a forceful way, an unanimated way, in a disinterested
way or some other way where each one of these ways of saying p represents what I call an expression
style.
The idea of expression style is similar to sociolinguists’ John Gumperz and Jenny CookGumperz’ idea of a ‘way of speaking’ (Gumperz 1982, 13). By Gumperz’ and Cook-Gumperz’ lights,
the basic idea of a way speaking is that speakers communicate at several “levels of generality”
(Gumperz 1982, 13). Speakers communicate with audiences through the use of syntax and semantics.
That is, a speaker communicates information through uttering certain words in a certain order where
this signals certain information to her audience members.

On the other hand, speakers also

communicate information through things like prosody, pausing, emotional tone and gesturing. That
is, a speaker not only communicates semantic content through using words in a certain order, but she
also simultaneously communicates to her audience through things like gesturing or expressing speech
in an emotional tone.

By Gumperz’ and Cook-Gumperz’ lights, speakers simultaneously (1)
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communicate semantic content through speech and (2) communicate about speech itself through
things like prosody, pausing, emotional tone and gesturing (Gumperz 1982).
But, expression style differs from the idea of a way of speaking because Gumperz’ notion
involves equal emphasis on grammar and lexicon along with things like prosody and pausing
(Gumperz 1982). The idea of expression style, however, puts greater emphasis on things like
gesturing, prosody, pausing and emotional tone.
A speaker’s expression style can affect how well hearers understand p or how receptive hearers
are to p (Abner et al. 2010). Contrast the following two professors. Professor Jimenez teaches an
argument h in a certain animated and gesturing expression style which causes his class qua hearers to
understand h. Professor Gonzalez teaches the same argument h in an unanimated and non-gesturing
style which causes his class qua hearers to understand h to a lesser degree than Professor Jimenez. To
put the point another way, I take it that two people can make the same argument, word for word, but
one of them can cause her audience to better understand the argument where the difference in
understanding is at least partly caused by expression style. So, expression style is not an unimportant
feature of an epistemic subject’s assertion that p, but rather it can affect how well her audience
understands p.
Understanding that p differs from knowing that p (Kvanvig 2003). Take Simone’s argument
that the US wealth distribution should be more egalitarian. If I claim to know this argument, then I
claim to know a conjunction of propositions that constitute the argument. But, if I claim to understand
the argument that the US wealth distribution should be more egalitarian, then I claim to grasp how the
argument’s propositions relate to each other and to concepts and facts that the argument depends on
like the concept of egalitarianism and the US history of relations between wage workers, capitalists
and free slave labor (Elgin 2009).
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Take geometry. I can claim to know geometry if I have memorized certain geometrical axioms.
But, understanding geometry seems to differ from knowing geometry. Someone is properly evaluated
as understanding geometry if they can do things like “reason geometrically about new problems, apply
geometrical insights in different areas [and] assess the limits of geometrical reasoning for the task at
hand” (Elgin 2009, 323, my emphases).
Understanding differs from knowledge partly because understanding “admits of degrees”
(Elgin 2009, 324). A freshman geometry student at the end of a semester of an introduction-togeometry course likely understands geometry to some degree. But, a mathematics major likely
understands geometry to a larger degree than this freshman. And, a professor of geometry likely
understands geometry to larger degree than both the freshman and the mathematics major because
the geometry professor’s grasp of how the relevant axioms cohere or hang together with one another
is greater than both the freshman’s grasp and the major’s grasp.
1.2: Degrees of Understanding and Expression-Style Features
I now suggest that expression-style features like emotional tone, prosody and gesturing can
make a difference to the degree of understanding that an audience has of a speaker’s argument. When
someone conveys her argument through a speech act to her audience, she not only conveys
information through the semantic-linguistic content of the utterances that constitute her speech act,
but rather she also conveys information through non-linguistic features of the utterances that
constitute her speech act qua argument (Abner 2015; Nygaard and Queen 2008). If (a) the information
that a speech act bears can covary with its non-linguistic features and (b) more information can help
an audience understand an argument to a higher degree, then an audience’s degree of understanding
in an argument can depend on a speech act’s non-linguistic features.
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One non-linguistic feature of a speakers’ utterances is emotional tone. So, Simone can utter
‘centuries of free labor by blacks played a large causal role in the US’ current distribution of wealth’
in, say, either an angry or placid emotional tone. A recent study suggests that if the semantic content
of an utterance connotes or is associated with an emotion like happiness, then a speaker’s audience
will both processes the utterance more quickly and recall it more easily (Baddeley 2010; Nygaard and
Queens 2008). So, if (a) Simone cannot convey her argument in an expression-style that involves an
emotional tone of outrage or even anger because she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty and (b)
these emotions are properly associated with her argument’s semantic content, namely the inegalitarianwealth distribution in the US, then (c) Simone’s audience will likely process and commit her argument
to memory less well and quickly. And, here I assume that processing ease can contribute to an
audience’s degree of understanding in an argument.
A second non-linguistic feature of speakers’ utterances are co-occurring gestures. Gestures can
play either interactive or representational roles in speaker-hearer communicative exchanges (Abner et
al. 2015). Speakers can use interactive gestures to manage dialogue. For example, a speaker can signal
through a gesture that someone may ask a question.

Speakers use representational gestures to

communicate information about the gesture’s co-occurring utterance.

Speakers can use

representational gestures to communicate things like properties of actual objects or metaphorical
properties (Kendon 1995). For example, Simone might gesture at levels that are above one another
in a metaphorical way to communicate that the US distribution of wealth is inegalitarian because it is
hierarchical along dimensions of race and class. Here, gestures can contribute to an audience’s degree
of understanding through either adding information to an utterance or partly constituting the
information conveyed in a given utterance.
Gestures can also contribute to an audience’s degree of understanding through aiding a
speaker’s facility in both producing speech and accessing information she has committed to memory
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which is relevant to better explaining an argument. In a meta-analysis of the cognitive science and
psychology literature, Abner et. al suggest that “gestures have been shown to facilitate lexical access,
[resolve] tip of the tongue states” and “reduce demand on working memory” (Abner et al. 2015). The
basic idea here is that if (a) a speaker can more efficiently and clearly explain an argument through
things like better word choice and (b) gestures help speakers recall helpful examples, then (c) gestures
can contribute to whether a speaker’s audience understands an argument to a higher degree. Or, in
Simone’s case, if Simone notices that her audience largely does not understand a premise in her
argument, then gesturing may help her recall things like helpful examples, ideas or synonyms that will
allow her audience to better understand this premise.
One might doubt that phenomenon such as more quickly recalling or more easily processing
information can contribute to whether an audience has greater or deeper understanding of a speaker’s
argument. But, if (a) understanding involves that a subject grasps the relation between facts, (b) this
grasping relation involves sensing how facts hang together or cohere, (c) that facts that constitute an
argument are more easily processed and thus more quickly recalled increases the likelihood that a
subject senses how an argument’s constitutive facts hang together and cohere and (d) the degree of
understanding that subject has in argument can depend on how many of these relations that she grasps,
then (e) easier processing and quicker recall increase the likelihood that a subject has greater
understanding of a speaker’s argument. The basic idea here is that the more quickly someone can
recall or process something, the more grasping relations they will instantiate such that they are more
likely to understand the object of understanding to a higher degree. So, one need not doubt that
phenomenon such as more quickly recalling or more easily processing information can contribute to
subject’s understanding of an argument.
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1.3: Argument Content and Audience-Understanding Maximization
If (a) an audience member more easily processes an argument when it is expressed in an
emotional tone that is associated with it, (b) ease of processing increases the likelihood that a subject
understands an argument to a greater degree, then (c) a speaker can maximize her audience member’s
understanding of her argument through expressing her argument in an emotional tone that is
associated with her argument.
A study suggests that “emotional tone of voice influences the time course of [a subject’s]
lexical processing” (Nygaard and Queens 2008, 1025). In this study, if a speaker expressed words
such as “beauty,” “cheer,” “glad,” and “sunny’ in a happy emotional tone, then a participant hearer
processed them more quickly than if the speaker had expressed them in an emotional tone that is not
associated with these words such as a sad or neutral emotional tone (Nygaard and Queens 2008).
If (a) an argument is in part composed of words and (b) words can be expressed in emotional
tones that are associated with them, then (c) arguments can be expressed in emotional tones that are
associated with them. For example, Simone’s argument is that the US’ wealth distribution should be
more egalitarian because it is so unjustly inegalitarian. This argument is seemingly associated with
anger. So, if Simone expresses her argument in an emotional tone of anger, then she has expressed it
in an emotional tone that it is associated with. If she were to express her argument in a neutral or
happy emotional tone, then she would express this argument in an emotional tone that is not
associated with her argument.
If (a) a speaker does not express her argument in a tone that is associated with it and (b)
expressing it in this associated emotional tone increases the likelihood that her audience member
understands it to greater degree, then (c) this speaker has failed to increase the likelihood that her
audience member understands her argument to a greater degree.
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1.4: Expression Style and Understanding Maximization
An expression style maximizes a speaker’s audience’s understanding of an argument relative
to the argument’s content. For example, an angry or impassioned expression style will maximize an
audience’s understanding of the argument that the US’ wealth distribution should be more egalitarian
because if a speaker expresses this argument in this angry or impassioned emotional tone, the audience
will likely grasp more of relations between facts and concepts that the argument involves.
A speaker S maximizes her audience’s understanding of an argument  if she expresses  in
an emotional tone that is associated with the content of . So, whether an expression style is
understanding maximizing at least partly depends on the associative relation between the content of
the argument and the emotional tone of the speaker’s expression style.
1.5: Understanding and Persuasion
One may object that expression style plays a role in an audience finding an argument
persuasive rather than an audience understanding an argument to a greater degree. So, the objection
goes, expression style is properly taken to maximize the degree to which an audience finds an argument
persuasive rather than maximize the degree to which an audience understands an argument.
This objection fails even though it points to an interesting feature of understanding
maximization. The objection fails because expression style can play a role in both (i) an audience
finding an argument persuasive to greater degree and (ii) an audience understanding an argument to a
greater degree. These two audience features often simultaneously obtain, but they are analytically
distinct audience features. An audience can find an argument persuasive but not understand at
argument. For example, many US presidential voters found Donald Trump’s arguments persuasive,
but, at least some, did not understand his arguments. Similarly, someone can understand Donald
Trump’s arguments, but not find them persuasive. Now, an expression style can contribute to whether
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an audience finds an argument persuasive, but this contribution differs from an expression style’s
contribution to audience understanding.
This objection points to an interesting relation between persuasion and understanding.
Persuasion, itself, can contribute to an audience’s degree of understanding in an argument because if
an audience finds a speaker’s argument persuasive, then they may more carefully attend to the
argument’s features and details such that they understand the argument to a greater degree. But,
persuasiveness’ contribution to an audience’s understanding requires that a speaker present an
argument’s features and details in a way that closer audience attention can result in a greater degree of
audience understanding of an argument
II
2.1: The Basic Idea of Expression-Style Exclusion
I now explain the basic of idea of expression-style exclusion. If expression style can affect to
what degree an audience understands a speaker’s argument, then dominant-identity-group-member
speakers can engage in a wider range of expression styles than non-dominant-identity-group-member
speakers without a similar loss of understanding in a speaker’s audience or bad epistemic
consequences.
Expression-style exclusion obtains if a non-dominant-identity-group-member speaker refrains
from expressing an argument in an understanding-maximizing expression style because if she were to
use this understanding-maximizing expression style, then she would likely suffer an epistemic penalty
where an epistemic penalty involves suffering things like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting.
Expression-style exclusion is not an entirely agentially-caused-epistemic injustice like
testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting because no particular agent perpetrates it. No agent
perpetrates expression-style exclusion because the speaker herself refrains from expressing her argument
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in an understanding-maximizing expression style. She so refrains because she knows that given the
ubiquity of identity prejudices like the angry-black-woman stereotype, her audience would likely
commit, say testimonial injustice or quieting if she were to so express her claim.
On the other hand, expression-style exclusion is not purely structurally caused because
individual audience members represent potential perpetrators of testimonial injustice and testimonial
quieting where testimonial injustice and quieting are agentially caused phenomena. So, the likelihood
of epistemic injustices that individuals can commit motivates Simone to refrain from using an
understanding-maximizing-expression style to make her argument.
2.2: Paradigmatic Epistemic Injustice Kinds
I now briefly sketch a few paradigmatic epistemic injustice kinds because these are at least
some of the epistemic penalties that Simone likely would pay if she were to express her argument in a
style that likely would invoke or interact with the angry-black-woman stereotype. First, I sketch
testimonial injustice where testimonial injustice obtains if historically oppressed group members are
undermined as knowers when they attempt to convey knowledge through testimony due to identity
prejudice (Fricker 2007). I, then, sketch Kristie Dotson’s view of testimonial quieting where controlling
images or identity prejudice partly cause believers with certain historically-oppressed identities to not
be recognized as knowers at all.
On Fricker’s view, in testimonial exchange, hearers need to quickly discern whether a speaker
is trustworthy regarding a particular topic where trustworthiness involves competence and sincerity.
Hearers use stereotypes qua heuristics which can be either reliable or unreliable indicators of a
speaker’s trustworthiness. For example, the identity prejudice that Puerto Ricans are thieves is an
unreliable stereotype which tracks Puerto Ricans in all domains of life such that they can be
systematically taken as untrustworthy speakers (Fricker 2007; Stavans 2001).
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For Fricker, a central-testimonial-injustice case obtains if (a) a hearer attributes a deflated
credibility judgment to a speaker (b) because of a widely-held identity prejudice where (c) this identity
prejudice pervasively and persistently tracks the speaker in all domains of life and (d) the identity
prejudice is held due to an ethically bad or “ethically noxious” affective investment.
A testimonial injustice victim is partly epistemically wronged, or harmed, because she is
undermined in her capacity as a knower. One bad epistemic consequence of this is that if a speaker
asserts p and the speaker is undermined through a deflated credibility judgment, then the speaker will
likely be less confident that she knows p or, at least, she will be less confident in her justification for
p. The second bad epistemic consequence of this is that if a speaker is consistently taken as less
credible, then the speaker is likely to lose confidence in her intellectual abilities more generally.
On Fricker’s view, testimonial injustice not only has bad epistemic consequences for
individuals, but it also has bad epistemic consequences for groups or communities because testimonial
injustice “blocks the flow of knowledge…evidence, doubts, critical ideas and other epistemic inputs
conducive to knowledge” (Fricker 2016, 162). Testimonial injustice can impede or prevent oppressed
group members from contributing certain true beliefs to their respective communities’ belief sets
where these true beliefs could serve as counterevidence, undercutters, defeaters and so on. So,
testimonial injustice’s epistemic badness not only consists in epistemic wrongs or harms for individual
knowers, but it is also bad for epistemic communities more generally because individual believers in these
communities miss out on truth conducive things like counterevidence, defeaters, doubts, evidence and
so on.
I now sketch Dotson’s view of testimonial quieting which she labels as a kind of epistemic
silencing. A speaker’s testimony is quieted if a hearer does not recognize her as a knower. A condition
that is necessary for a speaker to successfully convey knowledge to a hearer is that the hearer regard
the speaker as an agent who can know things. Dotson cites Patricia Hill Collin’s book Black Feminist
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Thought which points out that black women are systematically regarded as “non-knowers” because of
“controlling images” where black women “are perceived as mammies, matriarchs, welfare mothers
and/or whores” such that they are taken as lacking the capacity to be epistemic agents (Dotson 2011,
242; Hill Collins 2000).
Dotson calls these controlling images, negative stereotypes. I understand Dotson’ notion of
negative stereotypes and identity-prejudice to be so close that I will consider them functionally
equivalent for the purposes of this chapter. These negative stereotypes motivate, or at least, play a
role in black women’s systematic testimonial quieting.

This testimonial quieting differs from

testimonial injustice because in testimonial-quieting cases speakers are not even judged credible at all.
In testimonial injustice cases speakers are recognized as less credible than other speakers, and thereby
these speakers are recognized as knowers, but in testimonial quieting cases speakers are not even
recognized as knowers simpliciter.
2.3: Expression-Style Exclusion’s Causal Story
I now explain that expression-style exclusion’s causal story to make salient that expressionstyle exclusion is a consequence of testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting. Expression-style
exclusion obtains when an epistemic subject is diminished in her capacity to maximize her audience’s
understanding of her argument because of what likely would be interaction between her audience’s
identity prejudice and the expression style that she qua epistemic subject would manifest. Suppose
Simone and William express this same argument with the same forceful expression style. Here, only
Simone is likely diminished in her capacity to maximize understanding in her argument because a
widely-held negative-identity prejudice triggers her audience to take her as either less credible than she
is (Fricker 2007) or not as a knower at all (Dotson 2011).
If Simone does express her argument in a forceful expression style, the identity prejudice that
triggers her audience is that black women are angry and thus emotionally irrational. In the psychology
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literature, this stereotype or identity prejudice is known as the “angry black woman” stereotype (Ashley
2014; Lewis & Neville 2015; Lewis et al. 2016; Lewis et al. 2012). According to Lewis and Neville,
this stereotype causes black women’s audiences and interlocutors to behave in negative ways and say
negative things in the expectation that black women will instantiate the stereotype (Lewis & Neville,
2015).
William can forcefully express this argument without his audience taking him as either less
credible than he is or not taking him as a knower, because there is no widely-held negative stereotype
or negative identity prejudice to work on hearers’ testimonial perception of him. If anything, William
as a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant man will benefit from positive stereotypes or positive identity
prejudices that will likely cause hearers to perceive him as rationally, even while forcefully, making his
argument.
Recall that Simone is taken as rational when she makes her argument in an unanimated and nonforceful expression style but once she makes this claim in a forceful expression style she is taken to be
either less credible than she is or as not a knower at all. William can go from an unanimated to a
forceful expression style without suffering an epistemic penalty, but Simone cannot. Simone pays an
epistemic penalty if she forcefully makes her argument.
Expression-style exclusion obtains in virtue of certain stereotypes or identity prejudices.
Simone suffers expression-style exclusion partly because of a stereotype about angry black women.
Simone is excluded from making her argument in understanding-maximizing expression-styles
because if she were to use an understanding-maximizing expression style, then her expression behavior
qua expression style likely would interact with the angry-black women identity prejudice such that she
is taken as either less credible or not a knower.
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Simone does not express her argument in an understanding-maximizing expression style
because she has knowledge that involves (1) her identity qua black woman, (2) that her audience likely
harbors the angry-black-woman-identity prejudice, (3) that her expression-style will likely invoke or
trigger the angry-black woman identity prejudice that her audience harbors and (4) that her audience
is largely composed of white men whose testimonial perception of her is likely affected in an
epistemically bad way.
Fricker suggests that whether a speaker is taken as rationally making a point can depend on
the identity of a speaker’s audience (Fricker 2007). In Fricker’s Talented Mr. Ripley case, she points
out that Mr. Greenleaf takes Marge as irrational because she emotionally expresses her claim that the
Mr. Ripley killed her fiancé, (Fricker 2007, 169). But, Fricker also points out that if Marge had made
the claim, in the same emotional-expression style, to a woman hearer, then this woman hearer likely
would have taken her as rationally making her claim (Fricker 2007, 169).
Similarly, if Simone’s audience was a group of black women, Afro-Latinas or people of color,
then she could have made her argument in an understanding-maximizing-expression style because the
angry-black woman stereotype would likely not have affected their testimonial perception of her in an
epistemically bad way. Or, even if the angry-black-woman stereotype did affect this audience, it would
likely not affect their testimonial perception of her to the degree that it would affect, say, a white
audience’s perception of her. So, whether Simone is excluded from making her argument in an
understanding-maximizing-expression style depends on her audience’s identity.
2.4: Expression-Style Exclusion’s Primary Harm
The primary harm of expression-style exclusion is that a non-dominant-identity speaker
cannot use expression styles that would likely allow her audience to better understand her argument.
Simone is diminished in her capacity to maximize her audience’s understanding of her argument. She is
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diminished in this capacity relative to William, a dominant-group member who is not similarly
diminished in this way, because he can use a wider range of expression styles. William can engender
in his audience a greater degree of understanding in his argument because of his social location or
identity. That is, William enjoys an epistemic good of understanding-maximization in virtue of his
social location qua white man. On the other hand, Simone enjoys less of this epistemic good of
understanding-maximization because of her social location qua black woman.
Recall that when Simone expresses her argument in unanimated and non-forceful expression
style, her audience takes her as rationally making her argument. If her audience takes her as rationally
making her argument, then they likely know her argument as result of her making it. That Simone’s
audience knows her argument because she makes it is consistent with her also suffering expressionstyle exclusion. Expression-style exclusion is compatible with her audience knowing her argument because her
audience can know her argument but not understand it.
Knowing differs from understanding as an epistemic state that a believer can be in (Kvanvig
2003; Pritchard 2010, Zagzebski 2009). But, a speaker can have varying levels of success in explaining
an argument to an audience. One kind of success is when an audience knows an argument because of
how the speaker conveyed the argument. Another kind of success is when an audience understands an
argument because of how the speaker conveys the argument. If (a) a speaker’s success in explaining an
argument can vary and (b) expression-style exclusion diminishes a speaker’s capacity to engender
understanding of an argument in her audience, then (c) expression-style exclusion is compatible with
a speaker successfully engendering knowledge of her argument in her audience.
2.5: Secondary Harm of Expression-Style Exclusion
A secondary epistemic harm or consequence of expression-style exclusion is that a nondominant-identity-group speaker’s intellectual performance will likely suffer relative to dominant
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group speakers because she must self-monitor which expressions-style she uses to make her argument.
This non-dominant-identity-group speaker self-monitors her expression-style while making her
argument because she does not want to use expression styles that invoke or trigger identity prejudices
like the angry-black woman stereotype. If (a) a non-dominant-identity-group speaker self-monitors
which expression-style she is using, and (b) dominant-identity-group speakers do not self-monitor,
then (c) her cognitive load is greater than a dominant-identity-group speaker’s cognitive load. And,
(d) if an epistemic subject’s cognitive load increases, then her intellectual performance may suffer. A
subject’s cognitive load is the set of tasks she attempts to simultaneously perform.
Suppose that Simone does not use an understanding-maximizing-expression style because she
knows that she will likely suffer an epistemic penalty due to her audience’s likely latent angry-black
woman stereotype or identity-prejudice. She likely self-monitors the expression-style she uses to
convey her argument because she knows that her audience’s black-angry-woman-identity prejudice
can easily be triggered. Lewis and Neville found that in a study of 265 black woman participants,
roughly 90% affirmed the claim that “Someone accused me of being angry when I was speaking in a
calm manner.” (Lewis and Neville 2015, 295). This suggests audience members’ latent angry-blackwoman identity prejudice is easily triggered. So, Simone could easily trigger her audience’s latent
identity prejudice even though she is not expressing her argument in a way that is fairly characterized
as angry or even forceful.
Now, I take a speaker’s intellectual performance to involve things like successfully causing
hearers to know arguments and understand arguments. Intellectual performance can involve (1) selfmonitoring whether one is clearly conveying one’s argument, (2) monitoring one’s audience for either
signs of comprehension like head nodding or signs of lack of comprehension like quizzical looking
facial expressions and, of course, (3) actually conveying the argument.
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If a non-dominant-identity-group speaker has to worry about both clearly conveying an
argument and self-monitoring to avoid expressing her argument in an expression style that she knows
will likely make her seem less credible, then she will likely expend more cognitive effort to intellectually
perform at the same level as a dominant-identity-group speaker. If a non-dominant-identity-group
speaker expends more effort than a dominant-identity-group speaker to intellectually perform at the
same level, then the non-dominant-identity-group-speaker’s intellectual performance is more likely to
suffer relative to a dominant-identity-group speaker.

In other words, Simone’s intellectual

performance is more likely to suffer in comparison to William.
Findings in cognitive science, social psychology and linguistics suggest that if a speaker’s
cognitive load increases through the performance of multiple tasks, then a speaker will more often
choose referring expressions that are economical because the speaker’s working memory resources
are limited (Daily et al. 2001; Hendriks et al. 2014; Hendriks 2016; Vogels et al. 2015). Working
memory is a subject’s “system or systems that are assumed to be necessary in order to keep things in
mind while performing complex task such as reasoning, comprehension and learning” (Baddeley 2010,
137). Recall that a subject’s cognitive load is the set of tasks or task she performs or attempts to
perform at the same time. A recent study in cognitive psychology suggests that if a speaker’s cognitive
load is increased through providing her with a secondary task, then she will tend to choose economical
pronoun referring phrases like ‘she’ rather than noun phrases like ‘a saleswoman’ (Vogels et al. 2015).
Pronoun referring phrases are economical in comparison to more explicit noun phrases because it is
easier to remember and recall pronoun phrases like ‘she’ rather than noun phrases ‘a saleswoman.’
Suppose that Simone performs two mental tasks. Her first task is to clearly explain her
argument to her audience. Her second task is to self-monitor the expression style that she uses because
she could, unbeknownst to her, use an expression style that would likely cause her to suffer an
epistemic penalty. By the Vogels et al. (2015) study’s lights, if Simone performs these two tasks, then
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she is more likely to use pronoun referring phrases rather than more descriptive referring phrases. If
she uses less explicit referring phrases rather more descriptive ones, then her intellectual performance
could suffer because the sentences she uses to convey her argument contain less explicit content such
that her audience likely understands her argument to lower degree. And, William likely does not selfmonitor the expression style he uses to explain his argument and thus does not similarly suffer.
Here, someone might object that this study does not support the view that expression-style
exclusion can cause subjects’ intellectual performance to suffer. This objection fails because the study
could have found that subjects under increased cognitive load do not increase their use of less explicit
pronoun-referring phrases. And, if the study had found that subjects under increased cognitive load
did not increase the use of economical referring phrases, like pronoun-referring phrases, then this
would be evidence against the view that increased subject cognitive load can make intellectual
performance suffer.
Barch and Berenbaum (1994) found that subjects who were interviewed while doing
concurrent tasks showed decreased performance in answering interview questions when compared
with a control group who did not do concurrent tasks while interviewed. Subjects who were
interviewed while doing a concurrent task performed less well along dimensions of syntactic
complexity, verbosity and filled pauses (Barch and Berenbaum 1994). Syntactic performance was
judged in terms of independent and dependent clause use where independent clause use was a sign of
good performance and dependent clause use was a sign of poorer performance. Verbosity was judged
in terms of the number of words that subjects used. And, a subject who paused for shorter periods
of time between sentences, when answering questions, was taken to perform better than subjects who
paused for longer periods of time. By this study’s lights, Simone, relative to Williams, likely would
perform poorly along at least one of these dimensions if she self-monitors her expression style because
she performs a second task, conveying her argument. If she performs poorly in terms of syntactic
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complexity, verbosity and pausing, then her intellectual performance also likely suffers because a
speaker whose explanation of an argument involves long pauses and dependent-clause use likely does
not explain an argument as well as a speaker whose explanation lacks these things. So, if her
intellectual performance suffers in these ways, then her audience may understand her argument to a
lesser degree.
A basic idea that these studies, and others, trade on is that if (a) a speaker attempts to convey
information through speech and (b) she simultaneously performs another task, then (c) she will likely
convey this information to her hearer in a less efficient or clear way because (d) some of her working
memory resources will be diverted from conveying information through speech to this other task
(Daily et al. 2001; Hendriks et al. 2014; Hendriks 2016).
If (a) this basic idea is roughly correct, (b) non-dominant speakers actually do self-monitor
their expression style and (c) self-monitoring takes up a non-trivial amount of working memory or
cognitive capacity, then (d) non-dominant speakers’ intellectual performance likely suffers because of
expression-style exclusion.
2.6: The Double Bind of Expression Style Exclusion
Simone may face a double bind because if she either (a) uses an understanding-maximizingexpression style or (b) refrains from using an understanding-maximizing expression style, then (c) she
likely faces an obstacle to successfully conveying her argument to her audience. This seems bad
enough. But, Janice Moulton suggests that it may even be worse because it can be quite easy for
women to be taken as aggressive irrespective of what expression style they use to make their argument.
For Moulton, the adversary method involves the assumption that the best way to evaluate
philosophical views is to subject them to the “strongest or most extreme opposition” where part of
doing this involves attempting to refute views by entertaining counterexamples to a given view
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(Moulton 1996, 14). On Moulton’s view, philosophers are partly motivated to believe that the
adversary method is the best way to do philosophy because of a mistaken view of the relation between
aggression and competence or success.
Now, women are socialized to not engage in aggressive communication because of a widelyheld false view that aggressive behavior is thought only natural for men but unnatural for women.
This presents a dilemma for women. The first horn of the dilemma is that if a woman acts aggressively
or even in a way that can hint at or invoke the idea of aggression, then she will be taken as acting
unnaturally and thus she will be taken as acting unpleasantly. But, the second horn of the dilemma is
that if she exhibits success-associated traits like competence and authority in a non-aggressive way,
she will likely still be taken as exhibiting aggression because of success-associated traits’ association
with aggression. Just by being competent, a woman can be taken as acting unnaturally and also be
taken to be acting unpleasantly. So, the only option is to attempt to communicate or act competently
without seeming competent which makes acting competent that much harder for women than men.
Now, if (a) Moulton is right that it is quite hard for women to make arguments without their
audience taking them as aggressive, (b) the social psychology literature is correct that hearers are highly
prone to take black women speakers as angry because of the angry-black-woman stereotype, then (c)
black women and Afro-Latinas may not only be in a double bind where they suffer either expressionstyle exclusion’s primary or secondary harm. But, rather (d) a black woman or Afro-Latina speaker
could suffer expression-style exclusion’s secondary harm while neither avoiding epistemic penalties
like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting nor enjoying the epistemic good of using an
understanding-maximizing-expression style.
Take Simone’s case. If Simone refrains from using a forceful expression style because she
knows that she would likely suffer, say, testimonial quieting because her audience likely harbors the
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angry-black woman stereotype, then she makes her argument while self-monitoring herself to ensure
she does not use an expression style that could invoke the angry-black woman stereotype in her
audience. Even if she makes her argument in a completely tranquil and calm manner, she still could
very easily trigger this stereotype in her audience because the angry-black woman stereotype is so easily
invoked (Lewis and Neville 2015). Here, Simone’s identity as both a woman and black can make the
likelihood that her audience’s prejudice is triggered higher than, say, a white woman. If this likelihood
is higher for Simone qua black woman, then Simone could be in the horrible position that she expends
extra cognitive work to self-monitor her expression style, but she does not avoid the epistemic
penalties she sought to avoid through refraining from using an understanding-maximizing-expression
style.
2.7: An Intersectional Harm of Expression Style Exclusion
If (a) a non-dominant speaker knows she will likely suffer either expression-style exclusion’s
primary or secondary harm (b) a speaker who inhabits positions such as professor, lawyer, community
member, manager is entitled to epistemic authority in the domain that is associated with these
positions, then (c) a non-dominant speaker will likely not enjoy the epistemic authority from her
audience that the positions entitles her to.
Take Simone. She is a professor of philosophy and suppose that in virtue of this position she
is entitled to at least prima facie epistemic authority on the issue relative to non-philosophers. And,
suppose that even though she has this position that should grant her epistemic authority on
philosophical topics with at least non-philosophers, she still feels unease speaking on issues she knows
well because she knows that her epistemic authority will likely not defeat how her audience will
perceive her because of the mechanisms involved in expression-style exclusion.
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So, even if a non-dominant speaker, like Simone, has managed to obtain a position in society
that is secure and grants one prima facie epistemic authority, she will not enjoy the comfort of speaking
from that position with ease on topics she knows well. Here, the structure of society makes it such
that Simone, a black woman, cannot fully enjoy her station in life even though she may have worked
for it twice as hard as her dominant group counterparts due to, say, systemic racism and sexism.
III
In this section I suggest that expression-style exclusion shares features with testimonial
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. But, I suggest that expression-style exclusion does not share all
of its features with both.

That is, expression-style overlaps with testimonial injustice and

hermeneutical injustice.
3.1: Expression-Style Exclusion as Agentially Caused
Hermeneutical injustice obtains if an epistemic subject cannot communicate an experience
because of a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource due to hermeneutical marginalization (Fricker
2007). Hermeneutical marginalization obtains if non-dominant-identity group members cannot
sufficiently contribute to their society’s set of shared concepts because they cannot sufficiently access
professions in society that can influence their society’s set of shared concepts like journalism and law
positions (Fricker 2007). In Fricker’s central case, Carmita Wood cannot provide a succinct reason
why she was fired from her job, on an unemployment insurance form, because the concept of sexual
harassment did not yet exist in her society’s social imagination.
Hermeneutical injustice, by Fricker’s lights, is at least largely structurally caused because no agent
can be blamed for, say, Carmita Wood’s lack of the sexual harassment concept. Society is unjustly
structured such that this results in an epistemic gap in the social pool of concepts that Carmita Wood
can use to succinctly describe her experience of what we can now succinctly call sexual harassment.
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On the other hand, testimonial injustice is agentially caused because an agent, or hearer,
perpetrates it through a deflated credibility judgment of a speaker. If someone takes me as less credible
than I am because, I am Latinx, then I can blame this person. I can also point out that they are
perpetrating testimonial injustice such that they could recognize that they are actually testimonially
misperceiving me as not credible. By Fricker’s lights, I cannot point to an individual who perpetrates
hermeneutical injustice in the same way. If I can point to anything regarding hermeneutical injustice,
I can point to the structure of society such that black and Latinx folks do not have equal opportunity
in the US job market where this explains why certain gaps exist in the social imagination.
Expression-style exclusion is partly caused by individual agents or hearers because, say, Simone
refrains from using an understanding-maximizing-expression style due to the likelihood that her
audience will commit testimonial injustice. Simone knows that they likely harbor the angry-black
woman stereotype that can easily be triggered such that they would take her as less credible than she
is. So, here, individuals play a causal role because they represent the likelihood of an epistemic penalty
for Simone if she were to use a forceful expression style. If the audience was composed of black
women, then they would not represent an equal risk for Simone. Individuals who harbor the angryblack woman stereotype can be blamed because (1) they harbor this stereotype and (2) this stereotype
would likely result in Simone being taken as less credible if she were to use a forceful expression style.
If individuals can be blamed, then expression-style exclusion is in some measure non-triviallyagentially caused.
3.2: Expression-Style Exclusion as Structurally Caused
Expression-style exclusion is partly structurally caused because Simone’s audience is composed
of largely white men hearers. White men hearers largely constitute Simone’s audience because nonwhites and women have not had equal access to philosophy positions. A study by Mullainathan and
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Bertrand (2004) suggests that black candidates have a harder time in the job market than equally
qualified white candidates because resumes with white-typical-sounding names received substantially
more call backs than resumes with black-typical sounding names even though the resumes were
otherwise identical. Non-whites have to deal with things like failing schools, less access to loans and
capital, stop-and-frisk programs by police and lack of access to social capital or networks to a much
larger degree than whites (Mills 1997). These factors partly constitute the structure of society such
that white men will tend to compose the audience of a philosophy talk. And, white men qua audience
members are more likely to epistemically penalize Simone through testimonial injustice or quieting.
Here, a structural feature of society plays a non-trivial causal role in why Simone suffers expressionstyle exclusion.
Expression-style exclusion is also partly structurally caused because Simone’s audience harbors
the angry-black-woman stereotype due to hermeneutical marginalization. Black women currently and
historically have not sufficiently influenced the collective hermeneutical resource such that the angryblack-woman stereotype is unfortunately pervasive throughout society. This lack of influence plays a
role in why most white men harbor this stereotype. So, expression-style exclusion shares this structural
cause with hermeneutical injustice, namely hermeneutical marginalization.
IV
In this section, I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why white ignorance
obtains where white ignorance is a lack of true belief or false belief that obtains because of whites’
dominant-group status (Mills 2007). According to a 2016 Gallup poll, 69% of US whites believe that
blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market (Jones and Saad 2016). Here, 69% of
whites hold a false belief. And, I assume that a large number of these whites know things that either
undercut or defeat this false belief, namely facts about the nature of slavery and the Jim Crow era in
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the southern US. I argue that expression-style exclusion can partly explain why whites tend to not
notice the tension between this false belief and defeating facts they know.
My argument in this section goes as follows. If (a) non-white folks are the most likely to
understand oppression, (b) certain kinds of understanding may increase the likelihood that a believer
has certain kinds of knowledge, (c) expression-style exclusion makes it less likely that non-dominant
speakers successfully engender understanding in an audience, then (d) dominant audiences are less
likely to have knowledge of oppression. A subject is in a white ignorant state if she either holds a false
belief or lacks a true belief because of whites’ dominant-group status (Mills 2007). In this section, I
assume, rather than argue that (a) non-white folks or non-dominant groups are more likely to
understand oppression than dominant-group subjects.
4.1: Understanding and Knowledge
I may more likely have certain kinds of knowledge if I understand certain things. A physician
likely knows that a patient has a certain rare kind of allergy because she understands human physiology.
That is, it seems unlikely that this physician would have come to know that her patient has this rare
allergy unless she already understood human physiology. Similarly, an archaeologist of Mesoamerica
knows that a particular Mayan symbol has a certain meaning because she understands the system of
Mayan writing and how this symbol’s use differed over the course of Mayan history. It seems unlikely
that this archaeologist would have come to know this unless she already understood the Mayan system
of writing and the history of this symbol’s use.
Take Chad, a white man, who believes the falsehood that blacks have equal opportunity on
the US job market. Suppose that Chad knows things like that slavery in the US was a horrible moral
wrong, that Jim Crow era laws kept blacks from enjoying basic rights that whites enjoyed and that the
Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1963 and 1964 were morally good things. But, Chad neither
understands US slavery, the Jim-Crow era nor the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. If Chad understood,
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say, slavery in the US, then it seems less likely that he would believe the falsehood that blacks have
equal opportunity in the US job market. Understanding of slavery involves grasping things like (1)
that many blacks were forced to continue to work for free through unlawful imprisonment after
reconstruction and (2) the incalculable wealth that whites amassed over centuries through free slave
labor.
4.2: Expression-Style Exclusion and Understanding of Oppression
Expression-style exclusion makes it less likely that non-dominant-identity-group members will
successfully engender high degrees of understanding in their audiences about oppression. Expressionstyle exclusion can make this less likely because non-dominant-group members are the most likely to
understand oppression, but they are also the most likely to have experienced oppression. Nondominant believers who are most likely to know about, and understand, oppression are also the
believers who are most likely to express arguments about oppression in expression styles that are
impassioned. If Simone expresses an argument about oppression in an impassioned-expression style,
then she is likely to suffer an epistemic penalty because her audience likely harbors the angry-blackwoman stereotype. But, if she refrains from using an understanding-maximizing expression style, then
she less likely engenders understanding in her audience. And, she will likely also worry about whether
she expresses her argument in an expression style that could invoke this stereotype.
There is a relation between (a) understanding about oppression and (b) the believers who are
most likely to have this understanding. This relation is (c) that the people most likely to understand
oppression are also the same people who are the least likely to successfully convey this understanding.
They are the least likely to convey this understanding because they bear a relation of having
experienced this oppression. If a group of people have largely experienced oppression, then they are
more likely than others to convey this understanding in an impassioned or even angry expression style.
If this group is likely to convey this understanding in impassioned or angry expression style, then they
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will either suffer the primary or second harm of expression-style exclusion. So, there is a certain kind
of act that, say, Simone likely cannot perform because of expression-style exclusion. This is an act
where a non-dominant speaker engenders understanding of oppression in her dominant audience.
Rebecca Kukla describes a similar act in her account of discursive injustice (Kukla 2014). By
Kukla’s lights, a speaker’s identity can cause knowledge claims qua speech acts to have uptake as
expressions of personally experienced emotion even though she is entitled to have her knowledge
claim receive uptake as a knowledge claim. Kukla uses the following case to clarify this idea. Suppose
a woman professor claims that her colleagues systematically devalue job talks by women-job
candidates but her colleagues, men, take this claim as an expression of her sympathy for other women
going through the rigors of the job market rather than a claim about how the world is apart from how
she feels about it. Put simply, they take an assertive speech act as an expressive speech act because of this
woman professor’s identity qua woman. Here, this woman professor is entitled to perform an assertive
speech act, but she actually performs an expressive speech act because her identity qua woman causes a
“breakdown…of the path between performance and uptake” (Kukla 2014, 445). If a speaker’s
successful engenderment of understanding in her audience through conveying an argument is a speech
act akin to assertive speech acts, then the act where a non-dominant speaker engenders understanding of
oppression in her dominant audience can be understood as a kind of speech act. And, this speech act is
performed when a non-dominant speaker successfully engenders understanding of oppression she
experienced to her dominant audience. But, expression-style exclusion makes this particular speech
act obtain less often.
4.3: Expression-Style Exclusion and White Ignorance
Suppose Chad who is in a white ignorant state is at Simone’s talk where she makes an argument
that the US distribution of wealth should be more egalitarian. And, suppose that Simone was born in
Haiti, then emigrated with her mother to the neighboring Dominican Republic to look for work as is
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often the case. And, she and her mother eventually move to New York from the Dominican Republic
because they were discriminated against in the Dominican Republic and because there were few jobs
available for her mother. Now, suppose that Simone also in part grew up in Jamaica Queens New
York City, a community of color where opportunities are few and far between and schools underserve
the community. So, Simone has personal experience with inegalitarian distributions of wealth. She
has first-hand knowledge and understanding of inegalitarian distributions of wealth in the Caribbean
and the US.
Simone can make her argument in at least two ways. She could make her argument in an
impassioned-expression style. This is likely because of her personal relation to her argument’s content.
She could also attempt to make her argument in a dispassionate or non-forceful expression style. It
will likely be difficult for her to successfully engender understanding using this non-forceful expression
style because her audience’s angry-black woman stereotype is so easily triggered. But, if she manages
to use this non-forceful-expression style, her intellectual performance will likely suffer because she
will likely self-monitor her expression style. Here, Simone is in a double bind.
This double bind likely results in depressing the odds that Simone successfully engenders a
high degree of understanding, or any at all, in her audience. If Simone is less likely to engender
understanding in her audience, then Chad is less likely to be disabused of white ignorance. Chad is
less likely disabused of his white ignorance because understanding of say how inegalitarian
distributions of wealth caused by slavery can make it more likely that someone knows that blacks have
less opportunity in the US job market in comparison to whites. So, expression-style exclusion that
Simone suffers can play a role in Chad remaining in a white ignorance state.
Conclusion
I hope that I have made plausible the idea that expression-style is a consequence of testimonial
injustice and quieting. I also hope that I have motivated the view that identifying more subtle kinds
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of epistemic injustice matters because an organization or society can score well in terms of epistemic
injustices like testimonial injustice and testimonial quieting but simultaneously score poorly in terms
of more subtle kinds of epistemic injustice like expression-style exclusion. I also hope that I have
successfully argued that something like expression-style exclusion has contributed, and does
contribute, to what Charles Mills calls white ignorance.

40

Chapter 2
Coverage-Reliance Ignorance
Epistemologists have not considered how racial injustice can affect whether a subject is justified in
her belief. I argue that racial injustice itself can undermine whether a subject is justified in beliefs
regarding race and racial injustice.
Suppose Victoria works in current day Manhattan. And, suppose that Victoria overhears her
co-worker tell someone that Canada has declared war on the US. A few minutes later Victoria reflects
on whether this is true, and then she rejects the claim that Canada has declared war on the US at least
partly because if it were true that Canada declared war on the US, then she would have heard about it by now
from reliable sources such as the New York Times, Washington Post or The Wall Street Journal (Goldberg
2010). Suppose that Canada has not declared war on the US. Here, Victoria infers that Canada did
not declare war on the US. She bases this inference on her belief that if Canada had declared war on
the US, then she would have heard about it by now. So, a consequence of this is that Victoria properly
infers a true belief that Canada has not declared war on the US. Sanford Goldberg calls this
phenomenon coverage-supported belief (Goldberg 2010).
Suppose Jim is a white industrial worker who lives and works in Detroit during the mid-1980s.
While at work, Jim overhears a co-worker, tell someone that the police consistently pull over black
folks in his neighborhood for no legitimate reason while driving and that this kind of treatment is of
a piece with other ways that the Detroit police unjustly treat black folks relative to how they treat
white folks. A few hours after Jim hears this, he reflects on whether this is true, and then he rejects this
claim that the police treat black folks in this unjust way partly because he believes if it were true that
police treated black folks this way, then he would have heard about it by now from reliable sources like a national
or local newspaper. Suppose that police do treat black folks this way in Jim’s community. Here, Jim
falsely infers primarily because of his belief that if this claim were true, then he would have heard about
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it by now. And, suppose that Jim would not have heard about how police unjustly treat black folks
by now because of racial injustice in his society. This is a bad case of coverage-supported belief. It is a
bad case of coverage-supported belief because of racial injustice. I will call this phenomenon, coveragereliance ignorance.
I argue that Jim’s belief, that he would have heard about how the Detroit police unjustly treat
black folks by now, is false because racial injustice makes Jim’s news sources unreliably inform him of
racial-injustice-related topics. Racial injustice can make Jim’s news sources unreliably inform him
because of the effect of (1) racial prejudice and (2) society’s unjust structure on the news-gathering-anddisseminating processes Jim relies on. I assume that societies with entrenched racial injustice have
widespread racial prejudices and that these societies are unjustly structured. I argue that racial injustice
can undermine a subject’s capacity to be properly sensitive to her social conditions such that she is
doxastically justified in her coverage-supported belief.
I aim to motivate (1) that racial injustice can have purely epistemic consequences on a reliabilist
understanding of knowledge and justification and (2) that phenomena such as testimonial injustice
and testimonial quieting can make news sources systematically unreliable in a given domain (Dotson
2011; Fricker 2007; Goldman 1979). I understand “information” as true information, and information
that is not true as “false information.” And, I focus on cases of coverage-reliance ignorance that are
caused by racial injustice even though there are cases caused by other kinds of injustice such as gender
injustice.
In section one, I describe features of coverage-reliance ignorance, its relation to coveragesupported belief and white ignorance, its bad epistemic consequences and a case of coverage-reliance
ignorance where a subject holds a true, but unjustified, belief. In section two, I argue that racial
prejudice can make a news source unreliable in a domain because racial prejudice can make it less
likely that news sources report on racial injustice related topics. In section three, I argue that a society’s
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unjust structure can make a news source’s coverage unreliable because it can make it less likely that
reports on racial-injustice-related topics reach subjects who lack information on these topics. In
section four, I argue that racial injustice can undermine a subject’s capacity to be properly sensitive to
her social conditions such that she is doxastically justified in her coverage-supported belief.
I
In this section, I describe (1) features of coverage-reliance ignorance, (2) its relation to
coverage-supported belief and white ignorance, (3) its bad epistemic consequences and (4) a case of
coverage-reliance ignorance where a subject holds a true but unjustified belief.
1.1: Features of Coverage-Reliance Ignorance
Coverage-reliance ignorance obtains if (a) a subject infers either a false belief or a doxastically
unjustified true belief because (b) she bases her inference in a false belief that sources reliably apprise
her of information in a domain in a timely fashion where (c) injustice causes her sources to unreliably
apprise her of information in this domain.
I understand injustice to involve asymmetrical power relations between a dominant racial
group and at least one non-dominant racial group in a given society. Racial injustice, gender injustice,
injustice that involves sexual orientation and disabled-bodiment are examples of injustice as I
understand it. I take US society as a paradigm case of a society where racial injustice obtains (Mills
1997; Omi and Winant 1994; Taylor 2013).
Coverage-reliance ignorance is an epistemically bad case of coverage-supported belief because
racial injustice causes, say, Jim’s news sources to unreliably report race-and-racial-injustice-related
information. If Jose bases his inference that the New York Yankees have not moved to Hartford
Connecticut on the belief that the New York Times reliably apprises him of information like this and
the New York Times has not reported that the New York Yankees have moved to Hartford, then he
is justified in his inference that the Yankees have not moved to Hartford. The absence of a report from
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the New York Times justifies him in his inference that it is not the case that the Yankees have moved.
This case is epistemically good because the New York Times would and does reliably report on matters
like these such that the absence of a report justifies him.
Jose’s and Jim’s cases epistemically differ because Jim bases his inference in a false belief about
his sources’ reliable coverage of racial-injustice-related topics and Jose bases his inference in a true belief
about his sources’ reliable coverage of sports-related topics. But, Jim’s case is epistemically bad because of
racial injustice. Racial injustice makes Jim’s belief about his source’s reliability false because racial
injustice makes his sources unreliable. So, Jim’s and Jose’s cases importantly differ in terms of their
respective beliefs about their respective sources’ coverage reliability.
1.2: Unjustified True Belief Case of Coverage-Reliance Ignorance
Jim infers a false belief at least partly because of racial injustice. But, a subject can also infer an
unjustified true belief because of racial injustice. Take the following case. Thomas is an 18 th century
Anglo-Saxon-Philadelphian man. During the 1700s, news publications like the Pennsylvania Gazette
overwhelmingly reported that Native Americans “were cunning, barbaric, and evil – and certainly
undeserving of the vast lands coveted by the European settlers” (Gonzalez and Torres 2011, 22). The
vast majority of these reports were false or exaggerated, and reports of European violence against
Native Americans were rarely reported even though it comprised much of the violence between
Europeans and Native Americans (Gonzalez and Torres 2011).
Suppose that Thomas overhears someone in a Philadelphia crowd claim that two months ago
European settlers viciously attacked a Native American village outside of Germantown Pennsylvania.
An hour later, Thomas reflects on whether this claim is true, and then he infers that it is not true that
European settlers viciously attacked a Native American village outside of Germantown. He bases his
inference in his belief that if Europeans had viciously attacked a Native American village outside of
Germantown, then he would have heard about it by now from a reliable news source like the
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Pennsylvania Gazette. Suppose that this report Thomas overhears is actually false even though Europeans
often committed acts like these against Native American villages. Here, Thomas infers a true, but
unjustified, belief because he bases his inference in his false belief that news sources like the
Pennsylvania Gazette reliably report on matters like these. But, in point of historical fact, the Pennsylvania
Gazette did not reliably report on matters like these and thus Thomas’ true belief is unjustified
(Gonzalez and Torres 2011). So, Thomas’ case is similar to Jim’s case because racial injustice plays a
role in undermining the reliability of the news-gathering-and-disseminating processes such that their
inference bases are false or epistemically bad.
1.3: Coverage-Supported Belief
By Goldberg’s lights, a subject’s coverage-supported belief counts as knowledge only if it
satisfies (1) five jointly sufficient conditions and (2) a non-Gettier condition. These five jointly
sufficient conditions must be satisfied for a coverage-supported belief to count as knowledge because
if they are satisfied, then the belief is sufficiently reliable to be properly evaluated as knowledge.
The first condition is the source-existence condition. The source-existence condition obtains if
there is a person, group or organization that is disposed to report on matters such as whether ‘Canada
has declared war on the US’ (‘W’). So, in the case of Victoria’s belief that ~W, the source-existence
condition is satisfied because sources exist, like the New York Times and Washington Post, that are
disposed to report on matters like whether Canada has declared war on the US (‘W’).
The second condition is the reliable-coverage condition. The reliable-coverage condition is
satisfied if there is a source who is reliable in uncovering and publicizing information in a domain of
interest to a subject. In the case of Victoria’s belief that ~W, the reliable-coverage condition is satisfied
because the New York Times reliably uncovers and publicizes W-like information.
The third condition is the sufficient-interval condition. The sufficient-interval condition is
satisfied if a source relays information in some domain of interest to a subject according to the “time-
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related expectations of [the subject], on the one hand, and the abilities of the [source] to make any
relevant discoveries, on the other” (Goldberg 2010, 161). In the case of Victoria’s belief that ~W, the
sufficient-interval condition is satisfied if, say, the New York Times reports W-like information in a
time interval such that it meets Victoria’s time-related expectations where her time-related expectation
is that if W were true, she would expect to see it reported on the New York Times’ website within,
say, an hour from when Canada declared war on the US.
The fourth condition is the silence condition. A subject satisfies the silence condition if she has
not come across a report regarding her coverage-supported belief. In the case of Victoria’s belief that
~W, she satisfies this condition because she has not come across or encountered any report that W.
In other words, Victoria’s reliable sources are silent on whether W.
The fifth condition is the receptivity condition. A subject satisfies the receptivity condition if
she “would come across whatever relevant reports were offered by the source(s)” (Goldberg 2010, 164,
original emphasis). In the case of Victoria’s belief that ~W, she satisfies this condition if, say, her
internet is working properly and reliably such that if the New York Times did report that W, then she
would receive the report that W. In Victoria’s case, the New York Times has not reported W so she is
justified in believing ~W partly because she is properly receptive to any New York Times reports that
W.
By Goldberg’s lights, a subject is doxastically justified in her coverage-supported belief if she
is sensitive to the social conditions that “make it likely” that the five knowledge conditions obtain.
These social conditions involve the “various social institutions and practices that form the
processes(es) by which news is generated and disseminated in her community” (Goldberg 2010, 179).
For example, Victoria properly expects her news sources such as the New York Times to inform her
in a timely and reliable way about whether Canada has declared war on the US. Her expectations are
calibrated to the reliability of the processes that compose her community’s information gathering and
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disseminating (Goldberg 2010). A subject is doxastically justified if her expectations, or beliefs about
her community’s reliability, track the social conditions that make it likely that her community newsgathering and disseminating processes are reliable. A subject is not doxastically justified if she is
insensitive to these social conditions. For example, Thomas is insensitive to the social condition that
makes it unlikely that these five knowledge conditions obtain, namely racial injustice, and thus he is
not doxastically justified.
1.4: White Ignorance
White ignorance obtains if a (a) subject either holds a false belief or lacks a true belief (b)
because of either whites’ dominant-group status or white racism (Mills 2007). Coverage-reliance
ignorance overlaps with white ignorance because a subject is coverage-reliant ignorant if he infers a
false belief because of racial injustice or whites’ dominant-group status. Jim’s case is a white ignorance
case because he holds a false belief because of whites’ dominant-group status. But, Jim’s case is also
a coverage-reliance ignorance case because whites’ dominant-group status makes his inference base
false or epistemically bad.
Not all coverage-reliance ignorance cases are white ignorance cases. For example, Thomas’
case of coverage-reliance ignorance is not a white-ignorance case because (1) Thomas neither holds a
false belief nor lacks a true belief because of whites’ dominant-group status and (2) a subject must hold a
false belief or lack a true belief to count as white ignorant by Mills’ lights.
But, if white ignorance is understood in a broader way, where white ignorance obtains if (a) a
subject is in a bad epistemic state because of white’s dominant-group status and (b) bad epistemic states
include a subject holding a doxastically unjustified true belief along with a subject holding a false belief and
lacking a true belief, then (c) coverage-reliance ignorance and white ignorance overlap to a larger
degree. That is, on this broader understanding of white ignorance, someone is white ignorant if she
holds an unjustified true belief because of whites’ dominant group status.
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Charles Mills suggests that white ignorance is a species of a larger genus of ignorance, what I
will call identity ignorance (Mills 2007). Identity ignorance obtains if a subject either holds a false
belief or lacks a true belief because of an identity-group’s dominant status. Men have been and are a
dominant group along the gender dimension of identity. So, if a subject holds a false belief or lacks a
true belief because of men’s dominant groups status, then he is in a male ignorant state and thus also
in an identity ignorant state.
But, identity ignorance also can be more broadly understood. On this broader understanding,
identity ignorance obtains if (a) a subject is in a bad epistemic state because of an identity-group’s
dominant status and (b) bad epistemic states include a subject holding a doxastically unjustified true
belief along with holding a false belief or lacking a true belief. And, on this broader understanding of
identity ignorance, coverage-reliance ignorance can be understood as a kind of identity ignorance. On
this broader understanding, all coverage-reliance cases are identity-ignorance cases because (1) all
coverage-reliance-ignorance cases involve a subject who is in a bad epistemic state because of an
identity-group’s dominant status and (2) all identity ignorance cases involve a subject who is in a bad
epistemic state because of an identity-group’s dominant status.
II
In this section, I argue that racial prejudice can make a news organization report unreliably
regarding racial injustice-related topics because racial prejudice can make hearers less reliably perceive
speakers’ trustworthiness. If (a) a news organization relies on hearers reliably perceiving non-white
speakers’ trustworthiness to reliably report about racial injustice-related topics and (b) racial prejudice
can make hearers less reliably perceive non-white speakers’ trustworthiness, then (c) racial prejudice
can make a news source unreliable on racial injustice-related topics.
I argue that racial prejudice can make a source unreliably report in a given domain where this
differs from whether a source provides a subject with coverage reliability such that she either knows or
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is doxastically justified in her coverage-supported belief. That is, if (1) a subject is properly evaluated
as knowing her coverage-supported belief only if her source reliably reports in a domain and (2) a
subject is more likely justified in her coverage-supported belief if her source reliably reports in a
domain, then whether a subject knows or is doxastically justified in her belief can depend on her
sources’ reliability in a given domain.
2.1: News Organizations qua Information Channels
News organizations rely on reporters and editors reliably perceiving speakers’ trustworthiness
to reliably report in a domain because news organizations function as information channels. An
information channel is a medium through which a signal carries information (Dretske 1981). An
information channel is reliable if enough of the signals that enter it are transmitted. So, if a news
organization functions as a reliable information channel, then this news organization must be
composed of processes that reliably transmit information through it.
Following Fred Dretske, Sanford Goldberg roughly defines reliable information transmission
in this way:
…a signal , carries the information that p, just in case  wouldn’t have transpired unless p
(Dretske 1981; Goldberg 2018)

On this view of reliable information transmission, information is reliably transmitted through
a news organization only if a news organization would not have reported that the New York Yankees
beat the Boston Red Sox unless the New York Yankees actually beat the Boston Red Sox. Here, the
report that the Yankees beat the Red Sox is the signal that is carried through a news organization qua
information channel.
News organizations such as the New York Times function as information channels partly in
virtue of reporters and editors who instantiate reliable processes and methods. News organization
editors and reporters act as gatekeepers who follow certain methods to ensure the reliable transmission
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of information through their respective newspapers qua information channels. Alvin Goldman
characterizes gatekeeping in these ways:
“Broadly speaking, gatekeeping is any kind of third-party activity that controls the production
of speech or affects the dissemination of messages to possible audiences” (Goldman 1999),
189.
“This ‘gatekeeper’ function affects what messages are received by hearers or the number of
hearers who receive them, and thereby impinges on information-state changes” (Goldman,
189)

By Goldman’s lights, a gatekeeper can be veritistically assessed in terms of whether her
practices lead to her audience holding more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs (Goldman 1999, 189).
On assessing gatekeepers, Goldman says:
“Given the importance of gatekeepers…social epistemology must inquire into the practices available
to gatekeepers and the veritistic consequences that might flow from these practices” (Goldman 1999,
189).

A reporter or editor performs her gatekeeping function veritistically well if she employs
practices that increase the likelihood of true belief and decrease the likelihood of false belief among
her readers. I assume that practices can include following rules and methods.
John Greco suggests that norms that govern gatekeeping are (1) that information should be
let into a social system and (2) that false information should be kept from entering into or continuing
to pass through a social system (Greco 2016, 492; Greco 2017). If (a) reporters and editors are
gatekeepers, (b) information channels are social systems, (c) these two gatekeeping norms promote
the likelihood that information is transmitted through an information channel, then (d) a gatekeeper
who follows these two gatekeeping norms promotes the reliability of her information channel.
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The basic idea here is that reporters and editors qua gatekeepers can follow rules or methods
that aim to funnel information into the channel and prevent bad information from entering or
continuing to pass through the channel (Greco 2016; Greco 2017).
2.12: Gatekeeping and Political Framing
One could object that two gatekeepers can present the same information but frame it in ways
that support their political points of view such that whether a gatekeeper performs epistemically well
can depend on an evaluator’s political point of view. For example, a politically conservative news
source such as Fox News could report information that x number of Central American migrants
crossed the US-Mexico border without US documentation last year. Similarly, a politically progressive
new source such as Democracy Now could report the same information. But, suppose that Fox News
reports this information in a way that implies or suggests that these migrants are blameworthy for
crossing the border without US documentation. And, suppose that Democracy Now reports this
information in way that implies or suggests that these Central American migrants are not blameworthy
for crossing the border without US documentation. So, by this objector’s lights, the analysis of
gatekeeping offered above does not capture the way that different news sources can politically frame
the same information and thus this analysis leaves out something important.
This objection fails because even if two gatekeepers can politically frame the same information
in ways that differ, the way that they frame information can be assessed in terms of whether they
reliably lead the information recipients to form further true beliefs. Suppose that the way that Fox
News frames their information leads their information recipients to reliably form a false belief, namely
that Central American migrants are blameworthy. If Fox News’ political framing reliably causes its
information recipients to form false beliefs, then they are performing this gatekeeping function poorly
even though they present information that x number of Central American migrants crossed the USMexico border without US documentation.
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2.2: Racial Prejudice and Information Transmission
Racial prejudice can make a news organization’s information transmission unreliable because
it can make hearers less reliably perceive speakers’ trustworthiness. A news reporter may improperly
take a trustworthy news source as untrustworthy and thus not allow this trustworthy source’s
information into her news organization qua information channel such that the source reports it in
print or digital form. So, if (a) racial prejudice can affect whether a reporter allows information into
her news organization qua information channel and (b) allowing information into a channel partly
constitutes reliable information transmission, then (c) racial prejudice can make a news organization
qua information channel transmit information unreliably.
Take Jim’s case. Jim relies on local and national news organizations to reliably report on
matters like whether the Detroit police unjustly treat black folks relative to white folks. That is, Jim
believes that his news sources reliably uncover and publicize matters like these. Jim’s commitment to
the truth of this belief also involves commitment to these local and national news organizations’
reporters reliably perceiving speakers’ trustworthiness. That is, Jim’s commitment to the truth of this
belief involves a commitment to the view that his newspapers’ reporters will likely trust speakers who
are actually trustworthy and not trust speakers who are untrustworthy.
Hearers who harbor racial prejudice will tend to perceive, say, black and Latino speakers as
untrustworthy even though they are actually trustworthy (Fricker 2007). Hearers who harbor racial
prejudices will tend to misperceive black and Latino speakers this way because racial prejudice is a
kind of identity prejudice and identity prejudice can affect hearers’ perceptions of speakers in a
subpersonal way (Fricker 2007). Identity prejudices involve false generalizations about identity groups
such as men, women, blacks, whites, Latinx folks, disabled and abled bodied folks (Fricker 2007).
Identity prejudices can be negative or positive because the generalizations can have positive or
negative content. A positive identity prejudice is that White-Anglo-Saxons are above average abstract
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thinkers. A negative identity prejudice is that Dominicans are prone to criminal behavior. Both are
false generalizations, but one attributes a positive feature to a group’s members and the other attributes
a negative feature to a group’s members.
Identity prejudices are epistemically bad partly because they can cause testimonial injustice
(Fricker 2007). Testimonial injustice obtains if a hearer misperceives a speaker’s trustworthiness on a
topic because she harbors an identity prejudice (Fricker 2007). Identity prejudice can cause a hearer to
misperceive a speaker’s trustworthiness because the identity prejudice’s content can cause her to
perceive the speaker as either less incompetent or less insincere (Fricker 2007). Racial prejudice is a
kind of identity prejudice because racial prejudices are false generalizations about racial groups.
In Jim’s case, if (a) a reporter for one of his local or national news organizations harbors a
racial prejudice, (b) racial prejudice can cause reporters to misperceive trustworthy speakers as
untrustworthy, (c) a non-white speaker’s attempt to transmit that the Detroit police unjustly treat black
folks to a reporter is likely unsuccessful because the reporter likely commits testimonial injustice, then
(d) racial prejudice makes the news organizations qua information channel that Jim relies on unreliable
because (e) racial prejudice makes it less likely that this speaker will transmit this information to the
reporter who could publish this information so that Jim can receive it in a newspaper. So, racial
prejudice can make a news organization unreliable because news reporters are constituents of news
organizations where racial prejudice influences news reporters’ ability to reliably perceive speaker
trustworthiness.
2.3: Racial Prejudice and Racial Injustice Information
If (a) speakers who are most likely to have information about racial injustice are members of nondominant racial groups, (b) racial prejudices in societies with entrenched racial injustice tend to be
about non-dominant racial groups and (c) negative racial prejudices reduce the likelihood that nondominant group speakers successfully convey information about racial injustice, then (d) non-
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dominant-racial-group speakers who are most likely to have information about racial injustice are less
likely to have this information reported by news organizations because non-dominant-racial group
speakers are less likely to successfully convey information about racial injustice to reporters.
Non-dominant racial groups such as blacks, Latinos and Native Americans are more likely to
have information about racial injustice because of their social locations (Harding 2015; Harding 1993).
Social locations can include any identity dimension such as sexual orientation, economic class or
religion.

Non-dominant social locations are positions from which subjects are more likely to

hypothesize or pose questions that lead to information in certain domains (Harding 2015; Harding
1993). Similarly, whether an archer can hit her target can depend on whether she is located too far from
the target or whether her location is too foggy or windy. Similarly, a social location can differ from
others as a location from which to acquire a true belief. The basic idea is that if a group of nondominant racial subjects experience the effects of racial injustice, then they may be more likely to float
hypotheses or ask questions that answer racial injustice related questions or queries than dominant
racial group subjects who have likely only experienced the benefits and few of the bad effects of racial
injustice.
A paradigm example of a society with entrenched racial injustice is the US (Mills 1997; Omi
and Winant 1994; Taylor 2013). Racial prejudices are widespread in US society partly because of
hermeneutical marginalization (Fricker 2007).

Hermeneutical marginalization obtains if non-

dominant-identity-group members cannot sufficiently influence a society’s set of shared concepts
because non-dominant-identity-group members have poorer access to positions in society that allow
one to influence a society’s set of shared concepts (Fricker 2007). Examples of such positions are
university professors, political offices, legal positions such as being an attorney or judge and journalism
positions such as being an investigative reporter or periodical editor (Fricker 2007). If hermeneutical
marginalization obtains, then the set of shared concepts will likely be “structurally prejudiced” in favor
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of the dominant-group and similarly prejudiced in disfavor of non-dominant groups (Fricker 2007,
155). If (a) a set of shared concepts is structurally prejudiced against non-dominant groups, (b) blacks
and Latinos are non-dominant groups, (c) this set of shared concept set is widely held, then (d) negative
racial prejudices will be widely held by subjects in this society.
Negative racial prejudices tend to prevent non-dominant group speakers from successfully
conveying information about racial injustice partly because if they are widely-held, then not only will
testimonial injustice likely widely obtain, but testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering and will
also likely widely obtain. Testimonial quieting obtains if (a) a non-dominant-group speaker, say, a
black woman, cannot successfully convey information (b) because a hearer’s negative identity
prejudice against black women prevents him from recognizing her as a knower (Dotson 2011).
Testimonial smothering obtains only if a speaker refrains from fully conveying information because
she senses that (1) conveying her testimony is unsafe, (2) her audience demonstrates that they are
unlikely to find this information intelligible and (3) the audience cannot find the information
intelligible because of pernicious ignorance (Dotson 2011). That is, a speaker testimonially smothers
her testimony only if she refrains because she senses that (1), (2) and (3) obtain. Pernicious ignorance
is ignorance that reliably and systematically affects dominant-group hearers’ perceptions of nondominant speakers (Dotson 2011). Here, I understand pernicious ignorance to overlap with identity
prejudice.
Suppose a black speaker, Michael, tells a reporter, from a newspaper that Jim reads, that the
Detroit police unjustly treat black people relative to white people. But, this reporter commits
testimonial injustice against Michael due to an anti-black racial prejudice she bears. As a result, this
reporter does not consider investigating whether black people are unjustly treated in this way. Here,
information about racial injustice is less likely reported because of racial prejudice. And, here racial prejudice
makes it less likely that a non-dominant speaker successfully conveys information about racial
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prejudice to hearers in general and to newspaper reporters in particular. Michael is more likely to have
information about racial injustice because of his social location qua black man. Here, a non-dominant speaker
who is in a better epistemic position to have information in a domain is less likely to successfully
convey because of racial prejudice.
In this section, I have argued that racial prejudice can make news sources unreliably report on
racial-injustice related matters. Racial prejudice affects news sources’ reliability through affecting
individuals’ reliability qua information channels constituents. That is, so far I have taken up how
individual reporters or editors qua agents can affect new sources’ reliability in a domain.
III
In this section, I argue that a society’s unjust structure can make a news organization unreliable
because it can make it less likely that its reports on racial-injustice-related topics reach subjects who
lack information in this domain. If (a) a society where racial injustice obtains has an unjust structure,
(b) a society’s unjust structure can make news sources that are more likely to report on racial-injusticerelated topics less likely to reach subjects who lack such information, then (c) a society’s unjust
structure can make news organizations less reliably apprise subjects who lack information about racial
injustice.
3.1: Racial Injustice and a Society’s Unjust Structure
The legacy of slavery, Jim Crow and discriminatory hiring practices in the US shape the
structure of US society today in ways that negatively affect socio-economic outcomes for blacks,
Latinos and Native Americans (Mills 1997; Omi and Winant 1994; Taylor 2013). Charles Mills points
to the following to justify the claim that US society is structured to favor whites:
…if one [attempts to calculate] the cumulative value, with compound interest, of unpaid slave
labor before 1863, underpayment since 1863, and denial of opportunity to acquire land and
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natural resources available to white settlers, then the total amount required to compensate blacks
‘could take more than the entire wealth of the Unites States’ (Mills 1997, 39, my emphases).

This only concerns blacks qua non-dominant-racial group in the US. It does not concern the
value diverted from nondominant groups such as Latinos and Native Americans. If the ways that
income and opportunities have been diverted from these groups to whites is considered, then the idea
that US society is structured in favor of whites should at least seem plausible. I assume, rather than
argue that if racial injustice obtains in a society, then it will likely have an unjust structure, because
entire fields of inquiry such as black studies, Africana Studies, Latino Studies, Native American studies
and parts of entire disciplines such as sociology and history exist to explain the ways these structures
have affected people in the past and continue to affect people today.
3.2: Racial Injustice Information and a Society’s Unjust Structure
A society’s unjust structure can make news organizations that are more likely to report on racial
injustice related topics less likely to reach subjects who lack information about racial injustice. If (a) nondominant-owned-news sources are more likely to report on racial injustice related topics, (b) news
sources that lack resources such as capital, loans and proper funding are less likely to successfully
convey their information to recipients who lack it, (c) a society’s unjust structure makes it less likely
that non-dominant-group news sources have these resources, then (d) a society’s unjust structure
makes reports from news sources that are more likely to report racial injustice information less likely received
by subjects who lack this information.
New York City’s black owned and edited newspaper, Freedom’s Journal, was more likely than its
New York City counterparts to publish on issues that took up black experience and racial injustice
(Gonzalez and Torres 2011). Freedom’s Journal was in circulation from 1827 to 1829 (Gonzalez and
Torres 2011). During this time the Freedom’s Journal rebuffed falsehoods reported by the mainstream
press in New York City. One example of this is when Freedom’s Journal provided counterevidence to
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an article that the New-York Evening Post published that claimed that “the condition of blacks on
Southern plantations, despite some ‘occasional exceptions,’ was ‘one of contentment, of gaiety and
happiness” (Gonzalez and Torres 2011, 110). The New-York Evening Post went so far as to claim that
“the master-slave relationship [was] ‘one of mutual attachment’” (Gonzalez and Torres 2011, 110).
In 1892, Ida B. Wells as editor and part owner of Memphis’ Free Speech periodical published an
article that offered counterevidence and counterargument to the false, but widely-held, belief that
many of the black men who were lynched for raping white women indeed had raped white women
(Gonzalez and Torres 2011). Wells suggested that these black men were lynched not because they
forced themselves on white women, but rather they were lynched at least partly because white women
willingly engaged or wanted to engage in relationships with them (Gonzalez and Torres 2011). Both
Free Speech and New York’s Freedom’s Journal were more likely to uncover and publicize facts about
racial-injustice than mainstream newspapers. Both of these periodicals had less funding or capital
than their white-owned or mainstream counterparts (Gonzalez and Torres 2011).
If a news source has poorer distribution, advertising, printing material and insufficient staff and these
things contribute to a news source’s reports more likely reaching subjects, then this news source’s
reports are less likely read by subjects. If a newspaper has poorer distribution than other newspapers
it will reach fewer subjects than these other newspapers because it will be available at fewer venues
such as newsstands. Here, subjects are not as widely privy to the information that newspapers with
poor distribution carry. And, even if a subject happens to come across a newspaper that is poorly
distributed at a newsstand that carries it, this subject may improperly infer that this newspaper is not
epistemically as good as others because it has poor distribution. Suppose Jim comes across a
newspaper that is disposed to report that the Detroit police unjustly treat black people relative to how
they treat white people, he may not pick up this newspaper because he infers that if this were a good
news source, then he would have seen it at other newsstands. Here, Jim associates wide distribution
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with epistemic goodness and on this basis he infers that newspapers with good distribution are
epistemically better than newspapers with poor distribution. But, of course, newspapers with poor
distribution can be epistemically better than newspapers with good distribution
If a newspaper has poorer advertising than other newspapers, then fewer subjects will either
attempt to secure information from this newspaper or know that it is even a source from which they
could secure information (Wong 2013). If a subject does not know that a newspaper exists, then she
cannot seek it out for the information it has. And, if a subject comes across a newspaper that she has
not heard of because it is poorly advertised, then she may infer that it is not epistemically good because
either she has not heard that it is an epistemically good newspaper from a reliable source or that
newspapers that are poorly advertised likely do not have sufficient funds to provide good news
coverage. The basic idea here is that a subject may not pick up an epistemically good newspaper
because she is not familiar with it, due to its poor advertising
If a newspaper’s printing materials are poorer than other newspapers, then subjects may
improperly take the newspaper as less epistemically good than newspapers that are printed on better
materials because subjects may infer that if a newspaper has insufficient resources to print on better
materials, then it likely has insufficient resources to provide good news coverage (Langer et al. 2013;
Marlow and Jansson-Boyd 2011; Hampel et al 2012). Suppose that Jim sees a newspaper printed in
black and white on rough paper and next to it he sees a newspaper printed in color on high quality
paper. Jim is likely attracted to the newspaper printed in color on high quality paper even if the
newspaper printed in black and white on rough paper has more relevant information or even less false
information.
If a newspaper has insufficient staff and it is disposed to report on racial-injustice-related
topics, then it may not report on certain racial-injustice-related topics because it has to prioritize its
limited staff on some stories rather than others. Suppose that Jim often picks up a newspaper at his
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newsstand that is disposed to cover racial-injustice-related information, but this newspaper had to
prioritize covering city government’s decision to underfund education and housing in primarily black
neighborhoods over covering how Detroit police are disproportionately pulling over black drivers
relative to white drivers. Here, one of Jim’s news sources does not apprise him of this information
because it has insufficient staff.
If (a) black-owned news sources have poorer access to capital than white news sources, (b)
poorer access to capital makes it less likely that such a newspaper will have good distribution,
advertising, printing materials and sufficient staff, (c) society’s unjust structure makes it more likely
that black newspapers have poorer access to capital than white newspapers, (d) good distribution,
printing material, advertising and sufficient staff make it more likely that a subject will read a news
source, then (d) a society’s structure can make it less likely that subjects will read black owned news
sources.
If (a) white subjects are less likely to have information about racial injustice, (b) black subjects
are more likely to have information about racial injustice, (c) a society’s unjust structure makes it less
likely that subjects receive reports from black-owned newspapers, then (d) society’s unjust structure
reduces the likelihood that white subjects’ available news sources will apprise them of information
about racial injustice.
3.3: Racial Injustice’s Disjunctive Effect
So far, I have provided two causal routes or ways that racial injustice can make news or
information sources fail to provide reliable coverage for a subject in the race and racial injustice
domain. Racial prejudice is the first way and a society’s unjust structure is the second way. In the US,
racial injustice affects coverage reliability, or causes coverage-reliance ignorance, simultaneously
through both causal routes. But, analytically, racial injustice need only cause this through one route
for coverage-reliance ignorance to obtain. That is, racial injustice can cause a subject to be in a
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coverage-reliance ignorant state either because of (1) racial prejudice or (2) a society’s unjust structure
even if, as a matter of empirical fact, both (1) and (2) tend to simultaneously obtain.
If (a) racial prejudice makes a subject’s news sources unreliable because of how their
constituent parts, reporters and editors, reliably misperceive speakers’ trustworthiness, then (b) this
subject’s sources will not provide reliable coverage in this domain even if the structure of society does
not affect information dissemination or delivery. The basic idea here is that even if a source would
reliably transmit information in a domain to subjects who lack it, reliable transmission, and thus
reliable coverage, requires that a source actually reliably uncover information in this domain.
Similarly, if a society’s unjust structure makes a subject’s news sources unreliably apprise her
of information in the race-and-racial-injustice domain because this structure makes her sources’
reports unlikely to reach her, then these sources will likely not provide reliable coverage in this domain
even if these sources reliably uncover this information. The idea here is that even if a source reliably
uncovers information in this domain, reliable coverage involves that a subject’s sources’ reports
actually reach her.
That either widespread racial prejudice or a society’s unjust structure can cause coveragereliance ignorance to obtain matters because even if society becomes less racially unjust along either
of these dimensions, coverage-reliance ignorance could still obtain. So, society even if US society
seems much better in terms of, say, society’s structure disfavoring black and Latinx folks, racial
injustice may still be causing bad epistemic outcomes such as Jim’s and Thomas’.
IV
In sections two and three, I argued that racial injustice can make news sources less reliably
report on racial-injustice-related topics because of racial injustice’s effect on both news sources qua
information channels and society’s unjust structure. That is, I have argued that racial injustice can
undermine the epistemic goodness of, say, Thomas’ coverage-supported belief’s inference base,
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namely his belief that if it were true that Europeans had attacked a Native American village outside of
Germantown Pennsylvania, then he would have heard about it by now from a reliable source like the
Pennsylvania Gazette.

Racial injustice, I have argued, undermines the epistemic goodness of his

inference base because racial injustice makes his news sources less reliable on racial-injustice-related
topics such that his sources do not reliably apprise him of racial-injustice-related topics. So, Thomas
makes an epistemically bad inference because he bases his inference on a false belief. And, this belief
about the reliability of his news sources is false because of racial injustice. So, racial injustice makes
Thomas’ inference epistemically bad because racial injustice makes his inference base false.
But, I now argue that racial injustice not only can undermine the reliability of the processes
that would make his inference base epistemically good, but it can also undermine Thomas’ sensitivity
to the social conditions that make it likely that his news sources apprise him of racial-injustice-related
topics in a timely and reliable way. That is, I now argue that racial injustice can undermine a subject’s
capacity to be properly sensitive to their social conditions such that they are doxastically justified in
their coverage-supported belief.
4.1: News Sources and Proper Sensitivity
If (a) a doxastically justified subject is properly sensitive to the social conditions that make it
likely that she is reliably apprised of racial-injustice-related information, (b) a primary way to be
sensitive to these social conditions is through sensitivity to reports from news sources, (c) racial
injustice undermines the reliability of these news sources, then (d) it will be difficult for her to be
properly sensitive to these social conditions because a primary way to be sensitive to these conditions
is undermined by racial injustice. If there is more information for a subject to be sensitive to, then
she will find it easier to properly calibrate her expectations of her source’s coverage reliability to her
sources’ likely coverage reliability such that she is justified. And, similarly, if there is less information
for a subject to be sensitive to, then she will find it more difficult to properly calibrate these
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expectations to her sources’ likely coverage reliability. So, racial injustice itself undermines a primary
way for a subject to be sensitive to whether her news sources reliably report racial injustice
information.
In Thomas’s case, one of the primary ways that he can be sensitive to whether the social
conditions obtain such that his news sources reliably report information about racial-injustice-related
topics is to be sensitive to reports from these same news sources. So, Thomas in part relies on
information from sources that are unreliable for information about these sources’ coverage reliability.
But, of course, if these sources are unreliable, then they may not provide information for him to be
sensitive to such that his expectations about coverage reliability in this domain are properly calibrated.
The basic idea here is that racial injustice is a social phenomenon that obtains at a society-wide scale
such that it is difficult for subjects to be sensitive to it without relying on news sources that can inform
them about the world beyond the reach of their individual perceptual capacities.
4.2: Testimonial Injustice, Testimonial Quieting and Proper Sensitivity
If (a) a doxastically justified subject’s sensitivity involves sensitivity to information from
speakers about whether the social conditions obtain that make it likely that she is reliably apprised of
information on racial injustice, (b) this subject likely commits either testimonial injustice or quieting
against non-white speakers who would convey information that these social conditions do not obtain,
(c) these non-dominant speakers are more likely to have information about whether these social
conditions obtain, then (d) this subject is less likely properly sensitive to whether these social conditions
obtain because (d1) non-dominant speakers who are more likely to have this information are likely either taken
as not trustworthy or not recognized as knowers because of racial prejudice.
4.3: Racial Injustice and Dominant-Group Psychology
If (a) a doxastically justified subject’s sensitivity involves sensitivity to information from
speakers about whether the social conditions obtain that make it likely that she is reliably apprised of
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information regarding racial injustice, (b) dominant group subjects are unlikely to revise their initial
beliefs regarding a domain, (c) dominant-group subjects are unlikely to believe information that
conflicts with their dominant-group status, (d) dominant-group subjects form beliefs that support
their dominant status at an early age, (e) white subjects are dominant-group subjects, then (f) white
subjects are unlikely properly sensitive to information that concerns the social conditions that make it
likely that her news sources reliably apprise her of racial-injustice-related topics. Here, I assume that
the set of beliefs that a subject learns early in childhood overlaps with the set of beliefs that she has
first come to hold in a domain.
Suppose Thomas encountered well-supported information that newspapers such as the
Pennsylvania Gazette are not likely to report instances of Europeans attacking Native American
villages because of racial injustice’s effect on what Colonial-American newspapers publish. And,
suppose Thomas was taught at an early age that proper Anglo-Christian Americans would publicly
address wrongs done to any of God’s children where this includes Native Americans. Thomas would
find it difficult to believe this new well-supported information he encountered because it conflicts
with a belief that he acquired at an early age. The belief perseverance effect predicts that Thomas
would find it difficult to believe this new information (Nisbett and Ross 1980).

The belief

perseverance effect is a tendency that subjects have where they stubbornly retain beliefs that are their
first beliefs, or some of their earliest beliefs, on a topic (Nisbett and Ross 1980). That is, subjects’
initial beliefs regarding a domain tend to be stubbornly resistant to counterevidence in comparison to
beliefs in the same domain formed much later.
Another psychological feature of subjects that predicts that Thomas would find it difficult to
believe this well-supported information is ‘identity protective cognition’ (Stanley 2015, 230).
“[Identity] protective cognition is motivated reasoning with the goal of ‘affirming one’s membership
in an important reference group’” (Stanley 2015, 230). According to this psychological feature of
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subjects, white subjects are unlikely receptive to information that conflicts with their dominant-group
status because they want to protect this status. Similarly, social psychological research on dissonance
suggests subjects’ reception of “disconfirming evidence…actually causes discomfort” (Elliot and
Devine 1994; Mandelbaum 2018, 11). And, by Eric Mandelbaum’s lights, the social psychology
literature suggests that if (a) a subject encounters evidence that either is inconsistent with a belief that
they identify with or threatens their positive sense of self, then not only (b) will they reject this evidence
but (c) they may strengthen their confidence in the belief that they identify with (Mandelbaum 2015:
Mandelbaum 2018). The basic idea here is that subjects have a psychological mechanism that either
aims to preserve a subject’s positive self-conception or aims to avoid the discomfort that is associated
with believing negative things about oneself. And, if this psychological mechanism obtains, then
Thomas is unlikely sensitive to this information about Europeans attacking Native Americans that
either undermines his positive self-conception or is likely to cause him to believe something negative
about himself.
Conclusion
I have argued (1) that racial injustice can make news sources unreliably uncover and
publicize information in the race-and-racial-injustice domain because of racial prejudice’s effects on
news organizations qua information channels, (2) that racial injustice can make news sources, that
are more likely reliable in this domain, unreliably transmit their information to subjects who lack it
because of a society’s unjust structure and (3) that racial injustice can undermine subjects’ doxastic
justification in a coverage-supported belief because if racial injustice obtains in a society, then
information that subjects can be sensitive to is less likely available.
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Chapter 3
When Knowledge Is Not Enough
According to a 2016 Gallup poll, 69% of whites in the US believe that whites and blacks have equal
opportunity in the US job market (Jones & Saad, 2016). Suppose that William is a white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant man who, like these 69% of whites, believes that blacks and whites have equal opportunity
in the US job market. But, in point of fact, blacks and whites do not have equal opportunity in the US
job market (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). Here, William fails to avoid holding a false belief.
Suppose that William knows facts about US race relations such as that Jim Crow was immoral and
oppressive, that the legacy of slavery affects the structure of US society in unjust ways and that the
US Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1963 and 1964 ameliorated grave moral and political
wrongs. But, suppose that having this knowledge is not enough for William to avoid believing the
falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market. That is, that William
knows these US-race-relations facts does not preclude him from believing this falsehood even though
this falsehood is inconsistent with this knowledge. William fails to sense this inconsistency and, thus he,
like 69% of US whites, comes to hold this false belief.
Now, suppose that Thomas, a white-Anglo-Saxon protestant man, does not believe that blacks
and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market. And, suppose that Thomas knows the same
facts about US race relations as William such as Jim Crow was immoral and oppressive, that the legacy
of slavery affects the structure of US society in unjust ways and that the US Civil Rights and Voting
Rights Acts of 1963 and 1964 ameliorated grave moral and political wrongs. Suppose that Thomas
does not come to hold this falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job
market because he senses that it is inconsistent with facts he knows about US race relations. And,
suppose that Thomas senses this inconsistency because he has sufficiently deep understanding of US
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race relations. So, Thomas has sufficiently deep understanding, which William lacks, and this epistemic
state of understanding explains why Thomas avoids coming to hold this falsehood and William does not.
In this chapter, I argue that (C1) deep enough understanding is a cognitive feature of a subject
that can make it more likely that they avoid coming to hold a false belief in domains that concern
social-political phenomena such as racial injustice. I argue that (C2) a fragmentation view of beliefstorage explains why dominant-group subjects such as William tend to hold false beliefs in domains
that concern their dominant group status.
An aim I have in this chapter is to explain why 69% of whites hold false beliefs such as that
blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market where this is an example of a general
epistemic phenomenon. This is an instance of an epistemic phenomenon that is a result of both (i) how
subjects generally store beliefs and (ii) how relations of power in a society are generally asymmetrical
or unjust.
A second aim I have in this chapter is to describe the epistemic state of understanding on a
fragmentation view of belief storage. That is, I aim to describe features of the epistemic state of
understanding if (a) the fragmentation view of belief storage is correct and (b) understanding involves
that a subject grasps the relations between facts and concepts (Elgin, 2009; Bendana & Mandelbaum,
ms).
In section one, I argue that dominant-group subjects tend to hold false beliefs that are
consistent with their positive self-conception because of features of human psychology and the way
that subjects’ evidence bases tend to support these false beliefs. In section two, I argue that sufficiently
deep understanding of social-political phenomena such as US-race relations reduces the likelihood
that a subject comes to hold false core beliefs. In section three, I argue that sufficiently deep
understanding of social injustice is more likely to prevent a subject from holding false core beliefs that are
consistent with dominant-group subjects’ positive self-conception than knowledge. In section four, I suggest that
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educational systems should aim to instill sufficiently deep understanding of, say, US-race relations
early on in subjects’ educational careers.
I
In this section, I argue that (a) the fragmentation view of belief-storage, (b) the human
tendencies to avoid cognitive dissonance and (c) hermeneutical marginalization of non-dominant
groups explains why (d) dominant-group subjects tend to hold false beliefs that are consistent with their
positive self-conception.
1.1: The Phenomenon
The basic epistemic phenomenon that I explain involves (1) that dominant-group subjects
tend to hold falsehoods that are consistent with dominant-group subjects’ positive self-conception even
though (2) these falsehoods are inconsistent with facts they know. For example, William, like 69% of
whites, believes the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market
even though he knows facts regarding US-race relations that are inconsistent with this falsehood (Saad
and Jones 2016).
Suppose that William’s positive self-conception involves that he falsely believes that he deserves what
he has. William’s false belief that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market is
consistent with his positive self-conception because if (a) William’s wealth, status and station in life are only
due to his own hard work, diligence or perseverance rather than unfair advantage due to his race and
(b) hard work, diligence or perseverance bestow desert on a subject, then (c) William would deserve
what he has. But, the true belief that blacks and whites do not have equal opportunity in the US job
market is inconsistent with his positive self-conception because if (i) William’s wealth, status and
station in life are due to opportunities he has had due to his race and (ii) desert is incompatible with
unfair advantage due to race, then (iii) William does not deserve what he has.
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Recall, William knows US-race-relations facts, but that he knows these facts is not enough for
him to jettison this false belief. That is, these facts that he knows should spur revision of this false
belief because these facts are inconsistent or do not cohere with this US-race-relations knowledge.
And, this revision should obtain in part due to William sensing inconsistency between these US-racerelations facts and this falsehood in the domain of race and racial injustice. Here, William is in a bad
epistemic state, namely false belief, at least, partly because this epistemically bad state is consistent
with his positive self-conception. And, this positive self-conception involves commitments to
falsehoods because of racial injustice or that whites are the dominant-racial group in the US.
1.2: Fragmentation of Belief
The fragmentation of belief storage view explains why William’s US-race-relations knowledge
does not defeat his falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market.
On this view, a subject’s beliefs in part reside on “distinct, independently accessible data structures”
or fragments (Bendana & Mandelbaum ms). According to this view, I can hold the belief that p on
one fragment and the belief that ~p on another fragment without sensing incoherence or
inconsistency because I normally access one fragment at a time. That is, fragments are typically
activated one at a time and as a result subjects are unlikely to sense that a belief, p, that resides on one
fragment is inconsistent with another belief ~p that resides on a separate fragment. But, the
fragmentation view also holds that “intrafragmental inconsistency…would be automatically resolved”
(Bendana and Mandelbaum ms, 31). That is, if a fragment is activated and two inconsistent beliefs
reside on it, say, p and ~p, then a subject would resolve the inconsistency between these inconsistent
beliefs.
Subjects normally update fragments with new beliefs one at a time (Bendana & Mandelbaum,
ms). Fragments are updated when they are activated and whether a particular fragment is activated
depends on context. Context consists in either a place or time. Some evidence for this is that subjects
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can more easily remember information in the environment, or context, in which they initially obtained
it (Bendana and Mandelbaum, ms, 27).
Now, if two, or more, fragments are activated and these two fragments have inconsistent
beliefs, then these inconsistent beliefs will be rendered consistent. That is, if there is interfragmental
inconsistency between activated fragments, then the inconsistent beliefs will be made consistent. A
basic upshot of this view is that subjects do not store beliefs in a way that maintains consistency and
coherence across all of our cognitive real estate, but rather parcels of cognitive real estate can be home
to beliefs that are inconsistent or incoherent with beliefs that reside on other parcels. So, if subjects’
cognitive architecture can be home to inconsistent beliefs that reside in different areas, then this at
least partly explains how William can hold the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity
in the US job market while simultaneously knowing US-race-relations facts that are inconsistent with
this falsehood.
1.3: Core Beliefs
Core beliefs concern the positive characteristics of subjects who hold them. Core belief tokens
or copies reside on many, if not most, of a subject’s belief storage fragments and a given core belief’s
strength is a function of how many belief fragments it resides on (Bendana & Mandelbaum ms;
Mandelbaum 2018).
Beliefs that concern whether subjects are “good people, smart people, and reliable, consistent,
strong people” are examples of core beliefs, because they concern positive characteristics of the
subjects who hold them (Bendana & Mandelbaum ms).
A subject’s core belief that she is a good person likely resides on many, if not most, of her
belief storage fragments because typically whether a fragment is activated, and thus capable of
updating the beliefs that reside on it, depends on the context a subject is in. If fragments are updated
in particular contexts, then context features that are most often present are likely to reside on more

70

fragments than features that are not similarly present in as many contexts. So, if information about a
subject is present in most contexts that she can be in, then ipso facto core beliefs are likely to reside on
more fragments than non-core beliefs that do not contain information about the self (Mandelbaum,
2018). The basic idea here is that a subject’s beliefs about herself are likely present in most contexts
and thus stored on many fragments such that they are very redundant.
A belief’s strength or resiliency, on a fragmentation view, is a result of how many token beliefs
or copies of a belief reside on different fragments. If a subject’s token belief that p is defeated in a
particular context, but it is not defeated in other contexts, then this subject will likely still report the
belief that p in other contexts because other token beliefs that p may still reside on other fragments
that were not activated and thus not updated with defeating information.
1.4: False Core Beliefs and Hermeneutical Marginalization
If (a) dominant groups tend to have more influence over subjects’ evidence bases than nondominant groups, (b) if a group has more influence over evidence bases, then most contexts will have
evidence that supports the positive self-conception of this group’s subjects, (c) subjects are disposed
to believe positive things about themselves, (d) when subjects sense logical inconsistency in their
beliefs, they experience dissonance which causes them to resolve the inconsistency, then (e) dominantgroup-subjects are likely to hold false core beliefs that are consistent with their positive self-conception
at least partly because (e1) misleading evidence for this exists in most contexts and (e2) subjects have a
tendency to hold positive beliefs about themselves.
White Anglo-Saxon-Protestants became the dominant group in the North America shortly
after they arrived on the eastern seaboard of North America. As a result, white Anglo-Saxons have
had more influence over subjects’ evidence bases than other groups during this time period (Omi &
Winant, 1992). They controlled the vast majority of periodical or news presses, the content and
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character of memorials and monuments, museums, school curriculums, songs sung at the beginning
of public sports events and so on (Gonzalez & Torres 2011).
Non-dominant groups such as Native Americans and African-Americans have had little
influence over North American subjects’ evidence bases. These non-dominant groups have been
hermeneutically marginalized where this involves that a group unequally contributes to a society’s
shared set of concepts and shared social meanings that subjects draw upon to understand each other
and the world (Fricker, 2007, 153). For example, African-Americans and Native Americans have had
unequal access to positions in society such as journalist, professor and lawyer positions, such that they
can equally, or proportionately, contribute to the shared set of meanings and concepts that subjects
across US society use to both communicate and understand each other and the world. Here, I assume
that shared meaning and concept sets partly constitute subjects’ evidence bases such that if
hermeneutical marginalization obtains, then a subject’s evidence base will be negatively affected.
A core belief that North American white Anglo-Saxon’s largely held (and too many still hold)
was that Anglo-Saxon Protestants “deserve what they have.” Despite this core belief’s falsity, North
American white Anglo-Saxon Protestants’ evidence bases were replete with misleading evidence partly
because of the hermeneutical marginalization of non-dominant groups. For example, newspapers or
periodicals in the 1700s in the thirteen colonies largely did not report white violence against Native
Americans even though (1) they did report, in often exaggerated form, Native American violence
against whites and (2) white violence against Native Americans either equaled or surpassed Native
American violence against whites(Gonzalez & Torres 2011). Other sources of misleading evidence
may have been (1) false testimony from epistemic authorities and peers such as pastors, politicians,
teachers, professors, family members and colleagues, (2) monuments and (3) facts about who had wealth,
positions of power and control. A fact even though true can mislead because subjects can improperly
take it to cohere with false information where this false information and this fact jointly constitute
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misleading evidence. And, the truth of a fact can often appear to vindicate false information it appears
to cohere with.
Most contexts that an Anglo-Saxon Protestant would have found himself in would be such
that most of his belief storage fragments would have some misleading evidence that supported this
false-core belief that Anglo-Saxon Protestants deserve the wealth they have even though, in point of
fact, Anglo-Saxon Protestant wealth was largely a result of violence committed against Native
Americans and African slave labor (Mills, 1997). That is, Anglo-Saxon wealth was largely a result of
advantage that accrued to them because of their dominant-group status rather than because of desertbestowing actions.
Subjects often feel discomfort when they receive evidence that is inconsistent with their core
beliefs (Elliot & Devine 1994; Mandelbaum 2018: Bendana & Mandelbaum ms; Thibodeau &
Aronson 1992). The basic idea here is that we feel good when we believe positive things about
ourselves and we feel bad when we believe negative things about ourselves (Mandelbaum, 2014). “I
am a good person,” “I am not an idiot” and “I deserve what I have” are examples of core beliefs that
feel good to believe. When a subject attempts to resolve discomfort they feel because of evidence
that is inconsistent with their core beliefs, they tend to revise their beliefs such that they can retain
these core beliefs (Elliot & Devine 1994; Mandelbaum 2018; Thibodeau & Aronson 1992). Suppose
that I believe (1) I put a lot of time and energy into graduate school in philosophy, (2) only idiots put
lots of time and energy into training that is unlikely to lead to a job for which one was trained and (3)
I am not an idiot (Bendana & Mandelbaum, ms). To retain my core belief that I am not an idiot I
conclude that (C) I am likely to get a job in philosophy. I believe (C) to resolve the inconsistency
between (2) and (3). The basic idea here is that people will tend to resolve inconsistencies between
beliefs in ways that allow them to retain their positive core belief without inconsistency-caused
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discomfort. That is, it feels bad to believe I am an idiot, so to avoid believing this I form the belief
that I will get a job in philosophy.
Take William’s case. William believes the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal
opportunity in the US job market. Suppose William becomes aware of evidence that suggests that
employers call back whites at twice the rate than blacks even if white and black job seekers resumes
are identical (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004). This evidence implies that William likely benefited in
the job market from something other than his hard work, namely that he is a member of the dominant
group.

William can resolve the discomfort he feels upon receipt of this evidence by either (a)

accepting the new evidence and as a result accepting the belief that “I don’t deserve what I have” or
(b) rejecting the evidence and as a result retaining his core belief that “I deserve what I have.” But, if
subjects typically believe in ways that allow them to retain their core beliefs partly because jettisoning
the core belief would result in feeling bad, then William is likely to reject the evidence that conflicts
with his core belief.
In this section, I have explained the basic epistemic problem that William, like other dominant
groups subjects, faces in virtue of his cognitive architecture and his dominant-group status’ effect on
his evidence base. I have also argued that the (i) fragmentation of belief view, (ii) subjects’ propensity
to avoid dissonance and (iii) hermeneutical marginalization of non-dominant groups explains why (iv)
dominant-group subjects tend to hold false beliefs that are consistent with their positive selfconception.
II
In this section, I argue that a subject who has understanding is less likely to hold certain false
beliefs. That is, I argue that if (a) understanding involves the grasping of the relations between certain
concepts and facts, (b) if a subject grasps these relations, then she is less likely to hold certain
inconsistent beliefs, (c) if a subject is less likely to hold certain inconsistent beliefs, then she is less
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likely to hold certain false beliefs and (d) a subject’s greater degree of understanding of a target reduces
the likelihood that she will hold certain false beliefs, then (e) a subject who has understanding is less
likely to hold certain false beliefs (e1) where this likelihood of holding certain false beliefs will be greater
if a subject has a greater degree of understanding and it will be lower if a subject has a lower degree
of understanding.
In this section, I also argue that grasping the relations between facts can involve activating
multiple belief-storage fragments. That is, I argue that if understanding involves the grasping of
relations between facts and concepts that reside on different fragments, then understanding of a topic
can involve that multiple fragments are activated. Here, I argue for a view of what understanding
involves if the fragmentation view of belief is correct.
2.1: Understanding and Grasping
Understanding differs from knowing because if a subject understands something, then she
grasps concepts and facts that are related to this target of understanding (Elgin 2009; Pritchard 2009,
Kvanvig 2003). If I know the set of geometric axioms, then (1) I can reliably rehearse them to you
and (2) I learned them from a reliable source such as a geometry textbook or a geometry professor
(Goldman 1967, 1979). Even if I know the set of geometric axioms, I can lack a grasp of how they
relate to each other and how they can be applied in the world. On the other hand, a professor of
geometry who has understanding of the geometric axioms grasps the relations between them, how
they hang together and how they can be applied in the world. That is, this professor not only can, like
me, rehearse these axioms, but, unlike me, she also has a sense of how they hang together, cohere and
can be used in applications.
Understanding also differs from knowing because it “admits of degrees” (Elgin 2009). A
mathematics major may have a certain degree of understanding of the geometric axioms after a few
geometry courses, but a mathematics graduate student likely has a greater degree of understanding
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than an undergraduate-mathematics major. Moreover, a professor of geometry likely has an even
greater degree of understanding of these axioms than both the major and graduate student. But, what
the professor of geometry has in greater degree, than these students, is that she has a greater gasp of
the relations between these axioms such that she has greater facility with them to, say, draw
architectural blueprints or chart the trajectory of a space probe headed to one of Saturn’s moons.
Take US-race relations as a target of understanding. If a subject understands US-race relations,
then this involves that she grasps the relations between (1) facts such as that African peoples performed
slave labor for centuries in the Americas, that African peoples and their descendants were emancipated
from slavery in the US during the US Civil War, that reconstruction failed in the southern US after
emancipation, that Jim Crow laws in the southern US hindered black people’s economic progress and
that housing segregation and racism in the northern US affected black people’s capacity to build
intergenerational wealth and (2) concepts such as egalitarianism, racism, white supremacy and structural
injustice. That she grasps the relations between these facts and concepts involves a sense of how these
facts and concepts hang together, cohere and can be used in application such as implementing policies
that aim to allay the continuing effect of slavery on US society.
A subject’s understanding of US-race relations can come in degrees. A subject can understand
US-race relations to a smaller degree such that they grasp the relation between the legacy of US slavery,
and how the Voting and Civil Rights Acts of 1963 and 1964 in some measure ameliorated these effects.
But, a subject can understand US race relations to a greater degree such that she grasps the relations
between the legacy of US slavery, implicit bias, that blacks have less opportunity in the US job market
than whites and how colorblind government policies and laws perpetuate this lack of opportunity.
That is, a subject can have a shallower or deeper understanding of US race relations. And, a deeper
understanding differs from a shallower understanding because a subject with a deeper understanding
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grasps more of these relations between the relevant facts and concepts and a subject with a shallower
understanding grasps fewer of these relations.
Take Miguel who is a member of the Flat Earth Society. Miguel, like the rest of the Flat Earth
Society, believes that the earth is flat rather than round or spherical. Miguel took geometry courses in
high school and college, and he is properly evaluated as knowing the geometric axioms because (1) he
reliably remembers them and (2) he learned them from reliable informants. Even though Miguel has
knowledge of these geometric axioms, he does not understand these axioms. If Miguel had sufficiently
deep understanding of how these geometrical axioms hang together or cohere, then it is less likely that
he would have come to hold this false belief that the earth is flat. It is less likely because if a subject
has sufficiently deep understanding of the geometric axioms, then she has the capacity to apply these
axioms to the world and to objects in it such as the earth. If someone has sufficiently deep
understanding of geometry, then this subject would likely sense (1) that the way the sun casts shadows
of different lengths in separate locations rules out (2) that the earth is flat. Or, at the very least, if
Miguel had this understanding, then if someone pointed out these facts to him, then he would be
more likely to believe them than someone who just knows the geometric axioms.
A subject with a sufficiently deep understanding of geometry is less likely than Miguel to come
to hold this falsehood because of this sufficiently deep understanding of geometry. And, it seems that
the likelihood that Miguel comes to hold this belief bears a relation to his degree of understanding of
the geometric axioms. That is, if a subject has a greater degree of understanding in geometry, then she
is less likely to come to hold this false belief that the earth is flat. And, if she has lower degree of
understanding of geometry, then she is more likely to come to hold this falsehood that the earth is flat.
Similarly, if William had a sufficiently deep understanding of US-race relations, then it is less
likely that he would have come to hold this false belief that blacks and whites have equal opportunity
in the US job market. And, if William had a lower degree of understanding of US-race relations, then
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the likelihood that he would have come to hold this false belief would have been higher. But, since
William, as stipulated, only knows some facts about US-race relations, the likelihood that he would
come to hold this falsehood, which he realized, was even greater.
2.2: Grasping and the Fragmentation of Belief
If (a) grasping the relations between facts involves sensing whether sets of facts cohere, (b)
subjects often learn facts that constitute a fact set in contexts that differ in terms of time and place,
(c) facts learned in different contexts can reside on different belief fragments, (d) subjects can only
sense incoherence between facts that reside on separate fragments if they are activated, then (e)
grasping the relations between facts can involve activating multiple belief-storage fragments.
If understanding involves grasping facts that reside as beliefs on different fragments, then
understanding US-race relations may require activating fragments that otherwise would likely not be
activated. For example, if (1) a fact set about Jim Crow in the US resides on one fragment, (2) a fact
set about racially discriminatory bank-lending policies in the US resides on another fragment, and (3)
understanding US-race relations to a certain degree involves grasping how these two fact sets cohere,
then understanding US-race relations to this degree requires that the separate fragments on which these
fact sets reside are activated.
The basic idea here is that if a subject understands something, then this understanding will
likely involve activating separate belief-storage fragments because understanding often involves
information that is stored on separate fragments. Understanding often involves information that is
stored on different fragments because the information that constitutes understanding something is
often learned or obtained in different times and places or contexts.
2.3: Understanding, Grasping and False Beliefs
Suppose that Chet understands US-race relations to a quite high degree. Chet is unlikely to
believe the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market because his
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understanding of US-race relations involves grasping the relations between facts such as US slavery’s
current effect on black people, the current effect of former confederate states’ implementation of the
black codes right after the failure of reconstruction, de facto segregation in the northern US and
concepts such as intergenerational wealth, race and egalitarianism. If (a) these facts reside on different
belief storage fragments and (b) grasping them requires that they are activated, then (c) Chet is less
likely to believe the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market
because (c1) he will likely sense that this falsehood is inconsistent with these facts that reside on
multiple fragments. The basic idea here is that understanding will in a sense “block” this falsehood
from having a place to reside on one of his belief storage fragments.
Now, this account of how understanding makes it less likely that a subject will believe a
falsehood is not an account of defeat even if understanding can defeat such falsehoods. But, rather this
is an account of what I will call blocking. The basic idea here is that the epistemic state of understanding,
when sufficiently deep, can involve enough cognitive architecture and real estate so that a falsehood
cannot find refuge in any cognitive nook or cranny.
So far, I have proffered an account of something epistemically good, namely that a subject is
less likely in a state of false belief. But, of course, this account of how understanding can block beliefs
can be epistemically bad if a subject’s target of understanding is false. For example, if I have a
sufficiently deep understanding of astrology but astrology is false, then I may not believe a truth that
is inconsistent with astrology because of my understanding. Here, I assume that one can understand
something that is not true (Elgin, 2009). But, this is no strike against this “blocking” account. If a
subject’s sufficiently deep true understanding of a target makes it less likely that she will believe a
falsehood, then this understanding is a cognitive feature that makes it more likely that she will avoid
holding falsehoods in a given domain. Or, in the spirit of process reliabilism, sufficiently true
understanding is the kind of state that reliably leads subjects to avoid holding certain falsehoods.
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In this section, I have argued that a subject who has understanding is less likely to hold certain
false beliefs where this likelihood of holding certain false beliefs will be greater if a subject has a greater
degree of understanding and it will be lower if a subject has a lower degree of understanding. I have
also argued that on a fragmentation of belief view, understanding can involve that multiple fragments
are activated.
III
In this section, I argue that sufficiently deep understanding of social injustice is more likely to
prevent a subject from holding false core beliefs that are consistent with dominant-group subjects’ positive selfconception than knowledge because this sufficiently deep understanding involves more fragments than
knowledge. If (a) social injustice understanding involves activation of more fragments than knowledge
of social injustice and (b) social injustice understanding can “block” false beliefs from residing on
fragments, then (c) this understanding can make it less likely that a dominant group subject comes to
hold false core beliefs that are consistent with her positive self-conception.
3.1: Deep Understanding of Social Injustice
I submit that understanding of social injustice such as US-race relations likely involves facts
that reside on multiple belief-storage fragments because understanding US-race relations involves facts
that likely were learned in separate contexts. That is, if (a) understanding US-race relations involves
facts that a subject likely learned in distinct contexts, (b) facts learned in distinct contexts reside on
different belief-storage fragments and (c) understanding involves that a subject senses how facts hang
together or cohere, then (d) understanding US-race relations qua social injustice likely involves that a
subject senses the coherence between facts that reside on different belief-storage fragments.
If a subject understands US-race relations, then she will grasp relations between historical or
political scientific facts such as (1) that New York City landlords during the 1970s and 1980s
systematically did not rent to blacks and Latinos and (2) sociological facts such as that whites in the
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US tend to have x times as much wealth in comparison to blacks and Latinos. If a subject learns such
historical or political scientific facts in contexts that differ from where she learns such sociological
facts, then these fact types reside on different belief-storage fragments because whether a particular
fragment is updating information depends on a subject’s context.
3.2: Knowledge of Social Injustice
Suppose that William knows that New York City landlords during the 1970s and 1980s
systematically did not rent to blacks and Latinos. And, suppose that this knowledge resides on a few
fragments because this information was received in a few contexts. So, this knowledge can be stored
on a set of fragments while not defeating false beliefs that reside on other fragments if these two sets
of fragments are not activated at the same time.
Even if William’s knowledge resides on a good deal of belief-storage fragments, he can still
hold the belief that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market without any sense
of incoherence because his capacity to sense incoherence depends on which fragments are activated.
And, if the fragments that house this knowledge are not activated and fragments that house this
falsehood are activated, then he may assert this falsehood. So, knowledge of social injustice can only
act as defeating evidence of falsehoods if both the falsehood and deafening evidence or knowledge
reside on activated fragments.
3.3: Blocking
Suppose that William reports to Thomas the falsehood that blacks and whites have equal
opportunity in the US job market. And, suppose that Thomas considers this information but
ultimately rejects it because of his sufficiently deep understanding of US-race relations. That is,
Thomas’ understanding makes it more likely that he senses the inconsistency between William’s false
testimonial report and his own deep understanding of US-race relations. So, understanding as an
epistemic state has blocked this falsehood from finding residence on his cognitive real estate.
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By my lights, understanding is a more robust state than a belief because (i) it involves more
cognitive architecture and (ii) more cognitive commitments. Subjects with deep understanding of
social injustice are more likely to sense that (a) a false core belief is inconsistent with (b) a cognitive
commitment to the truth of information bits that form a coherent set. For example, because of his
understanding, Thomas senses that if he were to accept William’s false testimonial report, then he
would have to give up his commitment to the truth of facts that compose his deep understanding of
US-race relations such as that slavery’s legacy continues to affect black folks today, that de facto white
supremacy obtains and that black folks face a disproportionate amount of unwarranted police violence
relative to white folks.

Here, Thomas’ deep understanding of US-race relations differs from

knowledge of US-race relations in terms of the blocking function it can serve because this knowledge
will not similarly increase the likelihood that he senses information that is inconsistent with it. That
is, I can properly evaluate a subject’s belief as knowledge even though he does not sense the relations
it has to other information. Recall, Miguel who can rehearse geometric axioms but still believes the
earth is flat even though this belief is inconsistent with these geometric axioms and other knowledge
he has.
3.34: An Objection to Blocking
One could object that it is unclear how understanding will block dominant subjects’ tendency to
hold beliefs that are consistent with their positive self-conception. That is, people tend to believe
what makes them feel good and avoid believing what makes them feel bad (Elliot & Devine, 1994;
Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). So, the objection goes, it is unclear how understanding can block a
subject from coming to hold false beliefs that make them feel good. Put differently, there is an
arational tendency people have to believe things consistent with their positive self-conception and it
is unclear how a rational feature of understanding can override or defeat this arational tendency. Here,
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I concede that understanding may be unlikely to defeat false core beliefs that constitute part of a
dominant subject’s positive self-conception.
But, a response to this objection is that understanding can more easily block a false belief than
defeat one. One way to increase the likelihood that understanding can block a falsehood is to instill
sufficiently deep understanding in subjects early on in their educational careers. If a dominant-group
subject gains sufficiently deep understanding of US-race relations, say, in elementary or secondary
school and core beliefs such as “I deserve what I have” begin to populate a subject’s belief-storage
fragments as she moves on in her educational career, then understanding can more likely block these
core beliefs. Understanding can more likely block these core beliefs because, earlier on in a subject’s
educational career, the potential for a subject to feel good or bad as a result of holding this core belief
will likely be less salient. This will likely be less salient early on in a subject’s educational career because
its salience depends on background information about merit and desert and markets accurately valuing
individuals’ economically productive traits. And, if this potential dissonance is less salient, then
understanding can block, in a rational way, this false core belief from taking residence in her beliefstorage fragments.
A second response to this objection is that if (i) a subject has sufficiently deep understanding
of, say, US-race relations and (ii) she is presented with the false core belief, or evidence that supports,
that “I deserve what I have,” then (iii) she would have to relinquish her grasping of the facts and
concepts that compose her sufficiently deep understanding of US race relations. That is, if (a) a
subject’s deep understanding of US race relations involves that she grasps many of these relations
between facts and concepts, (b) these grasping relations compose a web of coherent beliefs and
concepts and (c) believing this core belief requires that one jettison this coherent belief web that
resides across many belief fragments, then (d) a subject will likely not relinquish this deep
understanding to take on a belief without an associated coherent web.
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In this section, I have argued that understanding of social injustice can make it less likely that
a dominant group subject comes to hold false core beliefs that are consistent with her positive selfconception because (i) this understanding involves activation of more fragments than knowledge of
social injustice and (ii) it can make it less likely that a dominant group subject comes to hold false core
beliefs that are consistent with her positive self-conception.
IV
In this section, I argue that if (a) understanding blocks false core beliefs from residing on
subjects’ cognitive real estate rather than defeating them and (b) the fragmentation of belief view
explains the belief perseverance effect, (c) the educational system in the US has failed to instill
understanding of, say, US-race relations but (d) the educational system is also where understanding
can be instilled such that it can block false core beliefs from taking residence in subjects’ cognitive real
estate, then (e) educational systems should aim to instill sufficiently deep understanding of, say, USrace relations early on in subjects’ educational careers. The basic aim here is to argue that educational
systems should instill understanding in subjects as early as they can in their educational careers because
understanding’s effectiveness in its blocking role is increased the earlier understanding takes residence
in subjects’ belief fragments.
4.1: The Belief Perseverance Effect and Fragmentation
This belief perseverance effect predicts that a subject’s first belief on a topic will be stubbornly
resistant to counterevidence and this effect predicts that a subject’s second belief will be less stubborn
and so on (Nisbett & Ross 1980). So, if a token-blocking belief is, say, the first belief that a subject
comes to hold on a topic and it is consistent with a subject’s core belief, then it is more likely to block
a false belief than a token belief that is not the first belief that a subject has on a topic. The basic idea
here is that the earlier a subject comes to hold a belief, the more stubbornly held it will be.
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This belief perseverance effect itself is explained by the fragmentation of belief view (Bendana
& Mandelbaum ms). On the fragmentation of belief view, “when participants initially hear
misinformation, they encode it into one fragment and then encode the correction into a different
fragment” (Bendana & Mandelbaum ms, 15). So, even if one is presented with information that
properly defeats a false belief, false information that was learned early on regarding a topic can reside
on many other fragments such that she will continue to affirm or report this false information when
she is in other contexts, and thus accessing other fragments. And, recall that contexts can differ not
only in terms of places, but also in terms of times.
If (a) contexts differ in terms of time and (b) a belief is the first one that is held by a subject
on a given topic, then (c) that belief will likely be more strongly held by a subject because (c1) a subject’s
first belief on a topic is likely to reside on more fragments than other beliefs a subject has on the same
topic. And, here, a belief p on a given topic is stronger than another belief ~p if a subject is cognitively
committed to p in a greater number of contexts than she is cognitively committed to ~p.
4.2: Blocking and the Belief Perseverance Effect
Suppose that Thomas, who has deep enough understanding of race relations, encounters false
information that is inconsistent with this understanding such as that blacks and whites have equal
opportunity in the US job market. When Thomas encounters this false information, he will sense that
this false information is inconsistent with his understanding because it is inconsistent with (i) facts
that partly compose his understanding and (ii) the grasping relation between these facts and concepts
that also compose his understanding. This grasping relation involves that multiple fragments are
activated and thus he is more likely to sense this inconsistency. But, understanding plays its blocking
role partly in virtue of some facts. And, if understanding is partly composed of facts that contribute
to understanding’s blocking capacity, then the likelihood that understanding will block some false
information from taking residence in a subject’s cognitive real estate, is increased when a subject comes
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to hold these facts earlier, rather than later on, in a subject’s cognitive life. The belief perseverance
effect predicts that this likelihood will here be increased. To put this point differently, understanding’s
blocking strength can depend on how early a subject came to hold the understanding if the belief
perseverance effect obtains.
4.3: False Core Beliefs and the Belief Perseverance Effect
Suppose that William came to hold the belief that “he deserves what he has” early on in his
cognitive life. And, suppose that this belief is false at least partly because much of whites’ wealth and
accoutrements are due to unjust racial advantage. And, suppose that this is a core belief and thus
resides on many belief-storage fragments. As a result, this false core belief will likely exhibit strength
or persist partly because of the fragmentation of belief. But, this false core belief will exhibit
stubbornness in the face of counterevidence not only because it will likely reside on many fragments,
and thus stubbornly persists, but it will also exhibit stubbornness because of the human tendency to
avoid believing things inconsistent with their positive self-conception.
4.3: The Dash to Belief Perseveration
Belief perseveration can make the epistemic state of understanding more likely to block false
core beliefs at least partly because understanding itself is composed of beliefs. That is, if a subject’s
sufficiently deep understanding consists in facts that reside on more fragments, then the likelihood is
increased that she senses the inconsistency between false information and this understanding because
it is more likely that a fragment that contains an understanding-constitutive fact will be activated.
Belief perseveration, on the other hand, can make a subject’ false core belief more likely to
stubbornly persist because if a subject learns this core belief early on in his cognitive life, then this
belief will likely reside on so many fragments such that he will continue to affirm this false belief
despite encountering lots of disconfirming evidence.
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So, belief perseveration either (i) can serve to make sufficiently deep true understanding
stubbornly persist where it blocks false core beliefs from taking residence in subjects’ cognitive real
estate or (ii) can serve to make false core beliefs stubbornly persist in a subject’s cognitive real estate.
4.4: Educational System
So far, I have presented an epistemic problem in terms of an individual’s relation to truth in
the domain of social injustice. I have offered an explanation of why William, unlike Thomas, does
not avoid getting it wrong regarding whether blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job
market.

If this explanation is correct, then subjects should come to hold sufficiently deep

understanding as early as they can in their educational careers. And, here I have in mind as early as
possible in grammar school. So, here I appeal to a structural, rather than individualistic solution to
this epistemic problem. And, even though I have cashed this problem out in terms of individual
subjects’ epistemic states, the cause of the problem is at least partly structural because subjects (i) are
misled by bad evidence bases and (ii) form false core beliefs largely because one group is dominant
over another. The basic idea is that individuals cannot pull themselves up from their epistemic
bootstraps relative to this epistemic problem. That is, we rely on others to inform us about the world
in an ineliminable way (Goldberg 2010, 2018; Medina 2013).
If (a) subjects ineliminably rely on others for information about the world, (b) if subjects do
not gain sufficiently deep understanding of social injustice early in their cognitive lives, then they are
more likely to hold falsehoods about social injustice, (c) educational systems are a way to instill this
understanding in subjects early enough, then (d) society should instill deep understanding, rather than
just mere knowledge, of social injustice as early as possible through its educational system.
4.45: An Objection
One could object that societies should instill deep understanding in subjects, rather than mere
knowledge, of social injustice for moral or political reasons rather than epistemic reasons. This objector can
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concede that false beliefs about social injustice formed early on in a subject’s cognitive life tend to
persist more than those formed later on and thus societies should instill this deep understanding
because these false beliefs tend to lead subjects and societies to perpetuate social injustice itself. This
objector can conclude that these moral or political reasons motivate early education rather than
epistemic ones because there are many non-moral or non-political things that may be at least equally
epistemically good to instill early on in subjects’ cognitive lives. For example, it may be at least equally
epistemically good to instill deep understanding of the scientific method in subjects early on in their
educational careers because so much scientific knowledge or information is supported by such deep
understanding.
This objections fails because if (a) one compares (a 1) instilling as subject with deep
understanding of, say race relations to (a2) instilling a subject with deep understanding of the scientific
method relative to (a3) a true-to-false belief ratio over the course these two subjects’ cognitive lives,
then (b) it is unclear that deep understanding of the scientific method will result in a better ratio than
deep understanding of race relations because (c) deep understanding of race relations can block false
core beliefs that affect a subject’s testimonial perception of non-dominant speakers such as black and
Latino speakers. Suppose that William lacks this deep understanding of race relations and thus he
tends to perceive black and Latino speakers as not knowers. Suppose that William’s mathematics
professors are black and Latino. Here, William may not properly uptake mathematical knowledge
from these professors qua speakers at least partly because he lacks this deep understanding of race
relations.
The basic idea here is that deep understanding of social phenomena can affect whether
speakers properly receive information from one of the most basic sources of information about the
world, namely other human beings who tell us things. So, even if I concede that a lack of deep
understanding of, say, the scientific method will result in an epistemically bad true-to-false belief ratio,
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a lack of deep understanding of, say, race relations will result in a similarly epistemically bad true-tofalse belief ratio. Or, at least, it is plausible that these two will result in roughly similar scores. So, the
objection fails because the objector must provide an epistemic reason to believe that one kind of
understanding will clearly result in a better ratio than the other.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have described an epistemic phenomenon that I argued is explained by a
fragmentation view of belief storage and social injustice’s effect on the beliefs subjects store where
these beliefs play an evidential role. I have also argued that the epistemic state of understanding, if
deep enough, can make it less likely that a dominant-group subject comes to find herself in this
epistemic problem, namely holding false beliefs that are consistent with her positive self-conception.
In other words, I have argued that understanding explains why William holds a false belief and Thomas
does not.
I have also drawn out implications of what the epistemic state of understanding can involve if
the fragmentation view of belief storage is correct. That is, I have argued that if the understanding
involves the grasping of relations between facts and concepts and the fragmentation of belief view is
right, then a subject’s understanding of a target can involve the activation of belief multiple fragments.
And, I have argued that a way to, at least partly, remedy this problem, epistemic phenomenon is to
instill sufficiently deep understanding of social injustice early in subjects’ educational careers.
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Chapter 4
How White Supremacy and Capitalism Affect Hip Hop as a Hermeneutical Resource

“Black aesthetics has not, usually, been a matter of art for art’s sake” (Taylor, 2017, p. 10).

“Just by virtue of white supremacy’s grip on the levers of power, white people can require and impose one-sidedness in a
way that other people cannot” (Taylor, 2017, p 98).

In the epistemology and philosophy of race literature, there has been no consideration of how nondominant forms of artistic expression can be undermined as hermeneutical resources due to both white
supremacy and capitalism. And, there has been no consideration of hip hop as a hermeneutical
resource even if there has been some consideration of hip hop as a source of information about black
and Latinx communities (Corlett 2005; Thompson 2005). I remedy this lack of consideration because
I take up how the combined collateral effect of white supremacy and capitalism undermine hip hop
as a hermeneutical resource that, say, black and Latinx folks can use to communicate about and
understand features of their reality.
I argue that if (a) hip hop is a hermeneutical resource that has helped black and Latinx folks
communicate to each other about and understand their reality, (b) hip hop as a hermeneutical resource
is more effective when descriptive rather than prescriptive rap predominates the content of hip hop,
(c) white supremacy and capitalism have together made prescriptive rap predominate relative to
descriptive rap, then (d) white supremacy and capitalism can make, and have made, hip hop less
effective as a hermeneutical resource for black and Latinx folks.
An upshot of this argument is that hip hop’s diminution as a hermeneutical resource is a kind
of hermeneutical injustice that differs from the kinds of epistemic injustice in the literature (Crerar
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2015; Fricker 2007; Medina 2013; Polhaus 2012). This kind of hermeneutical injustice differs from
the hermeneutical injustice kinds in the literature because the literature takes up how a society’s social
imaginary can lack hermeneutically useful concepts such that subjects are diminished in their capacity
to communicate their experiences to others or even have deeper understanding of their own
experiences (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013). So, this paper, contributes to the epistemic injustice literature
because it broadens the scope of what a hermeneutical resource is and when hermeneutical injustice
obtains. Although, I do not take this paper’s contribution as inconsistent with Fricker’s construal of
hermeneutical injustice, but rather I take it as a development of the idea, because Fricker leaves open
what can serve as a hermeneutical or interpretive resource (Crerar 2015; Fricker 2013a, 2013b).
This paper’s argument only concerns epistemic value where something is valuable if it either
bears fundamental epistemic value such as true beliefs, knowledge and understanding or promotes the
securing of things with fundamental epistemic value (Goldman 1999; Pritchard 2010). I take up how
hermeneutical resources are made less epistemically effective by white supremacy and capitalism
because hermeneutical resources promote the understanding and conveyance of truth or how the
world is. This argument appeals to social-political or moral phenomena to explain the diminishment
of a purely epistemic phenomenon, namely the diminishment of a hermeneutical resource. I do not
take up questions of whether hip hop is bad in terms of political or moral value partly because
philosophers in significant measure have taken up hip hop’s political or moral value (Gines 2005;
Gordon 2005; Lawson 2005; Pittman 2005; Shelby 2015; Taylor 2017) And I assume that epistemic
reasons can be distinct from moral or political reasons (Feldman and Conee 2004).
In section one, I sketch a notion of hermeneutical resource and I describe how hip-hop has
functioned as such a resource. In section two, I take up how hip hop has increasingly functioned
prescriptively rather than descriptively as a hermeneutical resource. In section three, I consider how
white supremacy and capitalism explain why hip hop now tends to function prescriptively rather than
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descriptively. In section four, I explain that if hip hop is diminished as a hermeneutical resource, then
this broadens the scope of hermeneutical injustice as it has hitherto been conceived in the
epistemology literature.
I
I now describe features that hermeneutical resources share. A hermeneutical resource
enhances subjects’ capacity to understand and communicate about their world and their experiences
(Alcoff 1996; Fricker 2007; Medina 2013). Fictional literature from authors such as Toni Morrison or
Shakespeare can enhance a subject’s understanding of her world and experiences.
Suppose that a black subject and white subject have both read Ralph Ellison’s The Invisible Man.
That both of these subjects have read this novel will likely increase the odds, even if only slightly, that
the black subject can successfully convey features of what it is like to experience oppression in the US
to this white subject. This novel, and others like it such as Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye, serves a
hermeneutical function because if the white subject had not read this novel, then the likelihood that
this subject would understand her is lower as a result.
Concepts can serve this hermeneutical function as well. Carmita Wood was an administrator
during the 1970s at Cornell University in the physics department. A senior faculty person regularly
behaved in ways towards Carmita that we would today call sexual harassment, but during the 1970s, the
term or concept had not yet been coined. Carmita Wood eventually quit her job due to the stress of
dealing with this behavior, but when she applied for unemployment insurance she could not use the
term or concept of sexual harassment to concisely explain why she quit and as a result she was denied
unemployment insurance. Here, Carmita Wood lacked a concept, the concept of sexual harassment,
and as a result she could not successfully explain to others the immoral and disturbing behavior that
she underwent. The concept of sexual harassment for subsequent women has played a hermeneutical
role because it enhances their capacity to communicate about their reality to others (Fricker 2007).
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Both concepts and novels can serve as hermeneutical resources because they enhance a
subject’s capacity to either understand their own experience or to communicate their experience to
other subjects. But, novels are works of art. So, it seems at least some works of art can serve as a
hermeneutical resource.
Many modes of artistic expression can serve as a hermeneutical resource. But, I will focus on
hip hop as a mode of artistic expression that can serve as a hermeneutical resource. Hip hop is a mode
of expression that was developed largely by black and Puerto Rican folks in the South Bronx during
the mid-to-late 1970s (George 2004). Hip hop as a form of expression can be expressed though graffiti
art, break dancing, DJ’ing and rapping. But, my focus will be on rapping or rap music.
If someone is rapping, then she is rhyming words over an instrumental in a way that is
synchronous with or bears a musically felicitous relation to the instrumental. One thing that makes
musical rhyming or musical poetry differ from rapping is that things such as the cadence, speed, and
delivery of the rhymes will differ depending on the features of the instrumental that a rapper is rhyming
over. Hip hop can serve as a hermeneutical resource largely, but not exclusively, because of this
particular mode of expression that obtains when a rapper rhymes over an instrumental.
Rap can serve a hermeneutical function in part because of its descriptive power. On The
Message, Melle Mel, the lead rapper of the Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, manifested this
descriptive power when he rapped, “It’s a jungle sometimes, it makes me wonder how I keep from
going under/broken glass everywhere, people pissing on the stairs, they just don’t care” (Grandmaster
Flash and the Furious Five 1982). Here, Melle Mel was describing the reality of his world, namely
poverty in the resource starved black and Puerto Rican neighborhood of the south Bronx during the
1970s and 1980s.
Melle Mel’s delivery of these lyrics, in combination with the instrumental track provided by
Grandmaster Flash, communicate content that the mere lyrics alone do not. Or, at least, I will assume
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that the descriptive power of rap is a function of how rappers deliver their lyrics over particular
instrumentals. Here, this song’s descriptive power depends in part on the urgency that the underlying
instrumental evokes in relation to Melle Mel’s lyrics. But, the instrumental does not do this alone, the
ways the lyrics are delivered in relation to the urgency that this instrumental evokes contribute to the
song’s descriptive and communicative power. So, here, the whole is not a mere sum of its parts. Put
differently, there is something it is like to hear The Message for the first time that does not reduce to
either the sounds that compose the instrumental or the song’s lyrics (Nethery IV 2011).
What it is like to hear, say, The Message for the first time can depend on whether one bears a
particular relation to places such as the south Bronx where the south Bronx is a black or Latinx
community. If one is from a place such as the south Bronx, then one may notice that this song puts
in new relief one’s experience of living in an impoverished community that is starved of resources and
opportunities. On the other hand, if one is not from such a community, one’s experience of the song
will likely differ because one does not have the relevant background experiences, concepts and
knowledge to have this experience.
Rap songs such as The Message served as a hermeneutical resource for black and Latinx folks
from places such as the south Bronx. That is, rap served as a hermeneutical resource for a nondominant group.

It functions as a non-dominant-group-hermeneutical resource because non-

dominant group members share the relevant background experiences, concepts, knowledge or
understanding such that The Message can play this hermeneutical role. That is, black and Latinx folks
from places such as the south Bronx are more likely than, say, white folks to have the requisite
information and experience for rap to play this hermeneutical role.
During the 1980s, rap in part functioned as a hermeneutical resource for communities of color
at first, largely, in New York and its surrounding areas and then throughout communities of color in
the US such as Houston, Dallas and Los Angeles. Rap artists and groups such as Melle Mel, Big

94

Daddy Kane, KRS-One, Eric B and Rakim, Kool G Rap & DJ Polo, The Geto Boys, The D.O.C and
N.W.A. described their realities through rap largely for communities of color.
Often the information that these rap artists conveyed involved features of life in impoverished
communities of color such as the south Bronx, Harlem or Queensbridge in New York City and other
places such as Oak Cliff in Dallas and Compton outside of Los Angeles. For example, on Eric B and
Rakim’s Paid In Full, Rakim raps, “I used to roll up, ‘this is a hold up, ain’t nuthin’ funny/stop smiling,
be still, don’t nothin’ move but the money’” (Eric B. and Rakim 1987) Here, Rakim is conveying what
he resorted to in order to secure money for basic needs due to the lack of opportunity in his
community. Before this line he raps, “so I dig in my pocket, all my money is spent/so I dig deeper
but still comin’ up with lint/so I start my mission – leave my residence/thinkin’ how could I get some
dead presidents” (Eric B. and Rakim 1987). Here, Rakim in part makes clear a precondition for
committing robbery, namely lacking the means to satisfy his basic needs. Later in the song, Rakim
describes how he ultimately refrained from robbery because he came into contact with the Five
Percenters or the Nation of Gods and Earths’ teachings about righteousness and morality
(Muhammed Knight 2007, 2014). The basic idea here is that in rap’s early stages it served a
hermeneutical role for communities of color because rappers described their realities in ways that not
only described things they already knew, but they described these realities in ways that helped nondominant subjects grasp features of their realities they had not yet as fully grasped.
Hermeneutical resources can be shared by societies as a whole and they can be shared by
smaller groups such as non-dominant groups. But, hermeneutical resources that are shared by a whole
society will tend to be influenced by and serve the hermeneutical needs of dominant groups (Fricker
2007; Medina 2013). Non-dominant groups often develop hermeneutical resources that speak and
respond to their particular hermeneutical needs which often differ from the needs of the dominant
group (Fricker 2015; Medina 2013). Hip-hop is a hermeneutical resource that black and Puerto Rican
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folks in New York City developed in response to phenomena such as de facto white supremacy where
examples are real estate redlining practices, mass incarceration, police brutality and white flightinduced-tax-base depletion of communities of color (Mills 1997; Omi and Winant 1992; Taylor 2013).
II
In this section, I explain how some rap is descriptive while other rap is prescriptive. This
distinction has been briefly discussed in the literature, but it has been discussed in the service of
analyzing whether rap songs that involve drug dealing, materialism and misogyny harm or morally
wrong non-dominant group members such as black women, Latinas and black and Latinx folks more
generally (McGrath and Tilahun 2005). I discuss and develop this distinction in the service of
determining whether rap music is serving a better or worse epistemic function for black and Latinx
folks as a hermeneutical resource.
Rappers in descriptive rap songs describe the world from their first-personal point of view.
That is, a basic feature of descriptive rap is that it conveys a rapper’s observations about her world
and often explanations of these observations. Take the following cases:
Descriptive Rap
(i) In 1982, Melle Mel rapped “It’s a jungle sometimes, it makes me
wonder how I keep from going under/broken glass everywhere,
people pissing on the stairs, they just don’t care” (Grandmaster Flash
and the Furious Five 1982).
(ii) In 1987, Rakim rapped, “I used to roll up, this is a hold up, ain’t
nuthin’ funny/stop smiling, be still, don’t nothing move but the
money” (Eric B. and Rakim 1987).
Now, rappers in prescriptive rap songs prescribe ways that one should be, act and even think.
Prescriptive rappers often convey their prescriptions through lyrics that judge someone who they think
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does not meet some standard. Often when prescriptive rappers claim through their rhymes that
someone does not meet this standard, the standard they are appealing to is some standard that they
themselves have met. Take the following cases:
Prescriptive Rap
(i) In 2013, on “Rich as F**k,” Lil Wayne and 2 Chainz rapped, “Look at you,
and look at us, all of my n***as are rich as f***” (Lil Wayne 2013).
(ii) In 2009, on “Lemonade,” Gucci Mane rapped, “My phantom sittin' on
sixes, no 20's in my gun/Your cutlass motor knockin', because it is a lemon”
(Gucci Mane 2009).
These are cases of prescriptive rap because these rappers are making clear that they have met
some standard that others are worse off for not having met. But, often, what are seemingly cases of
descriptive rap are actually prescriptive cases. In prescriptive rap cases that seem descriptive, a rapper asserts
descriptive claims about herself or her situation, but these descriptive claims signal that these are
descriptive features that should be true of someone. Or, put differently, these so-called descriptive
claims communicate that the phenomena described bear positive value. Take the following cases:
Seemingly Descriptive Rap
(i) In 2018, Travis Scott rapped, “Woo, made this here with all the ice
on in the booth” (Travis Scott 2018).
(ii) In 2016, Lil Uzi Vert rapped, “go to the strip club, make it rain
/Count 100,00 in your face/yeah, put 300 in the safe” (Migos 2016).
Now, someone could object that most, if not all, descriptive claims pick out features of the
world that can be evaluated negatively or positively according to a standard and thus the distinction
between (i) actual descriptive rap cases, (ii) seemingly descriptive rap cases and (iii) prescriptive rap
cases is hollow. This distinction is hollow because when someone describes something, she is likely
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describing a phenomenon due to some value she antecedently holds aside from a value concerning
description itself. For example, in Melle Mel’s case, he describes features of living the south Bronx
presumably because he disvalues the state of affairs in the south Bronx. Similarly, when Lil Wayne
and 2 Chainz make prescriptive claims about how being as wealthy as they are is good and not being
wealthy like they are is bad, they are doing so because they value a state of affairs, namely being as
wealthy as they are. So, if non-epistemic values motivate both descriptive claims and prescriptive
claims in rap, then this distinction between seemingly descriptive rap and actually descriptive rap is hollow
because both prescriptive and descriptive claims in rap are just valuing some state of affairs or other.
This objection fails because even if non-epistemic values motivate descriptive claims in rap,
these claims can still be evaluated for whether they are accurate or hit the mark in regard to the truth.
That is, an epistemic practice can be engaged in because of a non-epistemic motive, but this nonepistemic motive does not make the practice itself non-epistemic. For example, I may engage in
neuroscience because I disvalue Alzheimer’s disease and because I suspect that practicing
neuroscience could contribute to ameliorating this state of affairs that I disvalue. That is, even if
neuroscientists make descriptive claims about the brain because they disvalue Alzheimer’s disease,
their descriptive claims can still be evaluated for whether they are accurate or true. Similarly, rappers
can be evaluated for whether their descriptive rhymes are accurate or true even though a non-epistemic
value motivates their descriptive rhymes or claims.
Another reason why this objection fails is because the aim of prescriptive rap and descriptive
rap differ even if non-epistemic values motivate both of these kinds of rap. When Lil Wayne
prescribes being as wealthy as both he and 2 Chainz are, he aims to convey this non-epistemic value to rap
listeners. But, when Melle Mel describes conditions in the south Bronx, he aims to inform his listeners
of features of his reality in an interesting and musically appealing way. So, if Lil’ Wayne’s and Melle Mel’s
aims differ, then the evaluative criterion of whether they achieve their aims should also differ.
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A further objection to this distinction is that rappers’ intentions cannot be known and thus
whether they are performing an assertive, expressive or prescriptive speech act through their songs
cannot be known (Thompson 2005). Rap as an artistic medium involves personae that rappers
embody and develop such that their intentions are too difficult for hearers to determine because one
cannot know whether rappers are just playing a role, embodying their personae or trying to accurately
describe their world (Thompson 2005).
This objection fails because this objection assumes that an utterance’s or a speech act’s
meaning depends on speaker intentions (Grice 1957, 1989; Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton
1993). But, this view of utterance meaning or what kind of speech act is performed does not explain
certain phenomena. If a woman manager in a factory commands her employees to perform certain
tasks, but her employees take her commands as requests because she is a woman, then here uptake is
what determines what kind speech act she has actually performed rather than her intention (Kukla
2014). Similarly, if rhyming on a song is a kind of speech act, then the kind of speech that is actually
performed need not be determined by a rapper’s intentions. That is, even if a rapper intends to
perform an expressive speech act, her audience’s uptake of the song as asserting things about the
world may result in the speech act properly being evaluated as an assertive speech act. So, a speaker’s
intentions are not clearly the whole story regarding speech act individuation and as a result how a
speech act should be evaluated will not entirely, or at least, not always, depend on a speaker’s
intentions.
Now, whether rap effectively functions as a hermeneutical resource for non-dominant groups
such as black and Latinx folks depends on whether they reliably perceive descriptive rap songs from
prescriptive rap songs. If, say, a Puerto Rican listener, Marisol, misperceives seemingly-descriptive
rap songs, like Travis Scott’s ‘Sicko Mode,’ as descriptive, then, here, rap does not serve a
hermeneutical role because Marisol is not grasping more of the reality of black and Latinx folks’ lives.
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Or, to put the point more generally, if non-dominant listeners tend to misperceive seeminglydescriptive rap as actually descriptive rap, then rap is not playing as good of a hermeneutical role as it
could because these non-dominant listeners are not grasping more of reality, but rather what are
actually prescriptions.
III
I now explain how capitalism and white supremacy cause prescriptive rap to predominate rap
music over descriptive rap. By ‘rap music’ or ‘rap,’ I am referring to rap music that is on the Billboard
Top 200 and Hot 100 charts in terms of sales and radio plays or spins and music video YouTube
views. I restrict ‘rap music’ to this referent because music that is, say, played on the radio most often
and music that has received, say, tens or hundreds of millions of views on YouTube has uptake with
more non-dominant group members than music that is rarely played on the radio or music that has a
tens of thousands of YouTube views. Now, there are vibrant and very energetic rappers that have
less, even if very important, uptake with non-dominant group subjects such as Dead Prez, KRS-ONE,
Immortal Technique, K-Salaam, Mos Def, Mysonne, Oddisee, Blu, Pharaoh Monch and Jay
Electronica. But, these artists do not have nearly as wide uptake with non-dominant groups subjects
as artists that are on these charts such as Jay-Z, Migos, Drake, 2 Chainz, Travis Scott and Cardi B.
The basic idea that motivates restricting ‘rap music’ or ‘rap’ in this way is that if something serves a
hermeneutical role for a non-dominant group, then a large enough number of non-dominant group
members must be aware of or familiar with the thing that could serve this role. And music by artists
such as Jay-Z, rather than artists such as Dead Prez (unfortunately) satisfy this condition of awareness
or familiarity.
By Marx’s lights, a basic feature of a capitalist society is that workers sell their labor to members
of the capitalist class who own the means of production (Marx, 1971, p. 205-207). On this
understanding of capitalism, rap artists sell their labor to record company owners when they either
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license (temporarily allow) or permanently sell control of musical compositions they have labored to
create in exchange for compensation. The amount of compensation that a rap artist receives depends
on the current state of the market and the rap artist’s particular demand in this market. For example,
the amount of money that Drake was given in exchange for his first album was a function of (i) his
popularity both preceding and when he approached record companies, (ii) record companies’ staff’s
opinion of his album in terms of its sales potential, (iii) record companies’ opinion of the potential of
the music to be licensed to television programs, films and advertising or commercials and (iv) the
number of other similar artists in the market.
A basic feature of markets is that if something is in high demand but in low supply, then its
value in the market will rise or be high. Or, if a commodity’s demand surpasses its supply, then this
commodity’s value in the market will be higher than it would be if demand did not outstrip supply.
In the case of Drake, in the late 2000s, there were few, if any, rap artists who were not already in a
long-term recording agreement with a record label who had such a high demand for their music from
the public.
Now, the demand from the public was high for rap content that either describes or prescribes
materialism. Drake was in high demand because he satisfied this content demand and because he was
musically an excellent rapper. Here I assume that a rap song’s musical excellence does not depend on
its content. On the 2009 mixtape release, So Far Gone, that in part created this high demand for Drake,
he rapped:
“I ain’t drive here, I got chauffeured/Bring me champagne flutes, rosé
and some shots over/I think I’m better when I’m not sober/I smoke
goodie, no glaucoma, I’m a stockholder/Private flights back home, no
stopover/Still spittin’ that shit that they shot Pac over…” (Drake
2009).
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Here, the content of Drake’s rapping meets the demand of either describing or prescribing
materialism. So, the combination of his rapping skill along with meeting this content demand
propelled Drake into becoming one of the most commercially successful rappers in the history of rap
music.
Drake is not alone in meeting this content demand of materialism in the content of their
rapping. The Billboard Top 200 and Hot 100 charts are dominated by content of this and closely
related kinds.
Rap artists often make music that attempts to meet this content demand because if they do
they are more likely to have their songs played on the radio, editorial websites or blogs are more likely
to share links to their music and music videos and thus they are more likely to receive more
compensation from record labels for their albums and music. But, this particular content has not always
been in demand (Bailey 2014, 39).
The market demands one kind of content rather than another kind of content because of (i)
the convergence in tastes of the majority of rap consumers and (ii) the influence of taste making or
gatekeeping blogs, magazines and radio stations such as Pitchfork.com, The Source, Vibe and XXL
and leading rap radio stations such as New York’s Hot 97 (WQHT). Since the release of music from
NWA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of rap consumers have purchased rap content
that invokes ideas of materialism, gang affiliated violence and generally descriptions of life either in
impoverished black and Latinx communities or the lives of black and Latinx folks who have emerged
from these neighborhoods by means of activities such as drug dealing. The market has largely
demanded this kind of content from rappers since the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bailey 2014, 40).
When NWA released their sophomore album, Niggaz4life, in 1991, it sat atop the Billboard
Top 200 chart which tracks album sales (NWA 1991; Samuels, 1991; Thompson 2015). This was the
first time that hip hop or rap music had reached higher than the 27 th best-selling album in the US
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according to Billboard (Samuels 1991). As a result, a demand was created among record labels in the
US for music that had a content similar to NWA’s successful album. Demand was created among
record labels because demand existed among the dominant group for content of this kind. In NWA’s
case, the album was number one the Billboard Top 200 because young white men purchased the
album in great numbers. The lesson that record labels learned was that rap music that took up life
from the vantage point of young black men in the inner-city sold very well among young white
suburban men and teenagers.
Once record labels learned this lesson, record labels began to sign and develop rap artists who
described life in impoverished communities of color in urban centers such as New York, Los Angeles,
Houston and Philadelphia. But, not only did record labels contract with and develop such artists, but
they also encouraged already established and contracted rap artists who did not focus on describing
materialism, drug dealing and gang related violence to turn to making music that did focus on these
things. A striking and well-known example of this is 2Pac or Tupac Shakur who is the best-selling rap
artist of all-time. Early in Tupac’s rap career, he released music that did not involve this kind of
content, but by the end of his career and untimely death at 25 years of age, he was releasing music that
primarily trafficked in content of this kind. His career spanned from the late 1980s to 1996.
A basic phenomenon here is that dominant group members, young white men, who are a
consumer block with some of the greatest purchasing power in the history of humankind, created
market demand for music that involved features of black and Latinx experience in impoverished
communities of color that their own wealthy suburban communities lacked. Here a dominant group
through a market mechanism transformed or changed the content of rap.
This demand involved much of what groups such as NWA took up, drug dealing, drug related
violence and gang affiliated violence. Groups, such as NWA who described features of black
experience in Compton California, were what was on offer in the market and their album sold well
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because it responded to this demand created by dominant groups. But, as record labels and artists
responded to this demand there was a shift from rappers describing things such as drug dealing,
materialism and gang affiliated violence to rappers prescribing these things. Todd Boyd describes this
shift:
“’Gangsta’ rap offers original commentary on the horrific nuances of ghetto life. In many
cases, what was once thought of as a radical critique of repressive state apparatuses, as
in NWA’s Fuck Tha Police, has been transformed into a series of unapologetic narratives
that celebrate violence, humiliate women, and indulge in marijuana use to excess” (Boyd
2004, 327, my emphases).
One reason for this shift from descriptive to prescriptive rap is that prescriptive rap better
responded to the dominant group’s demand. Evidence of this is that prescriptive rap albums such as
2Pac’s All Eyez One Me, Jay-Z’ albums of the mid-to-late 1990s or The Lox’s chart topping albums of
the same time period sold better among white men than did descriptive albums of the same period
from groups such as Gang Starr, A Tribe Called Quest, The Jungle Brothers and artists like Mos Def,
Common and Pharaohe Monch (Samuels 1991).
Now, a hypothesis of why prescriptive rap sold better among white men than descriptive rap
is that white men consumers of rap music were valuing drug dealing, materialism and gang related
violence. A result of this is that prescriptive rappers more clearly responded to the fact that young
white men as a consumer block valued these things. Prescriptive rap more clearly responded to this
valuing because prescriptive rap conveys a positive value of the very thing that white men are valuing,
namely black experience in impoverished neighborhoods that involves drug dealing, materialism and
gang related violence. For example, suppose that Jose values documentaries about baseball because
he values playing and engaging with baseball and its culture. And suppose that I make documentary
films that are not only about baseball, but I make documentary films that say baseball is a good thing
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that one ought to engage in. My documentaries about baseball seem to more clearly respond to what
Jose values than those who similarly positively value baseball. Similarly, prescriptive rappers provide
white men with content that is not only about black and Latinx experience that involves these
activities, but it also values these things that white men value.
So far I have explained how a dominant group, white men, have created a market for rap that
has a particular content. Now, I explain how white supremacy explains why there is demand among
white men for rap that has this content.
Human subjects are disposed to believe what feels good and not believe what feels bad
(Mandelbaum 2016, 2019; Thibodeau and Aronson 1992). Dominant group subjects benefit from this
membership partly in virtue of the fact that non-dominant groups do not benefit from their nondominant group membership. And suppose that dominant group members like to believe that their
wealth, status and positions in society are due to their own hard work such that they deserve what
they have. Their belief that they deserve what they have is in tension with, if not, inconsistent with,
the fact that their wealth, status and position in society is due to their dominant group status rather
than their own hard work. So, these subjects are disposed to believe things that are not in tension
with or even support their dominant group status.
White men in US society are a subset of the dominant racial group in the US and because of
this they are disposed to like rap music that involves black and Latinx folk’s experience in urban
communities where this involves things such as drug dealing, valuing of extreme wealth and misogyny.
That is, rap music with this content makes them feel good because it is evidence that supports and is
not in tension with, or inconsistent with, their dominant group status.
Rap with this content supports their dominant group status because if (i) black and Latinx
folks tend to drug deal, value extreme wealth for its own sake and are misogynists, (ii) these features
of black and Latinx folks are taken as evidence that black and Latinx folks’ deserve their lack of wealth,
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lower status and positions in society and (iii) rap music tends to have this content, then (iv) rap music
is evidence black and Latinx folks do not deserve what white folks have, namely relatively more wealth
and higher status and positions in society. To put the point differently, rap music’s content here partly
explains why black and Latinx folks deserve their position in society relative to whites and this
explanation is something that it feels good for whites to believe.
Suppose that William, a white subject, considered rejecting the views involved in rap content
of this kind. If he considered rejecting that black and Latinx men tend to be drug dealers, materialistic
and misogynists, then he would have to accept that he should be less confident in his belief that he
deserves what he has. Suppose that his positive self-conception involves the belief that he deserves
what he has because he gained what he has through his own hard work in a fair society. But, if black
and Latinx men are not drug dealers, materialistic and misogynists in the way portrayed in rap, then it
is less likely that he deserves what he has. That is, it is easier to believe that one deserves what one
has relative to non-dominant groups if the members of non-dominant groups really are the way they
are portrayed in rap music. Suppose that William does not ultimately reject the views involved in rap
of this kind because if he were to reject these views, then it would be more difficult for him to believe
something that makes him feel good, namely that he deserves what he has. So, here, that William is a
dominant group member plays a role in his attraction to rap music. That is, de facto white supremacy
plays a role in William’s attraction to rap music.
This explanation of why white men are attracted to rap with this content also partly explains
why prescriptive rap predominates over descriptive rap because prescriptive rap is better evidence that
whites, say, deserve what they have than descriptive rap. For example, KRS-One’s description of drug
dealing in Boogie Down Productions’ “Love Is Gonna Get’Cha” is not as good evidence that whites
deserve what they have in comparison to Fat Joe’s prescription of drug dealing in his 2006 hit “Make
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It Rain” which featured Lil Wayne (Boogie Down Productions 1990; Fat Joe 2006). On this song he
says:
“I’m a hustla’s hustla, a pusha’s pusha / You a busta, a customer / I’ll
get you some cook up / yeah, crack [Fat Joe] is a chemist” (Fat Joe
2006).
In contrast to Fat Joe’s prescription, KRS-One describes how his impoverished position in
the south Bronx led him from being an average, but very poor, teenager to financially better off. But,
KRS-One concludes this story with the bad consequences that ensued from drug dealing. KRS-One
ends the song by saying,
“for future reference, remember, it’s alright to like or want a material
item, but when you fall in love with and you start scheming and
carrying on for it, just remember, its gonna get you” (Boogie Down
Productions 1990).
On the one hand, Fat Joe explicitly endorses selling drugs and does not say anything about its
bad consequences where some of those are that often drug dealers end up in prison or dead. On the
other hand, KRS-One explicitly describes the real consequences of selling drugs. Here KRS-One’s
song does better epistemically than Fat Joe’s song because KRS-One more accurately portrays the
attenuating consequences of dealing drugs. And if songs such as Fat Joe’s predominate rap over songs
such as KRS-One’s because of capitalism and white supremacy, then rap music is undermined as a
hermeneutical resource for, say, black and Latinx folks because songs like Fat Joe’s neither help them
more deeply understand their current reality nor help them communicate about their reality in a more
epistemically effective way.
Now one might object that even if prescriptive rap, that prescribes materialism, drug dealing
and misogyny, is more prominent in rap music than it had hitherto been because of white supremacy
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and capitalism, rappers such as Lil’ Wayne, Gucci Mane, Migos and 2 Chainz often are just describing
their worlds which involve materialism, drug dealing and misogyny. And if rappers such as these
frequently enough just describe their worlds, then prescriptive rap may not be as dominant as I have
claimed. But, any assessment of how often a rapper describes rather prescribes must consider the
distinction between seemingly descriptive rap and descriptive rap because if one does not countenance
this distinction in an accounting of the prevalence of descriptive over prescriptive rap, then one could
count actually prescriptive instances of rap as descriptive because at least some, if not many, instances
will be cases of seemingly descriptive rap. So, this objection fails because if one does not employ this
distinction when assessing rap music, one will inaccurately count descriptive and prescriptive rap
instances.
IV
I now argue that if white supremacy and capitalism diminish rap music as a hermeneutical
resource, then this broadens the contours of the hermeneutical injustice as epistemologists conceive
of it in the epistemology literature.
Carmita Wood suffered hermeneutical injustice because she lacked a concept, sexual
harassment, at least partly due to gender-injustice-caused hermeneutical marginalization (Fricker
2007). Hermeneutical marginalization obtains if members of, say, a non-dominant group are prevented
from contributing to their society’s set of shared social meanings, collective hermeneutical resource
or social imaginary (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013). Black and Latinx folks have been hermeneutically
marginalized because they have been systematically prevented from obtaining positions that do much
of the contributing to the collective hermeneutical resource such as journalist, professor, lawyer and
political positions.
Epistemologists have largely construed hermeneutical injustice as something that obtains
because either a speaker or hearer lacks a concept (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013; Polhaus 2012). Beyond
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this construal Charlie Crerar has argued that hermeneutical injustice can obtain even if there is no
relevant concept that a speaker or hearer lacks because societal norms and taboos can prevent speakers
from using certain concepts such that they successfully communicate about their world (Crerar 2016).
Even though this view broadens the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice beyond a speaker’s or
hearer’s lack of a concept, it still involves concepts doing the hermeneutical or work. That is, even if
this view broadens the scope of hermeneutical injustice, on this view hermeneutical injustice obtains
due to a subject’s inability to use a concept where this inability to use a concept is explains why
hermeneutical injustice obtains.
If I have shown that rap music, in addition to concepts, can serve a hermeneutical function
for speakers and hearers, then I have broadened the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice beyond
the views in the literature because rap music serves this function not merely in virtue of the conceptual
content of a rap song’s rhymes. Recall, that a rap song’s descriptive power and thus hermeneutical
effectiveness does not reduce to either a rapper’s rhymes or the instrumental underlying the rhymes.
A rap song’s descriptive power is a function of the musically felicitous relation between its mutually
constitutive rhymes and instrumental. Here, the product is more than the sum of its parts.
If (a) rap music was degraded as a hermeneutical function for black and Latinx folks because
of white supremacy and capitalism, (b) this degradation resulted in diminishment of black and Latinx
folks capacity to communicate about their realties and understand features of their realities, then (c) I
have broadened the scope of hermeneutical injustice beyond the phenomenon portrayed in the
literature because (d) rap music is a distinct hermeneutical resource from concepts.
One might object that hermeneutical injustice only obtains if a subject cannot communicate
about her world or understand features of her experience because of hermeneutical marginalization.
That is, a necessary feature of hermeneutical injustice is hermeneutical marginalization. So, the
objections goes, I have not broadened the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice as portrayed in the
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literature because black and Latinx folks compose a great number of rappers and creators of hip hop
and thus hermeneutical marginalization does not obtain. But, this objection fails because white men
compose the majority of the record executives in the music business. If white men compose the
majority of record executives in the music business and that they do so compose such a majority plays
a role in whether prescriptive rap with certain content predominates rap music, then black and Latinx
folks are hermeneutically marginalized because they cannot affect the content of rap music due to
their exclusion from such executive positions.
Someone could rebut that even if black and Latinx folks composed the majority of record
executives, prescriptive rap with a certain content would still predominate because black and Latinx
folks would themselves react to market demands in the same ways that white record executives have
and do. This rebuttal fails because racial injustice prevents a hermeneutical resource, descriptive rap
music, from composing more of the collective hermeneutical resource. That is if the basic idea that
hermeneutical marginalization invokes is that a collective hermeneutical resource is epistemically
worse off because of injustice, then hermeneutical marginalization obtains here because descriptive
rap music qua hermeneutical resource is less present in the collective hermeneutical resource due to
racial injustice.
If hermeneutical marginalization can be understood to obtain if hermeneutically better
resources do not inhabit a non-dominant group’s collective hermeneutical resource because of racial
injustice, then not only have I shown that hermeneutical injustice is broader in scope than portrayed
in the literature, but I also have shown that hermeneutical marginalization is broader in scope than
portrayed in the literature.
Conclusion
I have argued that rap music is a hermeneutical resource that is distinct from ideas and
concepts. I have also argued that white supremacy and capitalism have diminished rap music as a
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hermeneutical resource for black and Latinx folks. On this basis, I have argued that the contours of
hermeneutical justice are broader than currently portrayed in the literature. But, I do not take this
claim of broadness to be inconsistent with Fricker’s view of hermeneutical injustice, but rather I take
this claim to develop and build on the scaffolding that Fricker and other epistemologists have
provided.
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Chapter 5
Racial Injustice and Information Flow
In the epistemology literature, epistemologists have taken up how social injustice can affect the
transmission of information from speakers to hearers and they have taken up how a community’s
features can promote information transmission (Alcoff, 1999; Davis, 2018; Dotson, 2011; Fricker,
2007; Greco, 2016, 2017; Goldberg, 2010; Goldman, 1999; Hookway 2010; Mills, 1997, 2007; Peet,
2017).
But, epistemologists have not taken up whether social injustice can affect whether information
about social injustice itself flows properly through a community. Epistemologists have not drawn out
the epistemic consequences of epistemic injustices such as testimonial injustice, testimonial quieting,
testimonial smothering and participatory injustice for how well or poorly information flows through
communities and even societies. They have not drawn out these consequences because they have
focused on subjects as the target unit of analysis. I draw out these consequences because I focus on
information of a particular kind or with a particular kind of content as the unit of analysis.
I will draw out the epistemic consequences of epistemic injustices for how well or poorly
information flows where I focus on information that non-dominant group members are more likely
to have than dominant group members. In drawing out these epistemic consequences, I am drawing
out consequences from the social epistemology literature, epistemic injustice literature and the
standpoint epistemology literature.
Take the following case. Suppose that Miguelina, an Afro-Latina, tells Chad, a white-AngloSaxon Protestant man, that she did not get a financial-market-analyst job she is eminently qualified for
because (1) employers falsely thought she did not have the requisite analytical skills and (2) because of
economic obligations that her parents and siblings expected her to fulfill such that she ultimately had
to take a less remunerative bookkeeping job. Suppose that this is accurate testimonial information
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regarding racial injustice that non-dominant groups such as Afro-Latinas are more likely to have than
dominant group members. But, suppose that Chad does not believe Miguelina partly because he
misperceives her as untrustworthy due to a negative-identity prejudice he bears against Afro-Latinas. Chad’s
misperception of Miguelina is not only an interpersonal phenomenon, but it also partly constitutes racial
injustice’s effect on the flow of information in their group or community. Here, Chad is less likely to
communicate this information to other subjects and thus he contributes to making the flow of
information poorer in his community. And, if other dominant group members, like Chad, also tend
to misperceive non-dominant members, like Miguelina, then information that non-dominant members
are more likely to have will flow less reliably through this community. So, here, information of a certain
kind is less likely than other information to flow well through a community because information of
this kind is more likely to encounter situations like this one between Chad and Miguelina.
In this paper, I argue (C1) that if subjects in racially unjust societies tend to violate norms that
promote a community’s reliable information flow because racial prejudice is widely held in racially
unjust societies, then racial injustice can make information flow less reliably in a community. I also
argue (C2) that if racial prejudice can make information flow less reliably in a community, then
information that non-dominant subjects are more likely to have will less reliably flow to community
members who lack it.
I understand “information” as true information, and I refer to information that is not true as
“false information.” I also assume that if racial injustice obtains in a community, then racial prejudice
is widely held, either consciously or subpersonally, by subjects in this community.
I employ the notion of information flow, where information is transmitted in a community
from speakers, groups or institutions who have it to others who lack it through mechanisms such as
face-to-face testimonial exchanges.
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In section one, I describe a view of what an epistemic community consists in and I argue that
if a subset of a community’s members systematically violates norms that promote reliable information
flow, then information will flow less reliably in this community. In section two, I argue that if racial
prejudice is widely held in a community, then a subset of the community’s members will systematically
tend to violate norms that govern a its reliable information flow.

In section three, I argue that if

racial injustice obtains in a community, then information that non-dominant groups are more likely to
have will unreliably flow in a community.
I
In this section, describe a view of what an epistemic community consists in and I argue that if
a subset of a community’s members systematically tends to violate norms that promote reliable
information flow, then information will flow less reliably in this community.
1.1: Epistemic Communities
Suppose that I know that a highly regarded philosopher gave a talk at my department’s weekly
colloquium yesterday, because I read an email and a social media post that a departmental
administrator sent. This is an example of information flowing from (i) individuals in a community
that have information to (ii) individuals that lack it because a community member with information
that other community members lack shared it with other community members through an email.
Here, the community is the group of philosophers, philosophy students and administrators that are
involved with doing philosophy in this university. That is, this group shares a practical task that
depends on sharing information.
Communities can be understood politically, culturally, religiously, legally and so on. Here, I
understand and describe communities epistemically. John Greco provides this rough definition of an
epistemic community:
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a collection of cognitive agents, joined in relationships of cooperation, with respect to one or more informationdependent practical tasks (Greco, 2016, p. 491).

Greco understands practical tasks to include theoretical tasks such as asking questions and
solving problems (Greco, 2016). On Greco’s view, epistemic communities have norms that regulate
both information acquisition and information distribution such that its members reliably receive
information that is relevant to accomplishing its practical task or tasks.
Greco thinks that a person can simultaneously belong to more than one epistemic community
(Greco 491, 2017). And, Greco thinks that epistemic communities can consist in things such as:
universities, private corporations, work details, governments, government agencies, families and circles of
friends (Greco, 491, 2016).

Greco takes up the notion of an epistemic community and information flow notion because
he thinks they can help explain (1) why some testimony cases seem like cases where a hearer knows
that p on the basis of a speaker’s say-so and (2) why other cases seem like testimony cases where a
speaker’s say-so cannot serve as a basis for a hearer to know that p.
1.2: Identity and Epistemic Communities
Suppose that Marisol and Chad both hold business degrees from the prestigious Wharton
School of Business. They are part of a group of colleagues from Wharton who are now on the
financial-analyst job market. They exchange information and inform each other of their successes and
failures where they aim to share best practices and practices that did not work. Marisol and Chad, on
Greco’s view, belong to the epistemic community of Wharton graduates who are attempting to secure
employment for which they were trained. That is, they share an “information dependent practical
task” because the likelihood that the group’s members are successful in the job market is increased if
information flows reliably form those who have it to those who do not.
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But, suppose that Marisol is one of two Afro-Latinas in this Wharton graduate epistemic
community. The information she has is not likely to flow to those who do not have it because of
racial injustice’s effect on whether subjects in this community comply with the informationdistribution-and-acquisition norms. Their information dependent practical task qua helping each other
secure a job in part depends on information flowing because they can only advise each other relative
to the information that they all share. So, here, racial injustice and identity play a role in whether
information reliably flows in this community such that they are more likely to accomplish their shared
practical task.
1.3: Information Flow
Suppose that a philosophy department constitutes an epistemic community. And, suppose
that there are two groups that compose this community, namely the political philosophers and the
metaphysicians. Jose, a political philosopher, tells William, a metaphysician, that there will be a
colloquium held next week in room 1000. William tells other philosophers in the department who in
turn tell other philosophers such that this information reaches most of the department’s members.
Here, William believed what Jose told him on the basis of his say-so and as a result information flowed
from Jose to William and in turn William passed this information on as testimony such that it
continued to flow to others.
By John Greco’s lights, William is acting in accordance with a norm that governs good, or
what I will call reliable, information flow in an epistemic community (Greco, 2016). Greco calls this
the norm of information distribution. Communities have an interest in information moving through them
without much hinderance or fettering. By Greco’s lights, when a hearer believes a speaker merely in
virtue of her say-so, she does so because this speaker belongs to the same community as the speaker.
If a speaker belongs to a hearer’s community, then she should believe the speaker because the
information is not likely false. The basic idea is that if a community has an interest in promoting the
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distribution of information once it is inside a community and a community member tells another
community member something, then this speaker should believe her because the community has an
interest in the information’s efficient distribution through the community. And, I as a community
member should believe what a fellow community member tells me because this information that my
fellow community attempts to convey has likely been subject to someone in my community taking an
interrogative stance towards it. That is, if someone from outside of my community asserts something
to someone who belongs to my community, then it is unlikely that this community member will have
believed this non-community member only on the basis of her say-so.
Suppose that Simon, a historian, tells William that a philosophy of science view, call it x, is
wrong. And, suppose that William does not immediately believe him in virtue of his say-so. He does
not trust him. Here, by John Greco’s lights, William acts in accordance with a second norm that
governs reliable information flow in a community, namely the norm of information acquisition.
Communities have an interest in letting information in and keeping false information out. Simon does
not belong to William’s philosophical community and as a result William does not immediately believe
his testimony regarding this philosophy of science view. Suppose that William, instead of immediately
believing Simon, asks him questions and interrogates his claim about this philosophy of science view.
Here, William holds Simon to a higher standard before he believes his claim and thus allows it entry
into his community.
The basic idea here is that if a community’s members act in accordance with the norms of
distribution and acquisition, then this community increases the likelihood that information will enter
the community and spread through the community. Put differently, these norms promote that false
information is kept out of a community and that information, once in a community, reliably makes its
way to the members that lack it.
1.4: Systematic Norm Violation
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If a community reliably violates the norms of information acquisition and distribution, then
the community will not reliably acquire or distribute information. And, if a community’s members
systematically act in accordance with the norm of acquisition when they should act in accordance with
the norm of distribution, then this community’s information flow will be unreliable.
Suppose that a philosophy department qua community is largely composed of metaphysicians
and that the remainder of the department is composed of political philosophers. And, suppose that
the metaphysicians tend not to believe the political philosophers.

But, suppose these political

philosophers tend to make true testimonial claims. Here, the metaphysicians violate the norm of
information distribution because they should believe the political philosophers in virtue of their sayso at least partly because they belong to the same community. That is, these metaphysicians violate
the norm of information distribution because if the political philosophers are likely to pass on
information, then the metaphysicians should believe them. These metaphysicians impede the flow of
information that has entered the community.
Now, suppose that these metaphysicians tend not to believe the political philosophers because
they hold a prejudice against them that political philosophers deal with imprecise and unclear things
such as justice, rights and freedom. Thus, the prejudice goes, political philosophers are similarly
imprecise and unclear about most things. As a result of this prejudice, metaphysicians tend to hold
political philosophers to higher standards than other community members.

Here, these

metaphysicians are acting in accordance with the norm of information acquisition when they listen to
political-philosopher speakers because of their anti-political-philosopher prejudice even though they
should act in accordance with the norm of distribution when listening to political philosopher
speakers. To put the point differently, these metaphysicians act in accordance with the wrong norm
because of their prejudice. And, this mal-accordance results in the community’s information flow
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suffering because speakers with information are less likely to successfully pass it on to hearers who
lack it.

1.5: Evaluative Criteria
A community’s information flow can be assessed in terms of distribution. If information flows
to all of a community’s members, then this community’s information flows well in terms of
distribution. But, if this community’s information does not get to members who need it, then this
community’s information flows poorly in terms of distribution. Alvin Goldman points out that one
community’s information distribution needs can differ from others (Goldman, 1999). A judge as a
member of a legal community needs information about whether evidence is prejudicial that members
of a jury do not need and should not have (Goldman, 1999). A legal community does well in terms
of distribution when its judge gets this information from, say, prosecution and defense attorneys, but
juries do not.
Distribution speed is a second way that information flow can be assessed. If information gets
to a community’s members quickly, then this community’s information flows well in terms of
distribution speed.

But, if a community’s information flows slowly, then this community’s

information flows poorly in terms of distribution speed. In the philosophy department-community
case, information that the political philosophers have may take longer to reach the entire community
because the metaphysicians tend not to believe them and thus this community would likely score
poorly in terms of distribution speed because of this anti-political-philosopher prejudice. Here, the
metaphysicians improperly act as an information distribution bottleneck.
Information quality is a third way that information flow can be assessed (Greco 2016; Greco
2017). If false information does not flow to a community’s members, then this community’s
information flow does well in terms of information quality. But, if false information flows to a
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community’s members, then this community’s information flows poorly in terms of information
quality.
II
In this section, I argue that if racial prejudice is widely held in a community, then a subset of
a community’s members will systematically violate norms that govern a community’s reliable
information flow.
2.1: Racial Prejudice and Information Distribution Norm
Racial prejudice can affect whether a speaker successfully passes information on to a hearer
through testimony in several ways. One way is testimonial injustice. A speaker suffers testimonial
injustice if a hearer misperceives her as less credible because of an identity prejudice (Fricker, 2007).
Identity prejudices include negative generalizations or stereotypes about an identity group’s members.
Racial prejudices are a kind of negative-identity prejudice. Here, a non-dominant speaker does not
pass on information because of racial prejudice’s effect on her audience’s credibility judgement or
perception of her.
A second way that racial prejudice can affect whether a speaker successfully passes on
information to a hearer is through testimonial quieting. Testimonial quieting obtains if a hearer takes,
say, a black woman speaker as not in the business of giving knowledge or as not a knower because of
a controlling image, racial prejudice or identity prejudice about black woman (Dotson, 2011). Here,
information is not passed on because of a controlling image, identity prejudice or racial prejudice’s
effect on whether a hearer takes a non-dominant speaker as a knower and thus capable of passing on
knowledge.
A third way is utterance misinterpretation (Peet, 2017). Utterance misinterpretation obtains if
a hearer misinterprets a speaker’s utterance because of an identity or racial prejudice.

Here,
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information that a speaker has is not passed on because the hearer misinterprets and thus ends up
with different information than what the non-dominant speaker intended to pass on.
These phenomena represent ways a community’s hearers can violate the norm of information
distribution. Suppose that Marisol is a member of the Afro-Latina non-dominant group and that she
attempts to assert true information i to Alistair, Ben and Chad. If (a) Alistair commits testimonial
injustice, Ben commits testimonial quieting and Chad commits utterance misinterpretation, then (b)
this information i is less likely to be maximally distributed in the community than if these hearers did not
instantiate these phenomena. This information i is also less likely to be distributed quickly. So, here,
racial prejudice impedes this information’s proper distribution because racial prejudice affects hearers’
proper reception of speakers with information.
2.2: Racial Prejudice and the Information Acquisition Norm
If racial prejudice obtains in a community, then this community’s hearers will tend to act in
accordance with the norm of information acquisition even though they should act in accordance with
the norm of distribution. Testimonial smothering is an example of this.
Testimonial smothering obtains only if a speaker refrains from fully conveying information
because she senses that (1) conveying testimony is unsafe, (2) her audience demonstrates that they are
unlikely to find this information intelligible and (3) the audience cannot find the information
intelligible because of pernicious ignorance or racial prejudice (Dotson, 2011).
Suppose that Marisol and Alistair are members of the same community, but Marisol is a nondominant group member and Alistair is an Anglo-Saxon Protestant man, and thus a member of the
dominant group. Suppose that Alistair asks Marisol what she is writing her dissertation on and she
replies that she is writing about police brutality against black and Latinx folks. Alistair responds by
asking in a skeptical tone, “How does police brutality against black and Latinx folks differ from police
brutality in general?” Here, Marisol elects not to respond or explain her dissertation further because
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the three conditions of testimonial smothering obtain. In particular, Alistair has made it clear that he
is unlikely to find this information intelligible because of racial prejudice. Here, Alistair has taken an
interrogative or questioning stance because of racial prejudice he bears and thus he is acting in
accordance with the norm of information acquisition even though he should act accordance with the
norm of distribution. He should act in accordance with the norm of distribution because (i) Marisol
is part of his community, (ii) she has information and (iii) if he believes her because of her say-so he
will more likely pass this information on.
III
Suppose that Marisol has information about the difficulties that Afro-Latinas face when
applying for financial-analyst jobs that they are eminently qualified for. In this section, my task is to
argue that information of this kind is much less likely to reliably flow to the rest of the community
because of racial injustice’s effect on whether subjects act in accordance with norms of information
distribution and acquisition. The basic idea here is that information that non-dominant group
members are more likely to have is less likely to reach community members who lack it because a
community’s subjects tend to violate the information-distribution-and-acquisition norms. And, if a
community’s subjects tend to violate these norms, then information they have is less likely to reliably
flow through the community because these norms promote reliable information flow.

3.1: Non-Dominant Group Information
The information that Marisol has about the difficulties that Afro-Latinas face when applying
for financial-analyst jobs is information that Afro-Latinas are more likely to have given their social
location. This is information that she is more likely to have because of her social location qua identity.
Here, I assume a minimal version of standpoint theory. Standpoint theory involves the view that a
subject’s social location can be a location from which they are more likely to generate hypotheses and
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questions that lead to information in the domain of identity indexed injustice (Harding, 1993, 2015).
A similar formulation of standpoint theory is that it involves that subjects who occupy certain social
locations or identities more reliably answer questions in the domain of say, racial or gender injustice,
than others (Alcoff, 1999).
3.2: Standpoint Information and Information Flow
If (a) Afro-Latinas qua non-dominant group subjects are more likely to have information about
particular difficulties in the job market and (b) Afro-Latinas are less likely to successfully convey this
information through testimony to other dominant group members because dominant-group subjects
tend not to comply with information-distribution-and-acquisition in testimonial exchanges with nondominant groups, then (c) this information is less likely to flow to those who lack it because
compliance with these information norms promotes the flow of information in a community.
The basic idea here is that racial prejudice not only reduces the likelihood that non-dominant
racial groups can successfully transmit information in general, but it also reduces the likelihood that
they will transmit particular information that they are more likely to have than other groups. And the
rest of the wider community will tend to lack this particular information more than other information.
This view of information trades on the notion that there are two kinds of information. The
first kind is information that Afro-Latinas qua non-dominant group are just as likely to have as other
identity groups. The second kind of information is information that Afro-Latinas qua non-dominant
group are more likely to have than other groups. This is information that a group has in virtue of
their social location. Now, these two information kinds differ not only in terms of the likelihood that
a subject will have it, where this likelihood depends on a subject’s identity but these two information
kinds also differ in terms of their likelihood to flow through a community reliably to those who lack
it.
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This information is less likely to flow to those who lack it partly because dominant group
subjects are likely to violate the information-distribution-and-acquisition norms due to racial
prejudice’s influence on them. But, this information is also less likely to flow to those who lack it
because dominant-group subjects are likely to reject this information. They are likely to reject this
information because standpoint information tends to be inconsistent with dominant-group subjects’
positive self-conception. And, this positive self-conception is in part constituted by false core beliefs
that are supported by misleading evidence and subjects’ tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance
(Bendana & Mandelbaum, ms; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Mandelbaum, 2014, 2018; Thibodeau &
Aronson, 1992).
3.3: Standpoint Information and Dominant-Subject Positive Self-Conception
If racial injustice obtains in a society, then not only will racial prejudice widely obtain but
dominant group subjects will also tend to hold false core beliefs that (i) are consistent with their
positive self-conception, (ii) supported by misleading evidence and (iii) stubbornly resistant to revision
due to subjects’ general tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance.
Recall that Marisol told Chad, a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant man, about the particular
difficulties that she, as an Afro-Latina faced in getting a financial-analyst job despite being eminently
qualified. Suppose that Chad ultimately rejects this information because it is inconsistent with a core
belief that partly constitutes his positive self-conception, namely “I deserve what I have.” This
information is inconsistent with this false core belief because if he acknowledges that Marisol is
unsuccessful in the job market because of unfair disadvantage due to race, then he would have to
acknowledge that he has succeeded on the job market because of unfair advantage due to race. And
unfair advantage due to race is inconsistent with his false core belief that “I deserve what I have.”
This is an example of what Charles Mills calls white ignorance because Chad’s membership in the
dominant racial group plays a role in preventing Marisol from conveying information and thus
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sustaining his ignorance (Mills, 2007, 34). Someone is in whitely ignorant if he whiteness, racism or
racial injustice plays a role in in their lacking a true belief or holding a false belief (Mills, 2007).
Beliefs regarding whether subjects are “good people, smart people, and reliable, consistent,
strong people” are examples of core beliefs, because they concern positive characteristics of the
subjects who hold them (Bendana & Mandelbaum, ms; Mandelbaum 2014, 2018). That is, core beliefs’
content concerns the positive features of those who hold them.
Suppose that Chad, like other dominant group members, holds his false core belief in part
because his society is replete with misleading evidence. Elementary and grade school curricula,
museums, monuments, statuary, newspapers and national anthems sung at sporting events are
examples of what partly constitute Chad’s misleading evidence base (Gonzalez & Torres, 2011; Mills,
2007). That is, these evidence base’s constituents support Chad’s belief that “he” qua Anglo-Saxon
Protestant man “deserves what he has.”
This evidence base misleads in part because hermeneutical marginalization obtains in his
society. Hermeneutical marginalization involves that a non-dominant group unequally contributes to
a society’s shared set of concepts and shared social meanings that subjects draw upon to understand
each other and the world (Fricker, 2007, 153). For example, African-Americans and Native Americans
have had unequal access to positions in society like journalist, professor and lawyer positions, such
that they can equally, or proportionately, contribute to the shared set of meanings and concepts that
US subjects use to both communicate and understand each other and the world.
Suppose that Chad rejects Marisol’s standpoint information partly because of a general
tendency subjects have to avoid believing what feels bad (Bendana & Mandelbaum, ms; Elliott &
Devine, 1994; Mandelbaum, 2014, 2018; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). That is, suppose that subjects’
general propensity to avoid cognitive dissonance explains why he does not believe Marisol’s testimony.
When Chad hears Marisol’s testimony he can resolve the discomfort he feels upon receipt of this
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evidence by either (a) accepting the new evidence and as a result accepting the information that “I
don’t deserve what I have” or (b) rejecting the testimony and as a result retaining his false core belief
that “I deserve what I have.” But, if subjects typically believe in ways that allow them to retain their
core beliefs partly because jettisoning the false core belief would result in feeling bad, then Chad is
likely to reject this information that conflicts with his false core belief. As a result, Chad violates the
norm of information distribution because he does not believe a community member in virtue of her
say-so. And a further result is that information about racial injustice is less likely to flow through the
community.
Conclusion
I have argued that racial injustice not only affects the doxastic standing of subjects such that
they are properly evaluated as justified or knowing information, but rather that it affects information
of a specific kind, namely information about racial injustice. I have argued that the combined collateral
effect of epistemic injustices and white ignorance is that information of this kind is less likely to flow
through communities where racial injustice obtains. I have focused on the epistemic upshots for
information of this kind as a unit analysis rather than subjects’ doxastic features because whether
information of a certain kind flows through a community is a feature of a community rather than
believers compose it.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have offered an explanation of how racial injustice causes ignorance where
ignorance refers to bad epistemic states and outcomes. Each chapter of this dissertation took up a
different way that racial injustice causes ignorance.
In the first chapter, I explained how racial injustice affects non-dominant speakers’ capacity
to engender understanding in their audiences. I argued that racial injustice, through racial prejudice
or identity prejudice, precludes, say, black women from using epistemically more effective
expression styles without epistemic penalty. In that chapter, I contrast black women’s preclusion
from certain expression styles with white men’s lack of similar lack of preclusion. I argue that this
dissimilarity in preclusion is due to racial injustice.
In the second chapter, I argue that racial injustice can affect whether a subject is doxastically
justified in inferences that are based on the lack of a report from a reliable source such as a
newspaper. I argue that racial injustice undermines both whether news sources reliably apprise
readers of information regarding race and racial and subjects’ sensitivity to whether their sources are
reliably apprising of information regarding race and racial injustice. An upshot of this argument is
that racial injustice affects society in a way such that dominant members will often lack knowledge
of racial injustice and justification in their beliefs regarding racial injustice.
In the third chapter, I explain how so many white subjects can know information about
racial injustice while simultaneously holding false beliefs that are inconsistent with this knowledge.
For example, according to a 2016 Gallup poll, 69% of whites believe that white and black people
have equal opportunity in the US job market even though this belief is false. Yet, 31% of whites do
not hold this false belief. In this chapter, I argue that an explanation of why at least some of these
whites get it right is that they have understanding of racial injustice in the US rather than mere
knowledge of racial injustice.
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In chapter four, I argue that racial injustice can affect how well information flows in a
community where part of what composes information flow is speakers conveying information to
hearers through speech. I argue that racial injustice, through racial prejudice, negatively affects
whether hearers reliably treat trustworthy speakers as trustworthy and untrustworthy speakers as
untrustworthy. An upshot of this argument is that information about racial injustice is less likely to
flow to the parts of the community that lack it because non-dominant racial group speakers who are
more likely to have this information are less likely taken by hearers as trustworthy.
In chapter five, I argue that white supremacy and capitalism together make hip hop a less
effective hermeneutical resource for black and Latinx than it was prior to their influence on hip hop.
In this chapter, I take up hip hop as a hermeneutical or interpretative resource that differs from
concepts and argue that if hip hop is properly conceived of as a hermeneutical resource, then
hermeneutical injustice as a phenomenon may obtain more widely than is currently portrayed in the
literature.
These chapters are interventions into the epistemology, philosophy of race, political
philosophy and even aesthetics literatures. This dissertation intervenes into the epistemology
literature because it shows that considerations of race and more generally power relations can affect
phenomenon such as knowledge and justification. But, this dissertation is an epistemological
intervention because it takes up why people systematically get things wrong when it comes to
questions of race and racial injustice. Currently, there is very little by way of philosophical work that
attempts to offer explanations of why racial injustice as a feature of society causes such bad
epistemic outcomes. And there is a lack of philosophical work that attempts to consider whether
race and racial injustice are conditions that can bear on whether someone is properly evaluated as
knowing or justly believing something. This dissertation attempts to alleviate this lack of
philosophical work.

128

This dissertation intervenes in philosophy of race literature because it takes up and contains
descriptions of race’s epistemic effects. A large literature exists on the metaphysics of race which
concerns what race is. This dissertation takes up the causal epistemic effects of race on both
dominant and non-dominant racial groups. So, this dissertation can be understood as taking up
some of the causal effects of whatever race is, namely the epistemic effects.
This dissertation intervenes in the political philosophy literature because it shows how
injustice and inegalitarian distributions of wealth and other social goods can have epistemic effects.
That is, political philosophers often take up how democracies require its constituent members to be
good epistemic states themselves such as knowledge or in a good societal epistemic state such as an
ideal speech situation. But, this approach acknowledges that some political good such as democracy
depends on an epistemic good antecedently obtaining. This dissertation reverses the order of this
relation because an upshot of this dissertation is that good epistemic states such as knowledge can
depend on good political states of affairs such as justice or democracy. This dissertation implies this
because I show that bad political states of affairs such as racial injustice cause bad epistemic states in
society’s members and society itself.
This dissertation even intervenes, even if briefly, in the aesthetics literature because this
dissertation takes up the aesthetic qualities of rap music qua kind of hip hop. I argue that rap music
can serve as interpretative or hermeneutical resource where this resource’s quality differs from
concepts and ideas. And I argue that the aesthetic qualities of rap music can be more or less
hermeneutically effective depending on to what degree capitalism and white supremacy affect it.
But, this dissertation’s contribution does not end with philosophical literatures because
understanding why racial ignorance is so pervasive and persistent can have import for political
policies and activism. The political movement and group Black Lives Matter seeks to raise
consciousness about racial injustice and in particular police brutality against black people. The
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explanation of why white ignorance obtains in this dissertation could serve as a basis for effective
consciousness raising campaigns by groups such a Black Lives Matter.
This dissertation also can contribute to education policy regarding racial ignorance. If the
arguments in chapter 3 are plausible, then education policy in the US, and other settler colonial
societies with histories of entrenched and deep racial injustice, should reorient their curricula to
instill deep understanding of racial injustice. They should do so because, by my lights, if deeper
understanding of racial injustice is instilled from a younger age, then adults will more likely avoid
holding false beliefs such as that blacks and whites have equal opportunity in the US job market.
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